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This study is concerned with the history of Islam in 
post -independent Malaysia, particularly the subject of 
the reawakening of Islamic consciousness among the 
Muslims in the decades (: ) f the 70s and 80S. 
Accordingly, particular attention has been devoted to 
the role of three major dal-wah (Islamic missionary) 
movements, namely, An,,:,,, ka_tan 9elia Islam Malaysia (ABIM 
or the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia), Darul Arqam 
and Tamalat Tabligh which have the support 
especially of young educated Muslims in the country. 
Responses to these movements, which have come from 
various quarters within the Malaysian milieu, are also 
discussed. In this context, the process of Islam- 
isation and its impact upon Malaysian society are 
considered and so is the problem of Islamic 
heterodoxy, -which has in a wiay hampered the smooth 
development of Islamic da-wah. Further, -some 
consideration is given to the problem of ethnic 
rivalry among the Malaysians of diverse religious 
backgrounds and this problem is assessed in the light 
of the current Islamic revival. Also the imp-act of 
Islam upon Malaya' s/Malaysia' s foreign policy is I bri ef 1y eval uat ed. 
Yt he As a background to this study, we consider brie-Fl 
nature and development of Islam in the pre-colonial 
Malay States, the changes related to Islam during the 
colonial period and the position of Islam in post- 
independent Malaya/Malaysia until the late 6 0s. 
Simultaneously, the relationship between Islam and the 
rise of Malay nation, -: -: ýlism and 
the role of political 
parties are- also discussed. Without !:; uch discu, -=ýsions, 
it will be hard for us to appreciate the developments 
of the 70s and 80s. 
I< 
A Note on Transliteration: 
In the absence of a standard form for the spelling 
of various Ar; -=-ibic/ Islamic terms in the vast 
literature 
dealing with Malaya/Malaysia, the researcher has de- 
ci ded, for the sake of convenience, to adopt the 
following rules: 
1. Arabic/'IS-lamic terms- 
In this C, ---A s e-, a modi fi ed vers'i on (D f the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam' 3 system of trans-)1iteraticn as 
used by the Department of Islamic and Middle E, ---istern 
St udi es, University of Edinburgh is -=-ýdopted, except 
that words ending, in tW marbQtah ics spelt with 'h', 
for example: 
Shari 1,:: 
-ih and not 
Shari '-a. 
2. Malay words: 
As for Malay words, modern spelling is used. 
However, as spelling is not standardised, the 
researchet- has quoted spellingý-: 3 as found in sources 
used. As a resulf, there are some inconsistencies. In 
general, Arabic words have been quoted in an Arabic 
transliteration rather than the Malay version, e., -, cept 
when the word occurs in a purely local conte-,, t. For 
example: 
da '-Wah. rather than dakwah. 
21, ulari DalcT,, jF--ih and not Bulan Da6wah. 
In another case, shu' bah (Ar. department) is : -, -pelt 
as syukbah in M-:: tl. ay contexts, while q, ýi! jf (religious 
judge) is given as kathi or kadi =_ýs these forms occur 
at different times in the various documents. 
1) 
. -rs. Names of Local Muslims and Othý 
Names of local Muslims and other local perso- 
nalities ;; --tre spel t according to local 1-1 sageS. For 
exampl e: 
Abdul Rahman and not 'Abd ai-Rahmýýn. 
Names of rion-Malaysian Muslims: 
Names of such persons are spelt with the proper 
diacritical marks as often used in academic works. For 
ex amp l e: 
XL- 
lamc'ýil al-Din al-AfFhc7an! and not 
Jamaluddin al-Afghani. 
5. Honorary and Hereditary Titles: 
Malaysians arý-- generally fond of honorary -3nd 
hereditary titles, which bring great respect abilit y to 
the persons who carry them, even more so t t h. e 
present time as they also provide some political and 
economic connotations. Such titles are: 
Tengku (prince or princess in Kelantan). 
Tunku (prince or princess in Kedah). 
D at o' (, _=ancient title of Malaccan crigin, but 
now in use for state peer--) 
Dato' Sri, Tan Sri (titles created after 
independence in 1957). 
Datuk (Federal awarded honorary title). 
Tun (a Malaccan title, now revived as the 
hi, (. zhest title for a commoner in 
Malaysia), 
List of Abbrevi'at ions- 
The following is a list of abbreviations used in the 
thesis: 
ABIM Anskatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Muslim 
Youth Movement of Malaysia) 
AFMSA Australian Federation of Muslim Students 
Associations 
ALIRAN Alit-an Kesedaran Nezara <National 
Consciousnes- Society) 
ASAS 50 Angkatan Sasterawan 50 (GTen er at ion 50 
Writers) 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asli, ým Nations 
BARI SAN Barisan Nasional (National Front) 
(BN) 
BERTASA Barisan j, -ýýma I-ah Islam Se M, --zd,: -: tysi, a (Pan- 
Malaysian Muslim Front) 
BERTAYA Bersatu Rakyat J- el a ta Sabah (Peoples' 
Union of Sabah> 
BINA AnSkat-an Nahdatul. Islam Bersatu (Un it ed 
Islamic Renaissance Front) 
BMF Bank Bumiputra Finance 
CAP Consumers' Association of Penang 
ý, i ýý -, 
CCCS Chinese Consultative Councils 
DAP Democrat -, (: Action Party 
DBP Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Language and 
Literary Agency) 
D :7B Dasar Ekonomi Baru (New Economic Policy) E 
FELDA Federal Land Development Authority 
Federation of th ea St ud en t s' Islamic 
Societies of United Kingdom and 'Eire. k- 
UAPENA INasi onal Gabun,. 7an Persatuan Pen ul is 
Malaysia (Uri i on of National Writers 
Associations of Malaysia) 
GAPIM Gabungan Penulis Islam Malaysia (Union of 
Muslim Writers of Malaysia) 
HAMI M Hi 7bul Muslimin (Party of Muslims) 
HELWA Hal Ehwal Wani ta ABIM (AB I M' s Women 
Affairs Bureau) 
Islamic Education, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation 
IIFSO International Islamic Federation of 
Student Organisations 
IRC Islamic Representative Council 
I 'S A Internal Security Act 
X ! '*' 
I SEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
JKKK Tawatankuasa Kemaj u an dan Kesel-amatan 
Kampung (Village Development and Security 
Committee) 
1/211 Koperasi Delia Islam (Musl im yout h 
Cooperative) 
KIMMA Kongres India Muslim Malaysia (Malaysian 
Indian Muslim Congre-ss> 
KMM Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Young Malay Union) 
KRIS Kesatuan 'Rakyat In donesi a Se-menanjung 
(Union of Peninsular Indonesians) 
LUTH Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (Haii Fund 
and Management Board) 
MAGERAN maj 11 S Ger3kan NeSara (National 
Operations Council) 
MARA majlis Amanah. Rak-y-3t (Peoples' Trust 
Council) 
MATA Mailis Agama Tertinggi Sa Malaya (Highest 
Religious Council of Malaya) 
MCA Malayan Chinese Association (Pre-Sept. 
1963) Malaysian Chinese Associat i0n 
(after Sept. 1963) 
Mc P Malayan Communist Pýarty 
mic Malayan Indian Congress (Pre-Sept. 1963)/ 
Malaysian Indian Congress (after Sept. 
1963) 
MNP Malay Nationalist Party 
MP A JA Malayan People's Anti-Tapanese Army 
MSA Muslim Students' Association of America 
NASMA Parti Nasional Malaysia (National Party 
of Malaysia) 
NOC National Operations Council 
OSA Official Secrets Act 
P AP People's Action Party 
PAS Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Islamic Party of 
Malaysia) 
p B. CS Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah Union Party) 
PERKIM Pertubuhan Kebajikan Is la M Malaysia 
(Muslim Welfare Organisation, of Malaysia) 
PKPIM Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar Is- 
lam Malaysia (National Union of Muslim 
Students of Malaysia) 
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation 
PMIP P-3rti Islam Sa Tanah Melayu (Pan-Malayan 
Islamic Party, an old name of PAS) 
PPP Peoples' Progressive P, 5rty 
PSRM Part ai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia 
(Socialist Peoples' Party of Malaysia) 
RISEAP Regional Islamic Counci 1 of Southeast 
Asia and Pacific 
A. W. SallCýl Allltýfthu I-alayhi wa-sallam f 
SDP Social Democratic Party 
SI TC Sultan Idris Training College 
TABUNG, HAJI Lembaga dari Urusan Tabung Haji (Hajj Fund 
and Management Board) 
TAKAFUL Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad 
UDP United Democratic Party 
UIA Universiti Islam Antarc: kbangsa- (Internat- 
ional Islamic University) 
UKm Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National 
University of Malaysia) 
UMN(--) United Malays National Organisation 
UMNO (Baru) New UMNO 
UNHC R United Nations High 
Refusees 
Commission for 
USN (D United Sabah National Organisation 
X-, ' i 
WAMY World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
Y. A. B. Yang Amat, Berhormat (The Most Honour, =-ible, 
a phrase which is used as an address to. a 
respectable political leader of the 
ruling party) 
YADIM Yayasan Dakwah Islarniah Malaysia (Islamic 
Dakwah Foundation of Malaysia) 
YPEIM YaVaSan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam 
V 
Malaysia (Islamic Economic Development 
Foundation of Malaysia>. 
1 
INTRODUCTION. 
1: 7 world has undergone a iince the 1970s, the Islamic 
great change. The phenomenon of Islamic consciousness, 
which has affected every aspect of Muslim life, has 
aroused great interest throughout the worid, as is 
evident from the scores of studies currently available 
on the market. From all of this interest, there have 
1-1 emerged such cliches as the Islamic resurgence', 
I militant Islam' , 'dagger of Islam' and the 
'Like, 
sensational phrases which suggest that anxiety, fear 
and suspicion still persist among some Western 
observers towards Islam in the contemporary world. I 
However, upon a close scrutiny one will find that the 
present situation vis-A-vis Islam is not predominantly 
of such a dreadful nature as some may have depicted 
it, and indeed that there are various dimensions of 
Islamic consciousness operating at present within the 
Muslim milieu. 
At the same time, there is nothing absolutely new 
in this develo pment. Among the Muslims, there is a 
belief that a revival will be triggered each time 
Islam faces a decline. 2 This is based on the hadith, 
which states: 3 
" Allah will raise f or this urnmah at the 
beginning of each century such people as 
2 
those who will renew (yujaddidu) its faith 
for it". 
Narrated by AbQ Hurairah in Sun, 7in AbQ D, ýRwQd, 
(Malghim, l). 
In terms of history, there have been earlier 
revivals associated with such personalities as Ibn 
Taymiyy, -_ah, Muýammad b. '-Abd al-Wahhcýb, Sayyid Mulýammad 
b. '-Ali al-SanQsi, Muýammad Aýmad al-Mahdi, Sh<ýjh Wall 
Allýa-h Dihlawi, , Uthmc; in Dan Fodic, Mutiammad 'Abduh and 
so on. 4- In the Nusantara (Malay World), including 
Malaysia, there were also instances of Islamic revi- 
vals as manifested in the career of Imam Bonjol of the 
Padri Movement and Islamic intellectuals like Shaikh 
Daud Patani, Shaikh Tahir Talaluddin and Syed Shaikh 
al-Hadi. 5 Besides reacting to local conditions, these 
revivals were inspired by the more illustrious 
muýýlil-. iCin (reformers) and mujaddidýjn (renewers of 
faith) of the Middle East and Indian Sub-Continent. 
Similarly, the contemporary rise of Islamic conscious- 
ness in Malaysia, as we shall see, has been and is 
still shaped by local conditions as well as by 
external influences from the Middle East and beyond. 
3 
w 
a. The Subj ec- t of t hi s St udy: 
This study is concerned primarily with the history 
of Islam in post -independent Malaysia, particularly 
the subject of the rise of Islamic consciousness among 
the Muslims in the decades of the 70s and 80s. 
Accordingly, particular attention has been wiven to %.. J 
the role of three major dar-wah (Islamic missionary) 
movements, namely, Angkatan Belie Islam Malaysia (ABIM 
or the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia), Darul Ar! ýam 
and Tama-at Tablizh which have the support espe- 
cially of' young educated Muslims in the country. 
Simultaneously, responses to these movements, which 
have come from various quarters within the Malays4an 
milieu, are discussed. In this context, the process of 
Islamisation and its impact upon Malaysian society are 
considered. From yet another aspect, the problem of 
Islamic heterodoxy, a reemergence of one of the past 
trends, is discussed vis-ýt-vis the complications that 
it has caused to the progress of da6wah activities in 
Malaysia. 
To complete the st udy, we also devote some 
attention to the problem of ethnic rivalry among 
Malaysians of diverse religious backgrounds and assess 
this problem in the light of the current Islamic 
revival. In addition, the impact of Islam upon 
4 
Malaya' s/Malaysial s foreign policy is briefly eva- 
1 uat ed. 
As a background to the study, we consider briefly 
the nature and development of Islam in the pre- 
colonial Malay States, the changes related to Islam 
during the colonial period and the position of Islam 
in post-independent Malaya/Malaysia until the late 
6 O's. At the same time, we look at the relationship 
between Islam and the rise of Malay nationalism and 
the role of political parties. Without such 
discussions, it will be hard for us to appreciate the 
developments of the 70s and 80s. 
b. The Ob. lectives of this Stg. ý. 
177 jo far little has been written about the history 
of Islam in Malavsia and even less on the contemporary 
situation. Perhaps this ia so because of the 
sluggishness of events, including those affecting 
Islam, which have taken place in the country until the 
70s, when compared t0 the situation in the ever 
volatile Middle East. Most of the few available works 
by such scholars as W. R. Rof f, C. S. Kessler, S. Q. 
Fatimi, M. B. Hooker, Fred von der Mehden, N. J. 
Funston, Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas and so forth, 
deal only with specific topics like- the coming of 
5 
Islam, the nature and importance of Islamic mysticism 
among the Malays, the Kaum Tua/Kaum Muda dichotomy, 
Islam and the rise of Malay Nationalism, Islam and 
adat traditional Islamic education (pondok and 
madrasah), the growth of Islamic administrative and 
legal institutions as well as Islam, development and 
politics. 
At this juncture, it will be of ýreat benefit for 
us to look briefly at some of the works referred to in 
this study. Concerning Islam and the Malays in the 
early Malay States, one would find that Richard 
Wi nst edt 's book, T he Malays: A Cultural Hi st orýL 
(revised in 1981 by Tham Seonv- Chee. ) is still a ý. J
valuable source. However, this should be supplemented 
by the views cogently argued by Prof. Eyed Muhammad 
Naguib al-Attes in his famous work, Islam dalam 
Se. Jar-ah dan Kebudavaan Melayu (1972), which has not 
only provided us with more insight into the role of 
Islam in Malay historical thought, language and 
literature, but also contains a list of some of the 
valuable local Islamic works 6 and chronic'les written 
by the Nusantara scholars and court scribes and works 
by Europeans. With regard to the subject of Islamic 
mysticism and the Malays, there is nothing as yet that 
can replace Naguib al-Attas's seminal work, Some 
Aspects of _, ufism as 
Understood and Practised Among 
6 
t 1-1 e Mal a y-- (1963). As f or the nature of Malay 
feudalism, thf--- Malay Annals (a translation of Se-Jarah 
Melayu by C. C. Brown), remains the best reference. As 
a supplement to this classic, one can also refý--r to A. 
C. Milner' s article, Islam and Malay Kingship' in 
Tournal of the Royal Asiatic SociefLy, (1981) and T. M. 
G, ul IickIS, Indigenous Political j Systems of Western 
Malaya, (reprinted 1965). 
Meanwhile, there are some good ex-positions of the 
relationship between Islam and Malay adat (Ar. . 
'ý§dah). 
Among these are included Two Forces in Ma 1aY 
Society' Intisari, vol. I, Pt. 3, (1963) and Malay 
Customary Law/Family', Intisari, Vol. II, Pt. 2t 
(1963) by H. J. Mohd. Din b. Ali; Ahmad b. Mohd. 
Ibrahim, 'Islam, Customary Law/Malaysia', Intisari, 
vol. II, Pt. 2, (1963); Othman Ishak, Hubun!; ýan Ant-ara 
Undang-undang Islam den, ýzan Undamý-undanZ Adat, (1979) 
and M. B. Hooker, Islamic Law in South-East Asia, 
Chap. 3, (1984). Regarding the development of Islamic 
institutions, legal or otherwise, during the colonial 
era, the best account thus far is provided by Moshe 
Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British 
Malaya: Policies and Implementation, (1979), while 
extensive materials concerning Islamic education in 
Malaya/Malaysia can be acquired in such works as, 
Badriyah Hj. Salleh, Kampun!; c Haji Salleh dan Madrasah 
7 
-W 
Saadiah-Salihiah-, 1914 - 1959, (1984); Sabri Haii 
Said, Madrasah al-Ulum al-Syar' iah Perak: 1937 - 1977 
t (1983); ' Haji Saleh Masri: Pengasas al-Masriyyaht 
Bukit Mertajaml-, 'Madrasah Masyhur al-Islamiyyah, 
Pulau Pinang'; 'Madrasah al-Haji Taib, Kampung Parit 
Tamil, Muarl ;' Al-Madrasah al-Alwiyyah al-Madiniyyah, 
Arau, Perlis' and others in Islam di Malaysia 
(Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, n. d. ) and 'Ke Arah 
Pembaikan dan Pengembangan Sistem Pondok di Malaysia - 
Suatu Penyesuaian dengan Perkembangan Pendidikan Kini' 
in Jurnal. Pendidikan Islam, (ABIM Bil. 2, Oktober, 
1984) 
On the role of political parties vis-,; =: i-vis Islam, 
one can refer to such works as Safie- b. Ibrahim, The 
Islamic Party of Malaysia: Tts Formative Stages and 
Ideology <1981) and John Funston, Malay Politics in 
Malaysia: 
-A 
Study of UMNQ and PAS, (1980), while Halim 
Mahmood, Asri Dalam Dilema (1983) gives a good account 
of the PAS' s crisis in 1977 - 78, although it is 
written in a somewhat Journalistic style. W. R. Roff's 
work, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (1967), still 
remains the best on the issues of the rise of Malay 
Nationalism and its relation to Islam as well as the 
Kaum, Tua/Kaum Muda dichotomy. 
8 
L at e -. L y, some scholars, for example, Judith Nagata, 
Chandra Muzaffar, Muhammad Abu Bakar and Fred R. von 
der Mehden, have written on the subject of Islamic 
revival (or some prefer to call it resurgence) in 
contemporary Malaysia. However, their works in the 
form of books or articles, are not comprehensive in 
that they cover only the period of the 70s and mid- 
80s and in some cases suffer from defects in spelling 
and translation of Malay and Islamic terms and even 
contain some factual errors. For instance, Nagata 
renders seni silat cekak as seni silat cekah7, 
kepercayaan (belief) as nercayaan8, i-ahiliyah 
(ignorance) as unbelievers (Ar. kFafirGn)9 and tamr: fn 
(leadership training) as only leadership (Ar. 
qiyýýdah)10. Besides this, she states that Nasrul Haq, 
a local silat (Malay art of self-defense) cum mystical 
order of dubious origin, had enjoyed the patronage of 
the late Tun Abdul Razak in 1978, whereas the Prime 
Minister was already dead in early 1976.11 
As for Muzaffar, notwithstanding his seriousness 
in making a study of the Islamic resurgence in 
Malaysia and producing some good observations 
concerning it, his work is, however, flawed by the 
fact that he is too concerned with the physical 
aspects of t-he matter as if there is nothing spiritual 
in this life. For example, he perceived the growth of 
9 
Islamic consciousness among the Malays as being mainly 
a manifestation and reassertion of Malay ethnic 
identity, supported by such other causes as 
modernisation, urbanisation, the capitalist approach 
to development and so forth. 12 This makes his study 
more politically motivated than anything else. In 
considering the phenomenon, whether in Malaysia or C) 
elsewhere, one just cannot surely dismiss, however 
irrational it might seem, that some individuals after 
having indulged themselves in secular kind of life 
simply and uncompromisingly adopted a pious approach 
to life on account of being exposed to Islam as al- 
DTn. From here it follows that that these born-again 
Muslims have found their own 'spirit-ual bliss' within 
Islam after having undergone some process of 'soul- 
searching' and hence they are not interested in 
safeguarding their own ethnic interests based on a 
Bumiputra/non-Bumiputra or Malav/ncn-Malý 
dichotomy. i3 What they simply desire is to be truly 
Muslims and in this respect they view Islam as the 
only passport to salvation. This is a possibility 
which should not be ruled out. Besides th4 S, Muzaffar 
makes no mention at all of the problem of Islamic 
heterodoxy, which has to a certain degree affected the 
progress of dal-wah and also created more apprehension 
towards Islam within the Malaysian milieu. In another 
cý3se, he unwittingly translated ' Darul' as ' :: ountryl 
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or Iland'14, whereas anyone who is familiar with 
ArEabic langi--iage will recognise that it is simply the 
proper noun 'Dar' which means a house' ,I home' , 
' abode' I land' or I country' , while al' which means 
' the' being a definite article as in the case of Dgr 
al-Arqam (the House of Arqam). 
Hence, this st udy tries t0 gi ve a more 
comprehensive picture of Islam in Malaysia and correct 
the discrepancies concerned. With regard t0 the 
former, it will discuss Islam in its various forms 
ranging from the popular religion of the rural areas, 
the pondok. tradition, the SOIff groups, Islam of the 
Establis-hment, the revivalists or reformists currently 
stSsociated with the da(-wah phenomenon and so on. 
Furt her, some detailed discussions concerning inter- 
party rivalry between PAS (Parti Islam Se Malay sia or 
Islamic Party of Malaysia) and UMNO (United Malays 
National (-. -)rganisation), within UMNO itself and between 
these parties and others, the Islamisation 
programme and its impact, and the problem of Islamic 
heterodoxy will be made. Simultaneously, the subject 
is given a historical treatment, combined with some 
analysis based on sociological and Islamic 
standpoints. In this context, historical events are 
followed in -sequence and attempts are made to relate 
the past to the present, while the behavioural pattern 
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of people within certain groups or communities, 
religious or otherwise, is analysed and commented 
upon, and matters of Islamic: importance are discussed 
and explained. In addition, the process of change, 
tension and continuity which seems to be working 
within the fabric of the Malaysian society is 
considered. As part of the conclusion, this study 
attempts to explore some of the possibilities that may 
come about in Malaysia as a result of the present 
development vis-A-vis Islam and to suggest a few 
general solutions for the preservation of goodwill and 
stability within the country. 
c. Scope of the Study. 
This study concentrates mainly on Islam in West 
Malaysia or Peninsular Malaysia (previously the 
Federation of Malaya) as most of the changes taking 
place, that is, the dal-wah phenomenon, the 
Islamisation of institutions, work ethics and so 
forth, are more visible on the peninsular than in East 
Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). Besides t hi S, the 
situation in West Malaysia alone provides us with more 
than enouSh materials to work on. Nonetheless, the 
situation in East Malaysia is referred to in a more 
general way whenever it becomes necessary for us to do 
12 
so. In terms of period, this study extends -up to late 
1987. 
d. Sources. 
In the preparation of this thesis, the researcher 
has utilised primary and secondary source-s, which are 
available in Bahasa Malaysia/Bahasa Indonesia (the 
Malaysian language/Indone-sian language-) and English. 
The Malaysian sources referred to are mostly written 
in Romanised script, with a few in Jawi (that is a 
Malay script borrowed originally from Arabic). These 
sources can be broadly classified into historical, 
religious (Islamic and Comparative Religions), 
sociological and anthropological studies as well as 
books and articles on Islamic literature. Some of 
these have already been studied by other scholars, but 
there are others which have never been used or made 
available outside Malaysia. 
The primary sources consulted can be divided into 
four categories. The first category is made up of 
organs of political parties and various Islamic 
organisations or groups, memoirs, official reports, 
pamphlets and written speeches (published or 
unpublished). In the second category, we have the 
cassettes, which are specifically concerned with Darul 
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Arqam and the issues of Imam Mahdi and Tariqat 
Muhammadiy ah. Thirdly, we have the newspapers. Lastly, 
we include within this category of sources a number of 
interviews conducted in Malaysia. 
The secondary sources consulted are in the form of 
books, journals, magazines, theses and working 
papers. Some of these materials cited in the thesis 
were- collected by the researcher over the past few 
years, while others were acquired recently in 
Edinburgh, London and Malaysia. Furthermore, fresh 
information was obtained and interviews were conducted 
by the researcher during his short field trip to 
Malaysia in mid-1986. For details concerning the 
sources, see the bibliography provided at the back of 
this thesis. 
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Islam and the Malaygý. - 
The Pre-Independent Era. 
It is a little over five and a half centuries 
since the Malays adopted Islam as their religion. 
The whole process had evolved out of the general 
developmen t in the Nusantara region. Today, the Malay 
culture is still associated with Islam, both in its 
urban and rural setting. However, this is not to say 
that the Malays have not been affected by other 
traditions of the past like the ancient animism, 
Hinduism and Buddhism Or for that matter modern 
western values. Nonetheless, whatever might be the 
degree of his religiosity ,a Malay still declares 
himself a Muslim and refuses to accept anything other 
than that. This response towards Islam still continues 
and as we shall see has in itself undergone a number 
of phases of development before once again blooming 
into what is now known as the revival of Islam. 
While the Malays have been Muslims for quite a 
long time, scholars have not been able to agree 
regarding the exact date when Islam was introduced 
into the Malay States. Likewise, they still differ 
regarding the manner in which it was first introduced 
into the peninsula and from where it came, that is' 
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via India, China or directly from Arabia. 2 However, 
most of them agree that it was from Malacca, the great 
trading emporium, founded by Parameswara, a Palembang 
prince, that Islam spread to the rest of the Malay 
Peninsula, most parts of the Nusantara, and even to 
Patani, now a part of Thailand. 3 Further, it is 
generally accepted that the conversion began from the 
top, that is, that the conversion of the ruler to the 
new faith led to the acceptance of Islam by the rest 
of the population. 4- Conversion had come about rather 
easily as Islam was introduced among the Malays 
through peaceful means, tha't is, by way of trade, 
persuasion, marriage and even good examples set by the 
early Muslim du', ýýt (missionaries). r> Moreover, the 
Malays by tradition being unquestioningly loyal to 
their ruler were easer to follow the example set by 
their master. Beyond that the early missionaries were 
careful enough not to make great changes, except to 
lay more stress on personal imcýýn (faith) and the basic 
tenets of Islam. 
a. Salient Features of Malay Islam. 
From the outset, conversion had occurred rather 
gradually through the da4wah efforts of Muslim traders 
and ý5Gff teachers., ' These teachers were, in fact, 
mystics rather than theologians. As a result, the 
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Islarn that was established among the Malays- had never 
really been rigidly orthodoX. 7 In fact, elements of 
Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and practices and also animism 
still survived within the fabric of Malay society. For 
instance, the beliefs in semangat padi, that is, that 
the padi has a semangat (soul) and that the earth's 
spirits are responsible for a bad harvest, and that 
the Renun--Zu <guardian spirits) may cause all sorts of 
human ill-luck- and sufferings, are all Survivals of 
the ancient animism. 8 Similarly, the practice of 
charms and black magic among some members of the Malay 
community indicates a remnant of an 3nimistic 
tendency. 9 In addition, a large portion of the subject 
matter in the classical Malay Literature like the 
Ramayana and the Mahabharata epics are relic-: Z. of the 
early Hindu period-10 Nonetheless, recent developments 
have shown that there is an increased awareness among 
a sizeable number of the Malay populace of the non- 
Islamic character of these traditions. This is without 
doubt related to the present revival which is sweeping 
across the Muslim world, and as a result efforts are 
being made to eradicate local superstitions and 
whatever relics still exist of the Hindu past. 
The Malays have always been Sunni and have adhered 
t0 the Sh c7a fi Madhhab, except in the state of 
Perlis. However, this does not mean that Islam has 
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been accepted in toto by the Malays-P that is, so that 
it is fully implemented in every sphere of life or 
practised strictly according to the Sunnah 
(traditions) of the Prophet and the Ahl al-Salaf (The 
Early Three Generations of Muslims). On the contrary, 
the Sharicah has been evidently observed mainly in the 
realm of Muslim Personal Law, that is, in matters 
pertaining to marriage, divorce and funeral services, 
together with the rites and rituals of prayer, the 
hajj the fast of Ramaq9n, the collection of zakc; 'at and 
the cel,, ý--brati(Dn of the religious festivals. 
Apparently, h I-I d CI d (punishments for crimes 1 ike 
drunkenness, fornication and apostasy) as mentioned in 
the Malay Leg-al Digests of the pre-colonial era, have 
been largely ignored or in certain (: ases modified. 12 
Further, even in areas where Islamic injunctions have 
been observed, Islam has been syncretized with the 
local adat 13 and Hindu-Suddhist practices, wh ich 
proved to be in direct conflict with the central 
doctrine of Tawhid. In socio-economic matters, 7ak-ýit 
which was imposed at the earliest during the reign of 
Sultan Muhaiyuddin Shah of Pahang (15921 - 1614 A. D. ), 
has been understood to be merely a religious tax on 
padi. 14 Above all, feudalism with its usual 
forms of 
oppression and not the Islamic concept of Justice (al- 
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I-adl) and social equality, governed the relationships 
within society. IS 
(b) Impacts of Islam upon the Malays. 
The coming of Islam has brought about very little 
change in the Malays' notion of kingship and 
keralaan (government). 16 For instance, the Malayo- 
Musl im polity, as in the pre-Islamic era, centred on 
the Raja 17 (King), who was the owner of all the land 
in his territory and al-so the possessor of all laws, 
with his rar-Tyah (subjects) as his !, oatek. (slaves). 18 
Again, within this system, the kerajaan is associated 
with Rala. Hence, it was the Rala who became the 
primary object of loyalty and not the Malay race or 
the Islamic ummah (community). 19 
As mentioned ear1 ie-_ r, t he divergences from 
orthodoxy originated from the fact that the early 
Muslim du r- Cý7a t were most 1y mystics rather than 
theologians. Besides this, the theologian, if such a 
person happened to be present, found that it was more 
of a priority for him to focus on the basic principles 
of Is1 -=Am, 
that i S, 6Ilm al-Tawhfd as a means to 
extirpate the influence of Hinduism-Buddhism and 
animism. It is probable too that these early preachers 
found that it was safer for them not to tread upon the 
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sensit ivit ies of the Malay aristocrats by talking 
about issues which were in contradiction to their 
world-view, g 
.., 
iven the fact that feudalism was then at 
its height. 
Nevertheless, the coming of Islam brought about 
some changes in Malay cultural life. For example, 
Bahasa Mel!, ýýLýýu (Malay Language), which is the basis of 
the present Bahasa Malaysia began to be used more 
widely, that is, not only as a language of trade but 
also in religion and literature, after the 
introduction of Islam into the Nusantara. 211 This whole 
process started with the adoption of the Arabic' 
alphabet and script as a medium of writing in the 
Malay Language. 21 Also, as a result of the influence 
of' Islam, the Malay Language developed further and was 
enriched through the borrowing of a large number of 
Arabic and Persian words. Hence, the Malay Language 
acquired the status of a literary and religious 
language and became the medium of religious preaching 
and the lingua franca., taking over the previously 
important role of the Javanese language in the whole 
region. 22 
With the adoption of the Arabic script, Muslim 
writers began to write on various branches of Islamic 
studies such as Islamic Law, tafsfr (exege-sis of the 
i 
Qur' an), hadith, theology, philosophy, suf ism and so 
forth. 23 In addition, Arabo-Persian works, including 
epics and romantic literature and shar-ir_ (Ar. shi '-r) 
were written or translated into the Malay Language, 
thus enriching the various genres of classical Malay 
Literature. 24 At the same time, some efforts were also 
made to Islamise Hindu literary works, for example, by 
omitting Hindu terms, and names and discarding Hindu 
concepts and religious ideas; in their places Islamic 
alternatives were given. 25 
All these developments had taken place under the 
patronage of the two great Malay Muslim empires, that 
is, Acheh (1511 - 1650), now a part of the Indonesian 
Republic, and Tohore-Riau (1650 - 180()). 26 After the 
fall of Malacca, thzýse two empires, one after the 
other, became the main centre for the spread of Islam 
to the Malay Archipelago. 27 In this connection, ea ch 
in its turn became also the disseminating point of 
Malay culture. However, while the process of Islamisa- 
tion was continuing slowly throughout the region, the 
Malays found themselves face to face with the 
increasing threat of Western imperialism as 
represented both by the British and the Dutch. Of the 
two rival powers, it was the British who soon gained 
the upper hand and were destined to rule over the 
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Malay States until the middle part of the present 
century. 
In terms of diet, once the Malays embraced Islam 
they categorically abandoned the consumption of pig's 
flesh and other kinds of food and drink which are 
considered hargm in Islam. 28 As for attire, it has 
become somewhat common for the religiouý-=, -minded 
Malays, especially the -1, t, 
1-ulamd' and the bi_0173 to wear 
the serban (turbans) and ketayao. (skull-cap) and at 
times to appear in the Jubbah like t hei r co- 
religionists in the Middle East. However, the Muslim 
rules of purdah were ignored, in that Malay women did 
not wear the veil and they might appear in the 
presence of men other than their husbands and 
kinsfolk. 29 Nevertheless, they did not participate in 
the entertainment of their husband's guests nor were 
they allowed to travel without the escort of a kinsman 
or a trusted friend. 30 
Thus far, we have seen that the influence of Islam 
upon the Malays in general in the early Malay States 
was not very profound. Rather the Islam that they 
professed was somewhat limited in scope, strongly 
inclined towards sufism and tainted by local adat, 
which combined within itself both the experiences of 
animism and the Hindu-Buddhist legacies of thý- past. 
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Nonetheless, t hi s st at e of af f; =-ii rs slawl y began t, o 
change, coinciding with the development of the modern 
syst am of government introduced by the British 
following their intervention. 
c. Islam in British Malýjýva- 
On the eve of British intervention, the greater 
part of the Malay States were in a state of anarchy. 
There was constant warfare between the sultans, and 
civil war between chiefs and riv(-ýýtl claimants to a 
throne had also become almost a frequent affair. The 
old system of government that was inherited from the 
Malacca Sultanate had broken down, As the authority of 
the sultans had dec-aved, there was nothing to check .1 
the feuds of the petty rulers. 31 Beginning from 1866, 
a civil war had broken out in Selangor. 32 In the midst 
of this, the rival Chinese miners in the state soon 
Joined up with the Malay warring factions on the ý_a 
opposite sides. 33 From 1870- - 1873, these alliances 
waged a fierce war against each other, bringing 
destruction to KI-1a Ia Lumpur and the surrounding 
ark=aS. 34 Another great trouble spot of the period was 
Perak. A succession dispute had broken out in the 
state in 1871. 3,5 By 1872, a full-scale war was again 
In progress in the district of Larut between two rival 
Chinese secret societies, the G-7hee Hin and the Hai 
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San. 36 Soon, each of these societies became the 
supporters of Malay rival groups, and the situation 
became extremely tense. Besides this, piracy was still 
a menace along the western coast of the MaiaY 
C'tateS. 37 All these incidents brought complaints from -j 
the merchant community of the Straits Settlement 338, 
as it had lost much of its investment. However, it W---'S 
othe-r developments which were to influence the British 
into reversins their policy of non-intervention in the 
Malay States. 
At this Juncture, both the Straits merchants and 
the Colonial Office feared foreisn intervention in the 
Malay States, which in turn would mean the loss of a 
market and a source for investment as well as the tin 
resources. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, 
European interest in the East had i ncreased. 39 
Competition came not only from the Dutch and the 
French, but also from newcomers like the Germans. 
Simultaneously, by 18603s, there was an increased 
demand for tin in the West. This was reflected in the 
export f igures of Malayan tinf rom Singapore t0 
Britain and North Amerrica. 40 Fearing that they would 
lose to other Europeans, the British authorities 
embarked upon a policy of direct intervention in the 




British intervention in the Malay States had come 
rather gradually and its impact upon these states 
varied in intensity. It began in 1786, when by a 
treaty Penang. Island was acquired from the Sultan of 
Kedah. In the same manner, the island of Singapore was 
taken over in 1819, to be followed shortly by Malacca. 
However, direct and widespread intervention in the 
affairs of the Malay States occurred only after 1874. 
, ning of the 
Treaty of Pangkor in 1874, With the sig 
Perak came under British rule. Following this, by 
other similar treaties, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and 
Pahang were brought. under British control. It was not 
unt 11 after the turn of the Twentieth Century that 
Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and J-ohore accepted 
British rule. 41 Despite the differential impact of 
British rule on various Malay States, in the long run 
the consequences, will be seen, were much the same. 
d. British Administration, Islam and Adat: 
Initially, once the. British protection system was 
established in each of these states, the rule was that 
the Sultan or the Chief, as in the case of Sungai 
Ujong, one of the principalities that later made up 
Negri Sembilan, had to accept a British Resident 
Owhose advice then must be asked and acted upon on all 
questions other than those touching Malay religion and 
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CUStOM'. 42 This meant that the British Resident would 
administer the affairs of the Malay States which had 
accepted British protection, except in matters 
pertaining to Islam and Malay adat which were to be 
left in the care of the Sultan or the Chief, as the 
case might be. But in practice, British of f icials did 
intervene in both of these spheres. For example, in 
Perak and , or 
Selang the Resident and his officers put 
forward ca ndidates for appointments as kathis (qadls) 
and made recommendations for the administration of 
Muslim personal law. 43 Further, during the Residents' 
Conference in 1905, the Resident of Negri Sembilan did 
discuss the position of the kathis. It was dec-ided 
that the form of kuasa (power), that is, the letter of 
nomination, description of authority, and commission, 
in use in Perak for kathis and naib-kathis should be 
adopted in Negri Sembilan as well. 4" All laws, those 
dealing with matters of religion not excepted, were 
drafted by British personnel and passage 11 , thr(DUg' State 
Counci ls, which were later created, was little more 
than a formality. 45 In the Federated Malay States, the 
British also intervened directlV in the work of the 
committees, whose functions included nominating of 
kathis and religious teachers, considering points of 
Islamic law and practice or appeals f r- om lower 
religiou-s- courts, supe-rvi sing religious publications 
and dealing with religious legislation . 46 
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Howevý---r , wh i1 e- int er- vent 
ion did t ake place, 
British officials were tactful enough to continue 
showing public deference to Islam and adat in matters 
of ceremony and public holidays and in token financial 
support for the Islamic institutions which were later 
organised. Only in matters of personal beliefs, rites 
and rituals, and also social practices like marriage, 
festivals, divorce and funeral services, were the 
Malays left entirely on their own to cater for their 
own needs. This is not surprising at all, as such 
things, were unlikely to jeopa-rdise British political 
and economic interests in the Malay States. 
Several reasons could be given for the 
discrepancies seen between the practices of t he 
British --idministrators and what had been the avowed 
policy of the colonial Sovernment. Firstly, it was 
difficult to define Malay custom which in practice 
seemed to be interwoven with their relision. Hence, 
when British introduced administrative reforms, which 
touche-d upon all areas of human activity, they 
inevitably intruded into the spheres of Malay custom 
and religion. Secondly, being part of a cultural 
tradition which had been steeped in secularism, t 1-1 e, 
officials felt that it was absolutely right for them 
to intervene in Malay public life, which no (--'(: )ijbt 
involved political decision and 1, -=--ýw-making processes, 
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the religious not e: --cepted. On the other hand, there 
was no really org anised group of '-ulama' to challenge 
the British whenever they meddled in Islamic affairs 
and Malay custom. The Malay political 1ýlites were not 
really conversant with their religion and did not 
raise any objection to the reforms made as the British 
were careful not to allow the Christian missions to 
prosetylize among the Malays and to keep up the 
fiction that the rulers were still sovereigns in that 
they were the protectors of Malay religion and custom, 
and could keep their old titles and outward trappings 
of' power, In such a situation, more often than not 
British intervention in religious matters had almost 
complete Malay consent, and --. k t times actually 
responded to the wish and instance of the Malay 
Rulers. 47 
e. The Establishment of Tslamic Institutions: 
Before discussing the establishment of Islamic 
institutions in the Malay States, it will be necessary 
for us to look brief ly -at the general development of 
the British administrative system, After the 
residential system was established, British officials 
set about organizing the affairs of the Malay States 
concerned. 
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To establish law and order, small police forces 
were formed in each state. Courts were established and 
presided over by British magistrates. The system of 
taxation was organised. 48 To facilitate the transport 
of' tin and other produce to the ports, railway lines 
were laid down, thus helping to open up the country 
even further. Besides this, as revenue became 
available, roads were built, where they were most 
needed, to stimulate economic development. To 
streamline the administration and make expenditure and 
resources more manageable and evenly distributed among 
the states, Britain opted for a centralised form of 
administration. The Feder ated Malay States or rather 
the 'Protected Malay States', as thý--Y were 
known, were formed out of Selangor, Perak, Negri 
Sembilan and Pahang on Ist July, 1896, with Kuala 
Lumpur as its capital. Subsequently in 1909, the 
Siamese-controlled Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, 
Kelantan and Trengganu ac cepted British protection. 49 
It was also at this time that the f ixed boundary of 
the present West Malaysia was really established, 
However, the four northern states tozether with %-j 
Tohore, which accepted British rule in 1914, refused 
t (---) the existing federation for fear of losing j oi nI 
their 'independence. 50 Instead, each of them accepted 
a British Adviser whose function was purely to advise. 
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In practice, there was little difference between what 
went on in these states, and the situation in the 
Federated States. 
All in all, by the second decade of the Twentieth 
Century, the whole of Malaya came directly or 
indirectly under British control. 51. For 
administrative purposes, Britain had divided up Malaya 
into three administrative units. the Federated Malay 
St at es, Unfederated Malay States and t he Straits 
Settlements, 
Before the establishment of British rule i 1-1 
Mal, 
-=-Iva, 
Islam was not inst1tuti on a 11 zed as the 
national religion. No pub1ic rituals of a 
distinctively Islamic character were practised to 
legitimize the rule of the sultans. 52 Indeed Malay 
court ceremonies have been very much influenced by 
Hindu traditions. Further, although the Selarah Melayu 
(Malay Annals) did mention kathis in the time of 
Sultan Mansur of Malacca (14.56 - 77) and a kathi is 
referred to in the Kedah Laws which appear to date 
from 1700s, their functions as Islamic judges were not 
clear. 53 I rist ead, the Bendahara (a Sanskrit title 
often translated as "prime minister") was described as 
the "chief justice in all civil and criminal affairs" 
in 15th century Maj, =j(: C3.54 Then, in the detailed 
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descriptionS of late 19th century Pahang, written to 
brief the first British Resident of that state, there 
is no indication that legal questions were handled by 
a kathi. 55 Furthermore, no central Muslim institutions 
existed to act as focal points for religious 
activities or observances within any state. 56 Although 
Shari'-ah influenced legal codes and expressions of 
Malay adat in some states, these Islamic laws appear 
to have been largely ignored in administration and in 
the settlement of disputes. 57 
The colonial era witnessed greatly improved 
communications and consequently increased internal 
contacts within traditional society and greatly 
intensified exchanges with foreign cultures. At t he 
beginning, the most obvious changes in Malay society 
did not involve religion, but the cumulative effect of 
improved communications zradually brought about 
significant changes in Malay religious institutions, 
beliefs and practices. 
With regard to Islamic religious inst itut ions, 
some efforts were made to restructure them. For 
example, after 1884, various states began to create 
for the f irst time a centralized administrative 
structure and legal systems for Muslim, affairs. 58 The 
Islamic religious courts established in each state 
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enforced both Muslim and adat 1 aw. Within each 
district, a kathi. was appointed to administer Muslim 
affairs, to try cases within his Jurisdiction and to 
supervise the operation of the mosques in his 
district. 59 At the mukim level (a sub-district within 
the jurisdiction of a mosque) the kathi would be 
assisted by a naib-kathi. However, in the Unfederate-d 
Malay States, these courts were called Sharicah Courts 
and not the Kathi or Naib-Kathi CoUrtS. 60 Further, the 
court system in the Unfederated Malay States developed 
much more slowly and somewhat later when compared to 
the changes going on in the Federated States. 61 This 
was because British penetration into these states had 
occurred rather late. 
While Muslim affairs in the Malay States were 
legally the responsibility of t-he Ruler, over the 
years a confusing variety of committees and offices 
were created by various Rulers to assist them in or to 
relieve them of these duties. These included a MaAlis 
Airama (Council of Religion), a Sharfl-ah Committee (to 
interpret Muslim Law) and a Kathis, Committee. 62 In 
some states like Kelantan, Perak and Kedah, F3 
Department of Religious Affairs was established to 
administer religious matterS. 63 
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Constitutional and administrative changes wrought 
by the British reflected their urge to impose Western 
concepts of rule, that is, the introduction of written 
constitutions in Toh(: )rk-- and Trengganu, codification of 
the unwritten adat and the Sharl4ahj and modern 
legislation on religious matters. All this was done by 
the Europeans, though often on Malay initiative. 64 
Meanwhile, in the Straits Settlements, the Muslim 
communities (Arab, Malay and Indian Muslims) had their 
own kathis, recognised as such on grounds of piety, 
scholar-ship, or good works. On assuming control, the 
British authorities rec6, qnised this arrangement, 
though they did not appoint such 1-ulama'- to any 
official post. 6s It, was only in August 1880 that the 
appointment of kathis was undertaken by the 
Government, followinz a number of petitions made by IJ 
members of the Musl im C ommun ity of the 
Settlement S. 66 By the early years of the Twent it-at h 
Cent ury, mo re kathis were appointed on the 
recommendation of the Muslim community. However-, the 
role of the kathis in the Settlements was confined to 
the registration of' marriages and divorces; they did 
not enjoy wider powers, as their counterparts did in 
the Malay States. 67 
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f'. The-Impact of' British Rule on Islam: 
With the establishment of Muslim religious 
institutions, British rule had come to affect Islam in 
Malaya in various ways. First of all, the codification 
of civil and criminal law resulted in the 
strengthening of Muslim law at the expense of the adat 
more than ever before. 1,13 Despite the f act that both 
Shari I-ah or, as it was usually called, 'Mohammedan 
Law', and adat had been given a place in British 
Malaya, there were occasions when British statute law 
usurped the place of both of these laws, in matters of 
waqf., zak(ýRt, fitrah and bayt al-mal. 6 '1 In addition, 
there was a tendency toward af irmer State control of 
waQf. especially in Kelantan, and a move towards 
reducing the number of waqf, particularly personal and 
family ones, a process speeded consider-ably by new 
legislation and court decisions. 70 Apart f rom this, 
Muslim courts had few p -owe rs. and very narrow 
Jurisdiction. 71 In comparison with the administration 
of the other state programmes, Muslim administration 
was haphazard and lethargic. 72 This was because those 
who were charged with responsibility for the 
administration and leadership of religious affairs 
were either the traditional political elites of Malay 
society or the rural conservative religious elites who 
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were the products of the village pondok schools or the 
Malay vernacular primary schools. 
I Prior to British rule, education in the Malay States 
had not been widespread and formally organised. 
Generally, what had really happened was that the 
children were taught passages of the Qurl an by rote 
and also some basic tenets of Islam. 73 This was done 
by Muslim divines and hUJAýjj. 74 In any case, the 
coming. of the British heralded swift reforms in the 
school sys tem of the Malay States. As recruits were 
needed to man the Civil Service, the British found it 
necessary to educate the sons of Malay aristoc. tratS. 75 
In line with this, secular types of education were 
started in both mediums, English and Malay. 76 
Initially, this att(---mpt proved to be a failure, as 
Malays generally distrusted the new system of 
education which they believed would turn their 
.77 children into Christians In order to erase this 
suspicion, after some thought the British authorities 
took the step of stimulating and strengthening 
religious education. In this connection, Quranic 
education was added to the curriculum of Malay schools 
in Perak in 1891 and this gave the essential impetus 
78 E; I were also employed to its expansion. Village IulamL 
as tie-achers of the Qur'c; ýn, hence helping to neutralize 
fears of alien influences. By the beginning of the 
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Twentieth Century, religious afternoon classes were 
extended to cover schooling in L-j 
Perak, Selangor, Negri 
Sembilan and Pahang, though in many places, the 
mosques and surau 79 (prayer house) were still 
important centres of weekly religious teachings-80 
Those who wished to pursue their religious learning 
further might go to a sekolah pondok .81 (religious 
boarding school) in a northern state, or a centre 82 
in Sumatra (Indonesia) or even as far away as the 
Mi ddl e East. 13 3 
However, Quranic instruction did not remain as part 
of t he government Is school syst em f or 1 ong. 84 Inst ead, 
in the Malay schools more stress was put on the study 
of' the Malay language and the basic skills of' reading, 
writing and arithmetic together with gardening and 
handicraft. 13s Meanwhile-, in the English schools, which 
were opened for the scions of Malay Rajas and 
ari. stocrats, the students were provided with a 
curriculum which was similar to that of the schools in 
England. Besides this, in 1905, the Malay College, an 
'Eton-like' Malay Boarding School, was established for 
the selected sons of Rajas and aristocrats-86 It WaS 
also provided with a British Headmaster and teachers 
with English public school backgrounds. 87 In about 
1920, -: a small concession was made by the Board of 







to absorb the 
College into a 
V 
some of non-aristocratic origin, 
other English schools, to attend the 
ment classes organized for Malays who 
completed their Standard Seven 
Specifically, this scheme was planned 
cream of the graduates of the Malay 
governmental role. 
C)n the other hand, in 1922, the Sultan Idris Training 
college (S. I. T. C) was established at Kuala Xangsar, ý_. j 
Perak., for the purpose of training Malay teachers. 89 
The curriculum of this college was mainly concerned 
with normal 'secondary' education, and only marginally 
with prof essi onal' teacher training. In this 
connection, apart from academic training, the teacher 
trainee had to do practical work in the school's 
vegetable plots and to learn the skills of basket- 
making and other handicrafts-90 In addition, two hours 
per week throughout the three-year course were set 
aside for Tslamic religious instruction. 91 Teaching 
was done entirely in Malay, 92 Totally divorced from 
these two categories of Malay and English educated 
students were those who continued to pursue pandok 
education in the northern Malay States. Hence, as a 
result of these developments, we eventually come 
across Malays who have different world-views and 
aspirations in life. The English educated, who made up 
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the administrative elites, tended to be more secular 
and West ern-orient ed, whilst the Malay educated have 
generally identified themselves with the wider Malay 
world, especially Indonesia, and as a result of that 
influence may be inclined towards leftist politics 93 
or in some cases choose Islam if they have had a 
strong religious upbringing. But, generally it has 
been the pondok educated and later also the madrasah 
94 educated group who provide the bulk of the 
leadership- and indeed the followers of Islamic 
political part i(--3s. These three different groups, 
because of their respective orientation, have been 
locked in serious rivalry since the later part of the 
colonial period and continue to be so in independent 
Malaya/Malaysia. The situation is made more complex by 
the presence of the immigrant communities of Chinese 
and Indians, whose immigration had been encouraged by 
the British administration in order to ensure rapid 
economic development of the Malay States. 
In the Unfederated Malay States, educational 
development took much the same course as in the 
Federation, but with a more pronounced stress on the 
Qur' ýýin and rel igious instruction. Initially, the 
-supervision of religious schools in the Federated 
St at es was ent rust ed t, o Br iti sh of fic ers by t he wi sh 
of the sultans for the sake of greater efficiency, but 
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by the 1930s, special committeess for religious 
instruction were formed in all the four states. On the 
other hand, in the Unfederated States, the supervision 
was in the hands of senior '-ulamc; V, for (: --xample the 
Shaikh al-Islam in Kedah or in the case of Kelantan 
under the Mallis AEama. 95 At any rate, higher Muslim 
education was only started about two years before 
Malayan independence-, beginning with the establishment 
of the Muslim College (KoleJ Islam) in 1955.96 
Improved cornmunicat ions had also caused more and more 
people to perform the haj_j than ever before. This, in 
t urn, gave more vigour t0 Islamic sentiments in 
Malaya during the British period. 97 As opposed to the 
Dutch in Indonesia the British encouraged and faci- 
litated the hal-J. 98 As a result, the number of 
pilgrims to Mecca rose from year to year. Although 
contacts with Arabia were temporary and superficial, 
the hall did involve intensive indoctrination and 
brought the Malays into contact with Muslims from 
other parts of the world. This gave rise to an 
awareness among the hujjc; ýj that the Malays in general 
had all along been involved in non-Islamic practices 
and that these would have to be got rid of. Besides 
this, since the 19th century some men of Malay ethnic 
st oc k, mostly of Patani and Indonesian origin, had 
settled down and even taught at the MasJid al-Harc"3-m in 
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Mecca. 99 Those Malays who studied under them came back 
to Malaya, imbued with more purified ideas concerning -. 0 
Islam. Further, improved communications led to the 
incorporation of Arabs 100 and Indian Muslims (known 
locally as Jawi Peranakan) into elite positions in 
Malay society. 101 These people were respected by the 
locals on account of their attachment to orthodoxy in 
comparison to the indigenous Malay leaders. All these 
factors gradually brought about changes in the 
character of Muslim religious elites, thus creating 
tensions between the folk religion of the Malay 
kamponw, and the demands of orthodox Islam. 102 
On the other hand, because the Straits Settlements 
were not re-arded as "Malay States", but rather as 
Crown Colonies directly under British control, Islam 
was not recognised as the official religic)n in Penang, 
Malacca and Singapore. Accordingly, policies 
protecting Islam did not apply there. Inst ead, the 
Church of England was the established church and 
received a small annual grant in addition to donations 
of public 1-and for church buildings. 103 However, even 
in the Straits Settlements, British administrators 
discouraged (but did not prohihit) Christian missions 
from working among the Malays for fear of possible 
Malay reaction to s uc h efforts. Th i -3 policy of 
preserving and protecting Islam provided the Malays 
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Wi t 1-1 a psychol ogi cal assurance hat the countr,., 
continued to be theirs despite the influx of great 
numbers of Chinese and Indians, of course with British 
approval. 104 
Meanwhile, without official recognition, Islam in 
the Straits Settlements managed to develop in the 
urban centress through the efforts Of the A ra b C) 
community and the Jawi Peranakan, with the support of 
some scholars from Patani, Acheh, Palembang and Java - 
most of whom had previously studied in Mecca. 10s In 
the late 19th century, these people were mostly 
concentrated in Singapore, which was then already a 
noted commercial port and also a centre of Tslamic- 
1-ife and learning. The Arabs carried the honorific 
titles Of Sayyid 106 or Shaykh. 107 As a community, the 
Arabs had for centuries won the admiration of the 
Malays who respected its members for being pious and 
knowledgeable in Islam, in a(ldition to the fact that 
they were often. wealthy and related to the Prophet. 108 
In Singapore, the leading members of this community 
were active in charitable and social welfare work 
among Muslims. 109 They helped to endow hospitals, 
bui. 1t mosques, gave land for a burial ground and 
sponsored large public gathering!: -; on the occasion of 
Islamic festivities, which were attended by their co- 
religionists. I10 At the beginning of the Twentieth 
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Century, they together with the Tawi Peranakan had 
published a SrowinS body of religious and . secular 
publications which marked the start of a change in 
Malay society in the years to come. "' Th is 
development was to have an impact not only in the 
Straits Settlements, but throughout the Malay 
Archipelago. 
g. From Islamic Reformism to Malav Nation, --ýIism- 
The introduction of new religious ideas and the 
presence of some expatriate rel. igious '---ýlites created 
divisions between the society and the ! ýlites, as well 
as arrions the. ; ýlites themselves. After the turn of the 
century, there devý--Ioped a factional split between the IA 
Kaum Muda (Young Faction) and Kiium Tua (Old Faction), 
who were close to the Palace Circle. 112 The K, -: -kum 
Muda 
ýlites were influenced very much by the "Manýir Circle" 
and al-Azhar University in Cairo. 113 The leaders of 
this movement were urban-based Arabs, T-awi Peranakan 
or Indonesians, and were frequently the products of 
Arabic education in madrasah, schools or had obtained 
an Islamic education abroad, either in Egypt or 
Ind i a. 114 Initially, few of the Kaum Muda were of 
peninsular Malay origin. The most famous among them 
were lcjhaikh Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin al-A--hari (also 
al-Falaki) I's s S, =tyyid Shaikh b. Ahmad al-Hadi 116, 
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HJ. Abbas b. Mohd. Taha 117 and Shaikh Muhammad Salim 
al-Kalali. 11 8 Normally, they operated from Singapore 
and Penang. where they had no worries about Islamic 
religious censorship, which could be enforced against 
them in the Malay States. By the 1930s, the Kaum Muda 
movement had become highly politicized. It began to 
challenge the leadership of the traditional 'e'lites in 
Malay society. Among other things, it accused the 
traditional religious leader-ship of JumQd (stagnation) 
and instead called for iJtih9d and the need to return 
to the Qur6cýn and hadith. 11 9 It also rejected some of 
the adat and beliefs found among the Malays as being 
Pure bidcah. In addition, it discussed such ideas as 
nationalism and called for the improvement of Malays' 
social and economic condition. 120 Its ideas we-re 
vehemently propagated through the j nurnal s and 
newspapers like al-Imam Neracha al-Ikhwan Serijan 
Azhar and Saud, =_ira. 121 Besides this, the exponents of 
Kaum Muda established the madrasah schools for the 
dissemination of their ideas. 122 The islahi ideas of 
Kaum Muda had also found support from a prominent 
Kelantan 6alim, Hj. Wan Musa b. HJ. Abdul Samad (1874 
- 1939) of Kota Bharu. 123 However, through his early 
exposure to Sufism this man was more inclined towards 
the reformist ideas of Shiýýh Wali Allc; ýih Dihlawi. 124 
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In Malaya, outside of the coastal cities, the Kaum 
Muda made little headway as they were blocked by the 
alliance of Muslim traditionalists and Malay secular 
power. However, their influence spread into t he 
islands that later became Indonesia. Although the Kaum 
Muda movement never became a mass movement, it did 
help to generate nationalist and anti-colonialist 
sentiments based on pan-Islamic doctrines. 
As the appeal of the reformist group was weak, its 
place was taken by secular-oriented Malay nationalists 
once there was an upsurge of anti-British feeling 
following the end of the Second world War. 125 
Meanwhile, the eclipse of Kaum Muda influence from 
Malay politics did not mean that reformist ideas had 
become completely extinct. Instead, Kaum Mu da 
activists channeled their thought and energies int C) 
the fields of education, joi-ir-nalism and to a lesser 
extent into economic puuits. Th is was not 
accidental. Rather, it (developed out of the 
realisation on the part of their leaders that 
independence would not mean anything but self- 
destruction, and this in itself is contrary to 
/ 
Shar-T r-ah, unless all Bumiiputra 126 (in this context, 
Malay--, ) had acquired sufficient skills and education 
in all spheres and not only in religious knowledge. 
Besides this, they stressed the necessity of acquiring 
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enough wealth for the BumiRutra as a prerequisite to 
independence. The whole question may be easily 
understood, if we take into account what Shaikh Tahir 
Talaluddin himself had said-127 
of, .. independence requires a number of 
conditions and in my opinion it is not yet 
the time for us to rule on our own. If it is 
that what we require, then it is incumbent 
upon us, bumiputra, to acquire sufficient 
education in all spheres and not religious 
knowledge alone, but all knowledges and 
skills of the Europeans; I we] must If irSt 
acquire enough wealth for the bumiputra. When 
all this has been sufficiently --=icc-j-uired, then 
only [we] could hope for security and 
i ndependenc e. If not, this ambition could 
not be realised, Even if it is attained, it 
will bring about danger upon txF,, C and] this 
is not permitted by Syarak ". 
In line with this strate-gy, Kaum Muda activists 
set up more madrasahs. Shaikh Tahir Talaluddin himself 
had encouraged business activities in 41 -he area of 
Padang Ren-as, Perak, so that by the end of the 1930s ct 
there were almost 30 shops belonging to the Malays in 
t he 1.0 C, 'ality. 128 Further, through their journals and 
newspapers the reformist group continued to discuss 
rel igi ous matters and to talk of the social and 
economic problems faced by the Malays in the light of 
the newly established plural society in Malaya. By the 
end of the 1940s, the activists had provided shelter 
to Malay nationalists withJn the compounds, of their 
madras, ahs, especially in Perak. 129 However, it was 
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only after the Second World War 
the Xsulr'ý TAI-Ida ý-truggle was 
formation of Hizbul Muslimin 
Muslims), the forerunner of the 
Malaysia (PAS). 
that the real fruit of 
bor ri e. This was the 
(HAMIM or Party of 
present Parti Islam Se 
h. The Rise of Malav Nationalism. 
Prior to the Second World War, unity was not non- 
existent in Malaya. Rather, the loyalty of the Malays 
was -entrenched in the state where they come from or 
more accurately was identified with the individual 
sultan. This was because there was absolutely no 
administrative unity to bring about the people 
together in some form of closer association. 
Unlike Indonesian nationalism, Malay nationalism 
had developed rather late. The seeds of national 
consciousness which had been sown by the reformists 
had not fully bloomed until the late 1930S. 
Specifically, the early efforts of Malay nationalism 
only came to fruition on 6 August, 1939, that is, when 
the Conference of Pan-Malayan Malay Associations was 
held in Kuala Lumpur. 130 This was a step towards 
national unity. A third conference was planned, but it 
had to be cancelled when the Pacific War broke out. 
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At this stage, Malays were divided into t wo 
political groups. The first group, often identified as 
the Rightists, was the main sponsor of the above- 
mentioned conferences. As a group, it subscribed to 
the principle of 'Malaya for the Malays', and was led 
by the English-educated Malay aristocrats, usually 
associated with the Malay College. 131 On the other 
hand, the Leftists led by Ibrahim b-. Hj. Yaakob came 
under the influence of Indonesian nationalism and even 
Marxism. Members of this group were generally Malay- 
educated and often graduates of ' S. I. T. C. 132 
However, of the two groups, it was the latter that 
dominated the Malayan political scene till after the 
war. In 1937, this leftist group formed the Kesatuan, IV 
Melayu Muda (KMM or Young Malayan Union), with the 
object of attainit-Ig independence for Malaya and the 
incorporation of the peninsular into Indonesia Raya 
(Greater Indonesia). 133 Although the KMM was dominated 
by secular-oriented leftists, it also attracted 
Islamic-educated elements, especially at the grass- 
roots level. 134 Possibly this happened as these people 
were also inspired by Indonesian nationalism. 
Realising that the aims of the KMM threatened 
their position and interests, the British government 
arrested all its leaders in 1940. But soon, with the 
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sudden fall of Singapore, the British released them. 
During the Japanese occupation, the KMM leaders 
reorganised the party and as a tactical move 
collaborated with the Japanese authorities. But this 
'cooperation' failed to disguise their avowed 
intentions, and by June 1942, the Japanese banned the 
party. 135 Despite this, the leadership remained 
intact, and in the-ir own interest, -: --,, the 
two sides 
continued to 'cooperate' in spite of t he ban. 1 '3 6 At 
this time too, the KMM formed contacts with the 
Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and 
the Malayan People's Anti-Tapanese Army (MPATA). 
7ollowins the banning of KMM a new party, Parti 
Kebangsaan Melayu (or it was more popularly known, as 
the MNP, that is, Malay Nationalist Party) was formed 
by the leftist group, with the intention of winning 
full independence for Malaya. Towards the end of the 
wa r, the KMM group sponsored another organisation, 
Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia -Semenanjung (KRIS- or Union 
of Peninsular Indonesians) and tried to win an 
independence for Malaya through a union with 
Tndonesia. t37 But their efforts failed, as J-apan 
suddenly surrendered in August 1945.138 
Following their return, the British authorities 
kept a close wat ch over all lef t-wing political 
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part i es. Soon af ter 1948, when the Emergency 
Regulationss were proclaimed in the face of an 
increased Communist threat, all Malay left-wing 
parties were banned by the British Government, hence 
crippling all left-wing movements in the Malay 
Peninsular. 139 With this development, Malay 
nationalist leadership was consolidated in the hands 
of the more moderate elements who in UMNO determined 
to q.. Jain 
independence by more constitutional means. 
i. The Road to Independence: 
The Malay nationalism which developed after the 
war was one of internal self-defence, that is, in the 
face of a Chinese-dominated communist movement and the 
attempt of the British masters to create the Malayan 
Union 140, thus removing the Malays from their-special 
position and giving the Chinese community more 
power. 141 Further, this nationalism for the first time 
focussed its attention on Malaya itself and involved 
all classes of the Malay community, 142 
Amidst mounting threats, the old political elite 
under the leadership of a prominent Malay aristocrat, 
Dato Onn b. Ja6afar, created UMNO in May 1946. The 
main programme of UMNO then was to preserve Malaya 
for the Malays as expressed by the slogan ' Hidup 
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Mel ayu I (Long live the Malays). From the very 
beginning, the leadership of UMNO had fallen largely 
into the hands of the Malay aristocratic ClaSS. t43 
With the support of the Malays, UMNO was able to 
defeat the Malayan Union scheme. Following this, a 
long*negotiation ensued between the Malay Sultans and 
UMNO on the one hand and the British government on the 
ot her, r,: ýsulting in the establishment of the 
Federation of Malaya on Ist. February, 194-8,144 
Meanwhile, as a conservative and moder-ate party, 
UMNO. was opposed by the radical MNP whose programme- 
called for full independence and non-cdoperation with 
the British government. 1.4 5 In sum, the party' s aims 
remained very much the same as the defunct KMM and 
KRIS., The leadership of this party was dominated by 
the secular-oriented leftists, often with Malay 
education, English education Coming nex. t in 
importance. But initially, they were also some 
prominent religious-educated individuals like Dr. 
Burhanuddin al-Helmi "-6, Musa Ahmad and Baharuddin 
Tahir among the rank of its activists. 14 13 At this 
j unc t ur e, it was possible for the three different 
elements to work together on the basis of a common 
fight against colonialism, as the question of ideology 
was not viewed as something urgent and hence was not. 
st ressed. 148 
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With the encouragement of some MNP leaders, the 
first Islamic party, Hizbul Muslimin was formed on 14 
March, 1948.1 4- 9 It was the product of the I People' s 
Congress' I" held at an Islamic school, Malahad al- 
Ihya' ash-Sharif (usually called al-Ih: za' ash-Sharif) 
of Gunong Seman9gol, Perak. 151 Although to a certain 
degree, this new party was infliienced by Indonesian 
nationalism, for instance, adopting the 'red and 
white' of the Indonesian flag as its sYmbol, unlike 
other parties it was more committed to Islam. 152 Its V 
objectives were three-l"o-ld, that i S, to attain 
independence for the Malayan nation, to found an 
Islamic society and ultimately to establish the Dcý7ar al 
Isla-m (Islamic State) in Malaya. 153 Its leadership 
consisted of Ustaz Abu Bakar al-Baqir 154 as 
President, Engineer Hj. Ariffin of Johore as Deputy 
President, Uthman Hamzah '55 as President of the Youth 
Section and Mchd. Asri b. Hj. Muda '56 as the 
Secretary to the party' s Supreme Political Bureau cum 
Private Secretary to the President, 
Soon after its formation, the party won wider 
support, especially among the more religiously 
inclined Malay masses, who had hitherto been 
politically non-committal. 5" For UMNO, this was an 
increase in the strength of the anti-UMNO forces. In 
response, Dato Onn repeatedly warned about the "danger 
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from the xungng (mountain )" and cynicall'y th3t 
the party was "red", that is, communists. 
Meanwhile, since 1946, the MCP asserted that it 
did not recog., nise the unilateral talks between the 
British government and the sultans and the UMNO. 
Subsequently, it began to increase its militancy, 
hence endangering the peaceful political change 
achieved by the UMNO. To top it all, the MCP launched 
an uprising in -Tune 1948, as a means 
to wrest Malaya 
from the Colonial regime. 159 This aggravated the 
sit I-lat ion. As a result of Dato Onn Is cont inued 
campaign against the leftists and the ever present 
British fear of Malay radicalism, the leaders- of both 
MNP and HAMIM were arrested Linder the Emergency 
Regulations in 1u17 and August of 1948. Ill'I 
With the leftists and the ref or-mists otit of the 
Wa Y, UMNO was able to dominate the Malayan political 
scene. Under the liberal _: ind easy-groing 
Tunku Abdul 
Rahman 161 the UMNO worked to establish effective 
links with the older conservative leadership in the 
Chinese and Indian communities, who had formed the 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan 
(MIC 162 Indian Congress Prti Per ikat an (The 
Alliance Party), formed out of these three constituent 
9, -1 P S, 




Federation of Malaya. This federation consisted 
originally of Peninsular Malaya (including Penang and 
Malacca, hitherto parts of the Strait-- 1-7ettle-. ments), 
minus Chinese-dominated Singapore which was made a 
separate colony, enjoying a large measure of internal 
autonomy. 163 
By the early 50s, Britain began to introduce some 
measures of self -government into the federation, thus 
opening the way for eventual independence. Tn this 
connection, Britain was encouraged to Sr3nt such a 
system in view of the fact that UMNO was abla, to 
foster close cooperation with the leaders of the 
Chinese and Indian communities via MCA and MIC. In the 
fi rst elect i On of 1955, the Alliance W(D n an 
overwhelming majority. This was possible as comrnunal 
tensions and conf licts were eliminated through the 
cooperation established among the Alliance leaders. 
On 31st August, 1957, Maliaya Sained its merdeka 
(independence) under the premiership of Tunku Abdul 
Rahman. Meanwhile, the Islamic conservatives, who were 
dominant then, had opted for a pragmatic and 




I According to the Malaysian Constitution, a Malay is 
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Singapore: or (b) is the issue of such person. 
(Article 160 (2)). 
2 For theories on the coming of Islam to the Malay 
1ýt at es see S. Q. Fatimi, Islam Comes to Malaysia, 
Singapore- Malaya Publishing House Ltd., 1963; Syed 
Muhammad Na-guib al-Attas, Preliminary Statement on a 
General Theory of the Islamisatir-)n of the Malay- 
Indonesian Archipelago Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan 
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Introduction and E, xpansion of Islam in Malaysia', 
Silliman Journal vol. II, Pt. 4,1964, pp. 335 - 398. 
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Islam in Post-Independence Malaya-/Malaysia: 
1957 - late 1960s. 
Independence had come rather easily to Malaya. 
When the Malayan Delegation, composed of 
representatives of the Rulers and the Alliance 
Ministers, went to London in 1956 to negotiate with 
the British Government, there was almost no argument 
about the granting of independence 1, and the talks 
concentrated mainly on the type of constitution that 
the independent nation should have. This was resolved 
when the Alliance Party suggested that a Commonwealth 
Commission should be formed to draft the 
constitution. 2 Eventually, a Constitutional Commission 
known as the Reid Commission was duly approved, with 
Lord Reid as its chairman and other members being 
appointed, one each from the United Kingdom, 
Australia, India and Pakistan. 3 No one from Malaya, 
who presumably would know about local needs, was 
appointed as a member of this commission. Five 
specific matters were given to the Reid Commission as 
points of reference: there should be a strong central 
government with some autonomy for the states, 
secondly, the special position of the Rulers should be 
protected; thirdly, there should be a Common 
nationality; fourthly, a Head of State should be 
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appointed under this constitution and fifthly, the 
special privileges of the Malays and the legitimate 
4 interests of the non-Malays should be protected. 
Suggestions made for the formulation of the Malayan 
Constitution indicated that some intensive bargaining 
had been going on between the three parties 
representing the three major communities that made up 
the Alliance. In this respect, the provisions like the 
special functions of the Rulers, the choice of Islam 
as the State Religion and the decision that the Malay 
Language (Bahasa Melayu) should be made the only 
official language beginning from 1967, were all part 
of this bargaining. In March, 1957, the commission 
produced a draft constitution based on the memorandum 
submitted by the Alliance Party. 
The Malayan Constitution which came into force 
with the declaration of independence was a Federal 
Constitution. 5 In practice, the powers of the Central 
Government were considerable compared with those of 
the states. Secondly, the basic structure of 
government was to be Constitutional Monarchy, that is, 
there was to be a king who would rule through 
Parliament. 6 This King, the Yang Di Pertuan Aýzong (the 
Paramount Ruler) was to be chosen once every five 
years from among the Rulers of the Malay States. 7 
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As provided for by the Constitution, a bicameral 
parliament was set up. It consisted of a Dewan Rakyat 
(House of Representatives) all of whose members were 
to be elected for a period not exceeding five years 
and a Dewan Negara (Senate), whose 'members were partly 
nominated and enjoyed limited powers. 8 As in pre- 
independence days, the legislative and executive 
powers were divided between the Federal and State 
governments. At the federal level, the government was 
headed by a cabinet of ministers under a Prime 
Minister to be chosen from the majority party in the 
Dewan Rakyftt. 9 
Other important points of the Constitution 
concerned the special position of the Malays, 
citizenship and the national language. It was agreed 
that the special position of the Malays in respect of 
such matters as recruitment to the public service, 
award of government scholarships, Malay land 
reservations, and the grant of permits for certain 
types of business activity were to be safeguarded by 
the King. 10 But in the discharge of his duty, the King 
was to act on the advice of his cabinet (in which the 
non-Malay communities are always represented) and also 
to safeguard the legitimate interests of the non- 
Malays. On the language issue, it was agreed that 
Bahasa Melayu would be the national language, but for 
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the next ten years English would be a second official 
language, 
Concerning citizenship, the qualifications were 
further relaxed. Thus all children born in the 
federation after independence would be citizens by jus 
soli, but not retrospectively. 1.2 By this provision, 
the concept of Malayan nationality was developed and 
ref ined. 
When Malaysia was formed in September 1963, all 
these main provisions were retained in the new 
Constitution, However, the Malaysian Parliament, with 
the approval of two-thirds of its members, has made 
amendments whenever necessary in conformity with the 
political climate of the country. 
a. Islam and the-Malaysian Constitution: 
Under this subtitle, we shall examine the position 
of Islam vis-&-vis the Malaysian Constitution. In this 
connection, we shall look at some of the provisions in 
the Constitution and try to analyse their implication. 
Islam was first proclaimed as the religion of the 
Federation of Malaya in the Constitution of 1957 and 
this was again entrenched in Article 3 (D of the 
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Malaysian Constitution. 13 However, this practice is 
not a novelty in itself. Other Muslim countries like 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Tordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria have 
such a provision in their respective constitutions. 14 
Moreover, among the pre-independence Malay States, 
both Johore and Trengganu had proclaimed Islam to be 
the 'Religion of the State', while ensuring freedom of 
worship for other religions found within their 
boundari es. 15 
It was on the suggestion of the Alliance Party - 
that Islam was declared the religion of the 
federation. In its memorandum, the party stated-. 16 
' the religion of Malaysia shall be Islam. The 
observance of this principle shall not impose 
any disability on non-Musli. m , natives 
professing and practising their religions and 
shall not imply that the State is not a 
secular state' . 
However, at no time has the party asked that the 
Constitution should also declare, as did the Pakistan 
Constitution, that Malaysia be an Islamic State. 17 In 
fact, the issue of the Islamic State never received 
any serious consideration among the Malays of Malaysia 
during these early years, except that it was discussed 
just a few days before the declaration of independence 
by Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmi, the then President of 
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PAS, in the course of his talk 6t the party' s Seneral 
assembly. 18 
The provision to make Islam the religion of the 
Federation was at first opposed by the Malay Rulers on 
the advice given to them that if the Federation had an 
official religion, then logically the proposed Head of 
the Federation would become the Head of the official 
religion throughout the Federation and this would be 
in conflict with the position of each of the Rulers as 
Head of the official religion in his own state. 19 To 
overcome this fear, the Alliance Party explained that 
the intention of making Islam the official religion of 
the Federation was primarily for ceremonial purposes, 
that is, to enable prayers to be said in the Islamic 
way on official occasions such as the installation of 
the YanR Di Pertuan ARonjq Merdeka Day, and similar 
occasions; and that the position of the Rulers as Head 
of Islam in their own states would be respected. 20 As 
this explanation was accepted, the proposed clause was 
included in the Constitution, 
Although Islam was proclaimed the religion of the 
Federation, the Constitution guaranteed religious 
toleration as spelt out under the various articles 
embodied within it. For example, to Article 3 (1) of 
the Constitution was added 'that other religions may 
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be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the 
Federation'. 21 Besides this, Article 8 <2) states 
except as expressly authorised. by this Constitution, 
there shall be no discrimination against citizens on 
the ground only of religion... in any law or in the 
appointment to any office or employment under a public 
authority or in the administration of any law relating 
to the acquisition, holding or disposition of any 
property or the establishing or carrying on of any 
trade, business, profession, vocation or 
employment I. 22 
After Merdeka the Malay States Constitutions, 
which carried the provisions that only a Malay or a 
Muslim may be appointed Menteri Besar_ (Chief 
Minister), were amended to enable the Ruler to appoint 
a non-Muslim as Menteri Besar provided that, in the 
Ruler's Judgement, he is likely to command the 
confidence of the majority of the members of the State 
Legislative Assembly. 23 At the federal level, there is 
nothing in the Constitution which provides that the 
Prime Minister or any Minister or high official must 
be a MUSJ i M. 24 
Article 11 of the Federal Constitution provides 
that every person has the right to profess and 
practice his religion and subject to Clause (4) t C) 
75 
propagate it. 25 In this connection, Clause (4) 
provides that state law and in respect of the Federal 
Territory federal law may control or restrict the 
propagation of any religion, doctrine or belief among 
persons professing the Muslim religion. 2 6 There is, 
however, freedom to carry on missionary work among 
non-Muslims. Further, it is also provided that no 
person shall be compelled to pay any tax, the proceeds 
of which are specially allocated in whole or in part 
for the purposes of a religion other than his own. 
Every religious group has the right to manage its own 
affairs, to establish and maintain institutions for 
religious and charitable purposes and to acquire and 
own property and hold and administer it in accordance 
with the laW. 27 
In various states, laws have been passed to 
restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or 
belief other than the doctrine and belief of the 
Muslim religion to any persons professing Islam. In 
this connection, it becomes an offence to engage in 
missionary activities among MUSliMs. 28 State law also 
prohibits the teaching (except in one's own residence 
and in the presence only of members of one' s own 
household) of any doctrine of the Muslim religion 
without written permission-, and the teaching or 
expounding of any doctrine or the performance of a 
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ceremony or act relating to the Muslim religion in any 
manner contrary to Muslim law-29 
With regard t0 education, the Malaysian 
Constitution guarantees certain rights. For example, 
Article 12 (1) forbids discrimination against anyone 
based solely on religion in matter-s of administration 
of any educational institution maintained by a public 
authority, and in particular, the admission of pupils 
or students in any educational institution (whether or 
not maintained by a public authority and whether 
within or outside the Federation). 30 Meanwhile, 
Article 12 (2), which was amended in 1976, states that 
'it is lawful for the Federation and State governments 
to establish or maintain or assist in establishing or 
maintaining Islamic institutions or provide or assist 
in providing instruction in the religion of Islam and 
incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the 
purpose'. 31 
It may be noted that the powers under Clause (2) 
of Article 12 quoted above have been extended to the 
whole of the Federation, including Sabah and 
Sarawak. 32 
Even though Islam has been proclaimed the 
religion of the Federation, there is no Head of the 
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Muslim religion for the whole of the Federation. 33 The 
Yang Di Pertuan Agon-q is the Head of Islam only in his 
own state, in the states of Malacca and Penang, in the 
Federal Territory, Sabah and Sarawak and also for 
Singapore until its separation from Malaysia. 34 I-n 
other states, the position of the Sultcln or Raja as 
the Head of Islam remains intact. However, f or the 
sake of uniformity, the Federal Constitution provides 
that whatever religious acts or observances or 
ceremonies are agreed upon for the whole of the 
Federatlon by the Majlis Raja-Raja (Conference of 
Rulers) shall be declared by the Yang Di Pertuan Agong 
as - their representative. 35 This is provided for in 
Article 3 (2) of the Constitution concerning such 
matters as the starting of Ramaj9n, the celebration of 
r-ld il-Filr. and 41d il-Ajh9.36 In another example, the 
Mallis RaJa-Raja has empowered the Yang Di Pertuan 
Agong to issue tauliahs (letters of authority) to 
religious teachers for the Armed Forces after the 
individual teachers have been duly chosen separately 
by the Rulers of the States. 37 
Under the present constitutional structure, the 
Sult9n does have a great deal of influence on the 
appointments of religious officials, especially the 
Mufti, and in the direction of religious affairs in 
the State. 319 The Sultgns too are very jealous of their 
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position as heads of Islam, so much so that we find 
that through the influence of the respective Sult5ns, 
Kedah and Pahang have chosen to stay out of the 
National Council for Islamic Affairs. 39 Besides this, 
fatwas which are based on other than the doctrines of 
the Shafi4f Maddhab require the approval of the 
Sult7an. 40 Nonetheless, legislation can only be 
exercised by a Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly 
and assented to by the Sull9n, and to that extent the 
elected ministers and members of the Legislative 
Assembly can influence the administration of Muslim 
law in the States. 4 i As for the Yang Di Pertuan Agonýz 
in the exercise of his functions as the Head of Islam 
in the various states mentioned, he has to act on 
advice and thus the influence of the Prime Minister 
and the Cabinet are more significant. 42 
While undoubtedly Islam has been given favourable 
treatment in independent Malaysia, nevertheless, the 
Islamists, especially those within PAS and academics, 
have complained that it is subjected to certain 
constraints. For example, the Malaysian Constitution 
sees Shar! 6ah only as Muslim Personal and Family Laws 
to be implemented among Muslims within the 
jurisdiction of the States, except for the Federal 
Territory. 43 Within the scope of these laws are 
included the Muslim Law relating to succession, 
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testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, 
dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, 
, guardianship, gifts, partitions, and non-charitable 
trusts; Muslim wakfs and the definition and regulation 
of charitable and religious trusts, the appointment of 
trustees and the incorporation of persons in respect 
of Muslim religious and charitable endowments, 
institutions, trusts, charities and charitable 
institutions operati. ng wholly within the State; zak5t, 
fitrah and bayt al-mal or similar revenue; mosques or 
any Muslim public place of worship; the creation and 
punishment of offences by Muslims against the precepts 
of Islam, Muslim courts, the control and propagation 
of doctrines and beliefs among Muslims, the 
determination of matters of Muslim law and doctrine 
and of Malay CUStOM. 44 
From the above list, it can clearly be seen that 
the Jurisdiction Siven to the -State and to the 
Sharic, ah courts is limited. Even in matters included 
in the State List, there are many federal laws which 
limit the scope and application of State laws. For 
instance, in the field of succession, testate and 
intestate, account has to be taken of the Probate and 
Administration Act and the Small Estates 
(Distribution) Act with the result that the Kathis are 
only given the functions of certifying the shares to 
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be alloted to the beneficiaries under the Muslim 
Law. 45 
Further, in the field of criminal law in 
particular the jurisdiction of the Sharf 4ah courts is 
very limited. It has Jurisdiction only over persons 
professing Islam and it has jurisdiction in respect of 
of f ences only as is conferred by Federal Law. 46 In 
this regard, the Muslim courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) 
Act 1965 provides that such jurisdiction shall not be 
exercised in respect of any offence punishable with 
imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or with 
any fine exceeding 1,000 dollars or with both. 47 In 
addi t ion, the Shari: I-ah courts are not permitted to 
exercise Jurisdiction in respect of the ý, =. -dd offence 
of zing' in accordance with the rulings of the Qur'an 
and Sunnah. 48 
In Mal aysi a, the Sharicah courts are not 
recognised as having the same status and organisation 
as the civil courts. Thus the position of a kathi 
today is lower than that of a magistrate. 49 It JS alSo 
to be noted that in Malaysia, it is the Constitution 
which is the Supreme Law. 50 It is also significant 
that the definition of law which is contained in the 
Const it ut i on does not ment ion Islamic Sharic-ah. 's, 
While it is true that since independence the Federal 
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Parliament has not been able to make laws dealing with 
the Shari-ah (except now for the Federal Territory) as 
Islamic law is a State responsibility, the State 
Legi, slatures can make laws and the laws cannot be held 
void simply because they contravene the Sharicah. 52 
In view of the prevalent conditions vis-c&-vis the 
Federal and State Constitutions, Islam as a law still 
remains limited in scope and in public life it is 
constantly being challenged by secular norms and 
standards. 
b. Malaysian Islamic Policy and Its Implementation: 
Prior to Malayan independence, religion was in 
practical terms a state matter. Since independence, 
Islam has become more and more of a federal concern. 
Thus, the Rulers' ConferenceS 3 composed of all the 
Malay Rulers, began to consider religious matters from 
a federal perspective and the Keeper of the Rulers' 
Seal, that is, the Secretary to the Conference, 
exercised some authority for the coordination of 
Muslim affairs at the federal level. s4 Similarly, 
after 1957, large sums of money were allocated to the 
states for mosque construction, Muslim administration 
and Muslim welfare. ss 
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Most probably, federal involvement in religious 
affairs came about as a result of the fact that the 
constitution sanctions a system of special rights tied 
to religion. In this context, the Malays are given 
legal privileges in four general areas, that is, 
admission to public service, award of government 
scholarships, allocation of permits and licences for 
certain trades and businesses and also ownership of 
land in areas designated as "Malay Reservations". 56 As 
these special rights are given with a religious 
qualification, a Malay who abandoned his religion 
would also lose his claim to these rights. In any 
case, the inclusion of this system of Malay special 
privileges in the constitution has thrust religious 
questions into the centre of political controversy, 
making a secular approach to politics almost 
impossible. 57 
Once religion had been sanctioned as a federal and 
state matter, the federal government instituted a 
number of policies designed to promote Islam. Thus, 
all schools, including government-aided Christian 
mission schools, are required to provide compulsory 
Islamic religious education for Muslims if more than 
fifteen Muslims attend a school. 58 This is certainly 
true, but things are not so simple as they appear, 
since the curriculum for Islamic religious knowledge 
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provided in these schools has been so designed as not 
to expose the students to ideas which might challenge 
the status quo. 59 Besides this, Islamic religious 
knowledge is not taught to students in Form Six, that 
i s, during the final two years of pre-university 
education, with the exception that Islamic History is 
offered as an optional subject to MUSJJMS. 60 
Furthermore, students in the science stream as they g. o 
into the higher classes have to drop the subject 
altogether due to the demands of their major 
subjects. 61 Most seriously of all, the Ministry of 
Education gradually dropped the teaching of the Jawi 
character as a school subject in primary schools in 
the later part of the 60s. 62 This of course created a 
great problem among young Muslims in that they were 
cut off from the bulk of the religious literature 
which was still written in Jawi script. 63 In addition, 
those who had not pursued extra religious classes in 
their spare time found it difficult to read the 
Qur2Fan. 64 At the same time, they were exposed via the 
media to various elements of more sensual culture 
imported wholesale from the West. 65 As -a result, 
religious consciousness and practices began to wane 
among the younger people. 
Meanwhile, ' government policy toward religious 
broadcasting and censorship of entertainment also 
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reflected to a certain extent an ambiguity in the 
application of Islamic principles, contrary to what is 
claimed by Means. 66 In this connection, the Board of 
Film Censors, while prohibiting public viewing of any 
films which might offend Muslims or run counter to 
Islamic teachings, especially regarding political 
ideologies like Communism and religious heterodoxy, 
still permitted sex and violence to be displayed on 
the screen. 67 Further, in late 1966, there were 
protests concerning the impropriety of Malay girls 
participating in beauty contests. But these protests 
failed to find receptive ears in higher circles. For 
instance, the Prime Minister claimed that he failed to 
see anything in Islam that forbade the participation 
of Muslim girls in these contests. 68 
r 
Despite the fact that Islam has been proclaimed as 
the State Religion, in practice, the ruling government 
has only implemented certain aspects of the Shari-ah, 
particularly those related 'to family matters. With 
regard to criminal law, the jurisdiction of the 
Sharj: '-ah Courts is very limited. It has jurisdiction 
only over persons professing the Muslim religion and 
in respect of offences only as conferred by Federal 
Law. 69 In addition, the Sharlr-ah Courts are not given 
the power when dealing with the badd offence of zing', 
to impose the punishment fixed by the Qurlcln and 
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Surinah, 70 In this respect, the status of the Sharicah 
has not changed very much from what it used to be 
under the colonial administration, When Islam has been 
pushed into public view, it has always been more in 
the form of ceremonies or celebrations like the Maulid 
al-Nab! (the Prophet Muýammad's birthday), the 
Isrc'A'and Mir-r, ýý. j 3nd the first of Muharram, which marks 
the start of the Hijri Calendar, 
For the purpose of Promoting Islam in the country, 
the federal government also set up a number of Islamic 
institutions. For example, the Masjid NeSara (National 
Mosque) was officially opened in 1965.7.1 The complex 
itself was equipped with a lecture hall, classrooms 
and a library. 72 Today, the mosque continues to play 
an active role in spreadinS knowledge throt-igh its 
religious classes, lectures, forums, seminars and 
publications. Soon after, in March 1966, a class for 
memorising the QurI ýý n, and learning the art of 
recitation was started at the Mas, jid NeSara. 73 On 17th 
October, 1968, a further step was taken to coordinate 
the administration of Islamic affairs by the 
establishment of the Mallis Kebangsaan Hal-Ehwal AQýama 
Islam (National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs) 
by the Conference of Rulers. 74 In August 1969, Lembaq-a 
Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LU7H or the Hajj Fund and 
Management Boc=ird) was set up t0 facilitate the 
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pilgrirtiage to - Mecca a= T'j e 11 as th er- 1 -p the Muslims- I 
economicallvi that i S, through savings and 
investments. 75 Besides this, the federal government 
has promoted the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam 
through PERKIM (P ertubuhan Keba. likan Islam Malay-c, -ia)76 
or The Malaysian Muslim Welfare Organisation, which 
was f ounded by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then Prime 
Minister of Malaya, in 1960.7 7 These policies are 
still current in Malaysia today. However, in reality, 
they do not make Malaysia, or even for that matter the 
former Malaya, an Islamic State for the simple reason 
that the Sharfl-ah has never been fully implemented. and 
made the supreme law of the land.. 78 In fact, the 
ruling 61ites, within UMNO and the rulers of the 
states, have not at any time expressed strong support 
for this. 
c. Islam and Politics until the late 160s: 
Although Islam had been part of Malay culture 
since its introduction into the Malay States, it only 
became a political issue of national importance after 
Malayan independence. More particularly, it came into 
the centre (--)f the political arena after the E! arti 
Islam Se MaIaV3 (PMIP or Pan-Malayan Islamic Party) 
started to pose a serious challenge to the ruling 
Alliance Party in 1959.7 9 However, it should be noted 
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that some of the early founders of the Islamic party 
emerged from a group that broke away from UMNO in the 
early 50s. This group was then Joined by others from 
the radical nationalist and Islamic reformist elements 
in Malay nationalism. 80 
I nit ial ly, PMTP did not start of f as a political 
part y. In the early 50s, it was merely a religious 
wing of UMNO known under the name of Persatuan r-Ulama 
Se-Malaya (Pan-Malayan "-Ulamiý. V Union). 81 However, at a 
meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in August 1951, the union 
decided to establish an independent political party, 82 
This was based on the assumption that such a political 
party was necessary to bring about Islamic unity and 
the centralisation of Islamic affairs, which were 
deemed to be impossible: - within a secular-criented 
party like UMNO. 83 As a result, the PMIP was formally 
formed at a meeting in Butterworth, Penang in November 
1951.8 4 
Despite this, the party was no more than an 
Islamic wel f are organisation, without any clear 
political goal. 8s It was only in early 1954 that the 
relaxed policy on membership was changed and PMIP 
members were prohibited from Joining other political 
organisations-11 6 Incidently, this move came about as a 
result of the growing influence of anti-UMNO forces 
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within the party, including the ex-members of MNP and 
HAMIM. 87 The party was registered as a political party 
a day before the nomination day in the 1955 Federal 
election. 811 Following this, at a party conference of 
late December 1958, the name Persatuari Islam Se Malays 
was amended to Persatuan Islam Se Tanah Melayu. But, 
the initials of the English version, that is, PMI P 
remained unchanged. Finally in 1971, it was amended to 
Part i Islam Se Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic 
Party). 89 However, the party is better known by its 
acronym PAS. 
As a part y, PAS since itS birth had been 
predominantly Malay and had the support of the deeply 
religious East Coast, that is, Kelantan and Trengc-,, anu, 
where education and customs have maintained a strongly 
Islamic character. It is also this area that has sent 
an increasingly large number of students to the Middle 
East . After the East Coast, the main areas in which 
support for PAS is fairly strong are the northern 
states of Kedah and Perlis and also Krian, a northern 
district of Perak, which have been. famous for their 
Islamic religious education and a more religiously 
oriented way of life. 
89 
i-PAS and Other Political Parties, 
To its political opponents within UMNO and the 
non-Malay parties like MCA, MIC the defunct Socialist 
Front and People's Progressive ParL4 (PPF), Democratic 
Action ParL4 (DAP), and others, the PAS appears to be 
a party espousing intolerant Islamic communalism. 90 
This is attributed to the f act that it has been 
calling for the establishment of an Islamic State in 
which Malays Wi 11 be caused of toad0Pt Islamic 
principles in the life of the individual, the society 
and the State". 91 
li, PAS and Inter-party Rivalryt 
As a party, PAS is both radical and conservative. 
However, it is far from being otherworldly. In f act, 
it calls in Islamic terms upon its followers to adopt 
an energetic and committed stance in this world. 92 In 
terms of ideology, until the mid-70s it subscribed to 
both Islam and Malay nationalism. 93 Nonetheless, for 
PAS Islam is an organic whole, involving not only a 
system of belief and dogmas, but also politics, 
economic, social values and et cetera. 94 This is where 
it differs from UMNO which condemns the mixture of 
religion and politics. 95 
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One of the main issues fought out between the UMNO 
and PAS concerned the close cooperation between the 
former and the non-Muslims within the Alliance and the 
admi ni st rat i on. 96 Another point of conflict between 
the two was the issue of the socio-economic 
development of Malaysia. This did not mean that PAS 
rejected material development altogether. Rather it 
stressed that development should be carried out in 
conformity with the teachings of Islam, In this 
connection, PAS criticized the use of lottery funds to 
build and maintain Muslim religious edifices on the 
ground that lotteries involved gambling and thus 
should not be used for religious purposes. 97 It also 
opposed the sale of liquor and called for Friday to be 
made a weekend holiday for the whole of the 
Federation. 98 Besides this, it successfully moved a 
resolution banning the serving of liquor at official 
functions. 99 
With regard to economic policy, both parties 
focused primarily on the Malay economy. However, 
unlike UMNO PAS proposed to uplift the Malays through 
a system based on Islamic principles, mid-way between 
capitalism and full state control. 100 In line with 
this, it called for the nationalisation of all major 
industries, less reliance on foreign loans, the 
promotion of cooperative societies and the restriction 
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of rnonopol i es. 101 Further, itca1 led upon the 
government to provide more social and economic 
set-vices to the workers-102 
As f ar as foreign policy was concerned, PAS also 
differed a great deal from UMNO. UMNO was influenced ý. J
above all by anti-communism and pro-Western 
sentiments, though it also showed concern for regional 
solidarity and towards the end of the 1960s toned down 
its anti-communist stance and made cautious overtures 
to the Afro-Asian bloc. 103 On the other hand, PAS was 
strongly anti-colonial, advocated an active 
neutralism, and pl ac ed special emphasis on good 
relations with Islamic and neighbouring countries, 
particularly Indonesia. 104 PAS as an Islamic-based 
party, criticised the Alliance government for having 
recognised Israel. 105 In a similar vein, it condemned 
the government for ignoring the plight of the Muslim 
minorities in Patani and the Philippines. Besides 
being pressured by PAS , UMNO was also facing some 
criticism from the 'ultras' within its own party, who 
wanted its policy to be more in tune with Islam. In 
some cases, this group seemed to express similar 
opinions to those championed by PAS. 106 
In response to these pressures, the Alliance 
Government began to take organizational steps to prove 
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that it was for Islam. For example, in 1959, the UMNO 
organised an 6Ulamal Section to influence religious 
elements within the party and others outside it. 107 As 
pressure kept on mounting from within and without, the 
more Westernized central leadership of UMNO laid more 
stress on Islam in their political speeches to the 
Malays, 108 Also in an effort to attract Muslim voters, 
UMNO poured more money into such projects as the 
building of mosques and surau, promoting Islamic 
education, a Musýibaqah Ti 1 cliwat al-Qurla-n (Qur'an 
reading. Competition)109 at state, national and 
international levels, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. '. I) 
Religious teachers were also made primary targets of 
political indoctrination by the UMNO-dominated 
government in specially organised meetings and civic 
courses. "' 
Althovigh Islam as a political issue had already 
gained significance in Malaysian politics prior to the 
early 1970s, it was not the only issue being fought 
out among the political parties. Other issues like the 
t hreat of Communism 1129 the economic imbalance 
between Malays and non-Malays, the backwardness of 
Malays in education, citizenship rights for non-Malays 
and the establishment of Malay as the national 
language for Malaysia had also occupied the mind of 
Malaysian politicians. 
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As for the language issue, the majority of the 
Malays wanted Bahasa Malaysia which is based on the 
Malay language, to be established as the national 
language of the Federation as provided for in Article 
152 of the Malaysian Constitution. Against the 
agreement that had been reached during the Merdeka 
negotiation, the majority of the Chinese wanted 
Mandarin their written language, to be used liberally 
as the medium of expression in their schools and in 
official transactions, On the other hand, English 
educated 61ites of all races wanted English to 
continue as their common medium of communication even 
at official level. The then Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Education were reluctant to implement the 
Biahasa Malaysia policy. Eventually, with the excuse 
that parliamentary democracy had to be safeguarded and 
also that members of parliament and the judiciary were 
not fluent in Bahasa Malaysia the Parliament tabled a 
bill allowing both English and Bahasa Malaysia to be 
used in Parliamentary and State Councils, while all 
secular courts were allowed to hold their proceedings 
in English. This did not pacify the anger of the Malay 
activists and their sympathizers. Aside from some 
sporadic protests against the Language Bill, nothing 
serious really happened till the eruption of May 
1969.113 
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As usual, PAS sided with those who accused UMNO of 
being undu Iy compromising over language and %-j 
education. 114 Both issues were seen mainly in terms of 
their contribution to a national cultural identity, 
although there was also some stress on the importance 
of technical education and support for those 
campaigning for the Bahasa Malaysia and education as a 
means to uplift Malays economically. 115 
d. Students and Issues of t1he 60s- 
Like other Malaysians, university and college 
student-s of the 60s were never free from involvement 
in the socio-economic and religious issues of' the 
time. In fact, the students themselves seemed to 
reflect the mood of Malaysian society at large. They 
were vigorously involved in campaigns for or against 
any of the issues, depending on the ideology or world- 
view that they subscribed to. Nonetheless, Islam was 
Just a marginal issue, popular among a minority of 
Muslim students within the various campuses. The main 
body that espoused Islam among the Muslim students 
then was the Persatuan Kebangrsaan Pela, iar-pelajar 
Islam Malaysia (PKPIM or National Muslim Students, 
Association of Malaysia) founded in 1961.116 
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Initially, PKPIM drew its membership from various 
teacher and agricultural training colleges and also 
from the Islamic College. 117 Besides being involved in 
the national language issue, it was also concerned 
with broader social issues and displayed a distinctly 
ref ormist bent. In this connection, at the Muslim 
Students' Congress held in 1966, it called f or the 
establishment of an Islamic University in Malaysia. '" 
The following year, it wass involved in a Seminar on 
Islamic Civilization where the concept of the Islamic 
1t University was discu-sSed. 11 9 Beginning in 19 6 IS, 1- 
launched a programme known as Geraken Kempen Kesedaran 
(The- Consciousness Raising Campaign), whose intention 
was to draw the attention of rural Malays to broader 
issues relating to health, economic and political 
problems, with the dual aims Of Promoting Malay 
development and instilling a true spirit of ISlaM. 120 
However, for some of the student leaders, 
especially in the University of Malaya, socialism 
seemed to be the panacea for all Malaysian socio- 
economic pr-oblemes, i Tn -gener-al, the Malay youths c3f I-J 
the 60s were fascinated by a popular culture which was 
largely imported from the West, and to a lesser extent 
influenced by Hindustani-Indonesian cultural 
imports. i22 
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e-Ethnic Rivalry and Change: 
Under this sub-heading, we shall be looking 
briefly at the situation which led to the eruption of 
the racial riots of May 1969, commonly known as the 
May 13th Incident, and the changes that it brought 
about in the following years. As we have already 
observed, the independence of Malaya had been attained 
in 1957 through the 'bargaining process' worked out 
between the components of the Alliance, namely the 
UMNO MCA and MTC. Later, when Malaysia was formed in 
1963, joining together the territories of Sabah, 
Sarawak and Singapore with the Federation of Malaya, 
the compromise agreed upon by the major races of the 
Federation, that is, the Malays, Chinese and Indians 
initially seemed to be left undisturbed. Of course, 
since independence several political parties 
representing non-Malay interests like the Chinese- 
dominated Socialist Front the People's Progressive 
Party (PPP) and United Democratic Party (UDP) 123 had 
been championing the interests of the non-Malays, 
especially the Chinese, in politics, economic and 
education as well as language, as opposed to the 
Alliance's policy of safeguarding the Malay rights 
enshrined in the nation's constitution. However, the 
threat which these parties posed to the Alliance and 
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the Malay community in general had not been really 
serious. 
The situation began to change with the entry of 
Singapore into Malaysia. A more bitter rivalry between 
the Malays and the Chinese in particular began to 
take shape in 1964, when the Chinese-dominated Peoples 
Action PaCLY (PAP) headed by Lee Kuan Yew, the 
ambitious Premier of Singapore, led an onslaught on 
Malay rights within the context of a multi-racial 
Malaysia. As a means to diffuse the racial tension 
which had developed, Tunku Abdul Rahman firmly decided 
to expel Singapore from the federation. 124 As a 
result, Singapore unceremoniously left Malaysia in 
August 1965.11 25 This, however, did not reduce the 
intensity of communal politics in West Malaysia. 
Eventually, the volatile inter-ethnic rivalry erupted 
into the tragic May 13th Incident of 1969.126 
Many reasons have been given for the outbreak of 
the tragedy. 127 However, one could say that it was 
mainly because of the mutual frustrations and the 
threat felt by the Malays and the non-Malays alike in 
the years after independence, especially during the 
60st that led to open clashes particularly between the 
MalaySt 28 and the Chinesel 29 The suspicions that 
existed over the years -zimong 
the members of these 
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res-pective communities as a result of their past 
political experiences were further ignited by the fact 
that political campaigns during the 1969 National 
Election had been unrestrictedly communal in 
content. 131) 
Tragic as it may have been the incident has become 
a watershed in Malaysian history. It has ushered in a 
new era, that is, an era of great changes, In order to 
restore law and order, the Malaysian Government 
immediately proclaimed a State of Emergency, whereby 
parliamentary democracy and the Constitution were 
temporarily suspended, The whole country was then 
placed under the rule of the Mallis Gerakan Nejz-ara 
(Mageran or the National Operations Council) headed by 
the late Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime 
Minister. 131 This council ruled by decree. As for the 
Tunku, with the establishment of the MaZeran he 
gradually drifted away from the centre stage and left 
political decisions largely in the hands of others. 132 
Under the Mageran administration, government 
leaders, particularly Malay leaders, reassessed the 
direction of Malaysia's political development and 
began to introduce several important changes. Briefly, 
UMNO leaders acted to entrench their own political 
position, partly by reorganizing and revitalizing 
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UMNO, by attempting to correct previous shortcomings 
in government assistance to Malays in the fields of 
education and economics, and partly by using ideology 
and para-military organisations to mobilise the masses 
and also by drawing former opposition parties into an 
UMNO-controlled grand Alliance, known as the Barisan 
Nasioncal (BN or National Front). 133 Further, several 
restrictions were introduced, particularly, regarding 
the 'sensitive issues', as a measure to avoid a future 
recurrence of racial conflict. 
In order to ensure. that their base in the Malay 
community, remained firm, UMNO leaders shifted the 
Malaysian political system more decidedly in a Malay- 
oriented direction, though at the same time care was 
taken not to disregard important non-Malay rights. i34 
As we shall see, this government response to 13 
May had several implications for the Islamic revival 
of the following decades. To safeguard their own and 
UMNO's position within the Malay community, government 
leaders adopted a number of policies which placed 
greater stress on Islam. In this connection, steps 
were taken to expand the religious bureaucracy under 
the Prime Minister's Department as a means to promote 
more Islamic programmes at the federal level. 13S 
Besides this, the government also expanded the 
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opportunities for Malays to pursue tertiary educa tion 
after 1969.13 6 The majority of these new students came 
from rural areas , and often had a stronger Isl amic 
background, thus helping to boost the growth of 
Islamic societies within the various campuses. The 
inclusion of PAS in the coalition government in 1973 
also led in a way to the strengthening of' the 
government's commitment to Islam. 
With regard to the Malays, the incident rudely 
shocked them out of their 'deep slumber'. Almost 
overnight, most of them, especially the young, 
'returned to Islam', not as lip-service, but with a 
new sense of commitment, very much in contrast to the 
life of complacency that they used to lead. With a new 
spirit and a newly found confidence, they accepted the 
challenges of the business world, and also rushed for 
the opportunities that a tertiary education and the 
technical and professional careers had to offer on a 
very much greater scale than ever before. 
Apart from the internal changes that we have 
described above, the Muslim Malays of the late 60s 
were also influenced by a number of international 
events, especially th ose occuring in the Middle East 
and South-East Asia. However, further developments in 
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modern post -independence Malaysia will be dealt with 
in more detail in the following chapters. 
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Islam in the Seventies and Eighties: 
The Winds of Change. 
In this chapter, we shall focus our discussion 
mainly on the development of Islam in Malaysia since 
the 70s. In this connection, we shall study the 
various trends which have emerged within Malaysian 
society and which up to the present have been 
associated in one way or another with the rising tide 
of Islam. Before dealing with the subject-matter, 
however, we shall consider the general changes that 
have taken place in Malaysia since May 1969. This is 
necessary as these changes have had some influence on 
the developments of the following decades. 
a. Post-1969 Malaysia: 
Following the racial riots of 1969, the Malaysian 
authorities initiated a number of measures to restore 
peace and stability within the country. In this 
context, while emphasizing that it would act without 
discrimination on behalf of all races, it also took 
care to appoint non-Malays to various government 
bodies, including the Capital Investment Committee. I 
Besides this, it set up a National Goodwill Committee, 
which was soon broadened to include committees at 
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state, district and area levels. The general functions 
of these committees were to foster goodwill among the 
communities and to solve any problems that might 
hinder this. At the same time, - the Department of 
National Unity was established with the main function 
of drawing up a Rukunegars (that -is, a National 
Ideology). 2 This rukunegara was officially proclaimed 
on 31st August, 1970, It was not intended to be 
included in the Const it ut i on, but was to "guide 
Malaysians of all races in their everyday affairs in a 
conscious effort to bring about a single united and 
strong Malaysian nation". 3 (See Appendix A). 
In Tanuary 1970, the government set up the 
National Consultative Council (NCC)ý whose members 
were drawn from various political parties (excluding 
the DAP since it nominated an official still under 
detention and the PSRM which abstained in protest 
against the arrest of two state assemblymen), 
professional groups, trade unions and re1iio us 
bodieS. 4 With this council as a platform, issues which 
were considered communally sensitive were discussed in 
camera and recommendations were made on how to handle 
them as a means of avoiding the recurrence of 
violence. Despite the fact that the proceedings of 
this council were confidential, free discussion of all 
issues was permitted. 5 Before this, the government 
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also demonstrated its communal impartiality by taking 
stern action in mid-Tuly 1969 against Malays opposing 
the Tunku and calling for a more Malay-oriented 
government. 6 In the same vein, it temporarily launched 
a major anti-corruption drive in March 1970, resulting 
in the removal of the Malay Menteri. Besars of Perak 
and Trengganu from their posts and disciplinary action 
against several public servants-7 While all these 
efforts were being made, the government began to take 
serious action to redress the economic and educational 
problems of the Malays also. 
To correct the economic imbalance that prevailed 
among the Malays, the government introduced the Dasar 
Ekonomi Baru (DES or New Economic Policy), which had 
as its prime objectives the eradication of poverty 
regardless of race and the increasing of Malay 
participation in modern sectors of the economy. 8 This 
two-pronged approach was most clearly enunciated in 
the Second Malaysia- Plan (1971 - 1975), and has 
continued in subsequent plans to the present day. By 
means of this policy, it is hoped that by the year 
1990 the Bumiputra will have achieved a 30% equity in 
the modern corporate sector of an open market economy 
traditionally dominated by the Chinese and foreign 
concerns. " 
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Simultaneously, several measures were enacted by 
the government to help in the uplifting of the 
Bumil2utra, ranging from loans and training and 
investment projects for aspiring businessmen, to 
employment quotas within the civil service, commerceo 
industry and enrolment quotas for universities. 11) By 
1975, through a generous programme of allowances and 
scholarships, Malay university enrolment had reached 
57.2% of the whole, and by 1978 - 1979, a new Malay 
enrolments (for all f ive universities) had reached 
66.4%. At the same time, there has been a concerted 
effort to redirect Malays from the arts and social 
sciences to the natural sciences. 12 
Besides this, educational strategies since the 
early 70s have also involved sending a growing number 
of BumiRutra students abroad, that i s, to Britain, 
Australia, North America, India and many countries in 
the Middle East. 13 Since then, many have returned to 
occupy a variety of government and university posts. 
However, while overseas, some of these students have 
acquired Islamic values and an Islamic way of life 
through reading and contact with other Muslim students 
and emigres, notably from Pakistan, Egypt, Libya and 
Saudi Arabia. 14 Such organisations as the Federation 
of the Students' Islamic Societies of United Kingdom 
and Eire (FOSIS). the Muslim Students' Association of z 
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America (MSA) and the Australian Federation of Muslim 
Students Associations (AFMSA) have been equally 
responsible for inculcating a sense of Islamic 
consciousness among the Muslim students studying at 
various universities and colleges in the respective 
host countries. Is In addition, the students concerned 
have had the opportunity to study Islam with the help 
of a few Muslim graduates, who had gone to study in 
the West after having completed their studies at 
Middle Eastern universities. 16 Consequently, these 
people have raised serious doubts concerning the 
Western value system and these misgivings have 
undoubtedly been reinforced by the economic and 
political successes achieved by some Middle Eastern 
countries, and the resurgence of the Muslim world in 
general. 17 Perhaps also, some of these students have 
opted for an Islamic way of life "as an apparent 
reaction to the garishness and permisiveness of a 
Western enviroment". 18 Hence, instead of being imbued 
with Western cultures, they now return with renewed 
commitment to Islam, which to some of them even means 
the adoption of the ý; CallýRbiyah jilbýib and the like. 
Meanwhile, in order to curb any opposition to the 
rapid expansion of Malay special rights and 
privileges, the government took special care to define 
the whole question pertaining to these matters as a 
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"sensitive issue" within the Rukunegara. 19 Further, 
under the provisions of t he new constitutional 
amendments and the Sedition Ordinance of 1970, public 
criticism of all such policies was prohibited. 20 
In another move to reduce political dissension, 
UMNQ_ leaders, then under the leadership of Tun Abdul 
Razak, beg-an to negotiate with opposition parties for 
the formation of a coalition government, whereby these 
parties would retain autonomous structures and gain 
limited access to informal political bargaining 
structures in return for accepting restrictions on 
their public pronouncements and mobilization 
activities. 21 By the end of 1972, most opposition 
parties, including PAS, had agreed to the coalition 
form of government. In Peninsular Malaysia, only the 
DAP, the extremist Chinese party, was denied access to 
the broadened Alliance SySteM. 22 Hence, the 
established Barisen Nasional (9N or National Front), 
as the coalition is known, came to dominate the 
Malaysian political scene in place of the Alliance 
Party. Through this arrangement political stability 
was restored, though the realities of communal 
politics had forced parliament to surrender most of 
its powers and functions to extra-legal and informal 
political institutions. 23 
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b-The Barisan Nasional: 
-Cooperation'and 
Dissension. 
The establishment of the BN had brought about the 
strengthening of Malay nationalism as UMNO and PAS 
were united, 24 Simultaneously, Kelantan, which had 
been under PAS since 1959 Parliamentary Election, was 
reintegrated into the mainstream of the country. On 
joining the coalition, Datol Muhammad Asri, the then 
PAS President, had to drop his insistence on any rapid 
implementation of an Islamic socio-political order, 25 
However, the coalition with UMNO, which PAS had before 
denounced as the betrayer of Islamic principles, 
placed considerable strain on the rank and file of the 
party and even caused the resignation or expulsion of 
some of its leading memberS. 26 
Besides facing internal problems, PAS also had to 
face the attempts made by UMNO to break its hold upon 
Kelantan. The opportunity to wrest the state from the 
PAS came as a result of a leadership crisis which 
developed openly within the party at state level 
towards the end of 1977. It is interesting to note 
that the whole episode wh ich later led to the crisis 
had its beginnings in the appointment of the Menteri 
Besar (Chief Minister) of the state back in 1974, that 
is, just after PAS had joined the BN. In this 
connection, Tun Abdul Razak, the then Prime Minister, 
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in his capacity as the head of the coalition 
government, had insisted on appointing Dato' Muhammad 
Nasir, a PAS man of his own choice as the Menteri 
Besar rather than accepting the man suggested by 
PAS.? 7 This Menteri Besar was by no means a 
charismatic leader. Rather he was widely respected by 
the people for his integrity and amiable character. 28 
On. the other hand, he was strongly opposed by the PAS 
state assembly members as he was more conciliatory 
towards UMNO's interests and also threatened t C) 
jeopardise their political careers by exposing land 
deals made by the previous PAS administration. 29 In 
response to his stand, they campaighed vehemently for 
his removal as Menteri Besar. 
At this point, it should be noted that PAS in 
comparison to UMNO has been a party of limited 
financial resources. More-over, by sticking to its own 
policy, it has deprived itself of any federal grant. 
To overcome its financial straits, the PAS 
administration decided to mortgage part of the state' s 
land to the Timber Mine Company of Singapore as well 
as to effect other business transactions. 30 
Eventually, the crisis reached a peak when the 20 
PAS state assemblymen carried a vote of no confidence 
against the Menteri Besar. 31 In response to this 
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development, UMNO came out in support of Nasir by 
opposing a rival group known locally as Kumpu. lajj-- '20' 
(The gang of 20). 32 
Through well-planned poIitical manoeuvres, the 
manipulation of the mass-media and UMNO-supported 
anti-PAS demonstrations, a state of emergency was 
created, thus giving the Barisan government t he 
pretext to take over Kelantan. 33 UMNO also gave its 
blessing to Nasir when he and his supporters founded a 
new Islamic party, the Barisan Tamaah Islam Se 
Malaysia (Berjasa) and even promised to consider his 
application to join the BN. -34 By 13 November, 1977, 
PAS was officially expelled from the Front. 
Subsequently, while its opponent, PAS was in disarray, 
UMNC held a snap election in March 1978.35 
In the new cabinet that followed, Datol Muhammad 
Nasir was given the post of Minister to the Prime 
Minister' s Department, with the special function of 
looking after Islamic affairs at national level. 
c. Tlie Islamic Revival in Malaysia: 
Meanwhile, during the period when the relationship 
between PAS and UMNO seemed to be cordial, another 
development was taking place within the Muslim 
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community of Malaysia. By the mid-seventies, this 
change had become perceptibly widespread, especially 
among the youth and intellectuals in a number of urban 
centres. This phenomenon has come to be known as the 
revival of Islam (Kebangkitan Semula Islam). Usually, 
it is associated by scholars and writers with the 
activities of the various da"wah. movements (Serakan 
dakwah). 36 
Literally, the term dakwah, as used in modern 
Bahasa Malaysia, originates from the Arabic dacwah-, 
which has its root in the word da'a or yad-Ck (to call 
or invite). 37 In its fullest sense, it means to call 
or invite others (mankind) to Islam which is in itself 
an act incumbent upon all the Mt_, SJJ. MS. 38 Historically, 
dacwah in its generic sense has been associated with a 
wide range Qf expressions and meanings from an almost 
unspoken, but implicitly accepted duty, to 
identification with specific political causes. 39 As 
far as Malaysia was concerned, prior to the 60s, 
da(, wah as a term was little known or used, except by 
'-Ulamcýl' familiar with religious vocabulary. Further, 
it drew little public attention and stirred no 
controver Sy. 40 But today in contrast, even when used 
in its original meaning, da-wah has the power to stir 
many more and stronger emotions, and its use is 
commonly associated with some value-laden message of 
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approval or disapproval. To label another individual 
as 'Idal; wah" is. to register Cj a judgement, positive or 
negative, of both the indivi dual concerned and of the 
orient(ation in Seneral. 41 In some instances, dal; wah in 
Malaysia is associated with organisational -: ictivities 
of certain religious movements or bodies, which f or 
many Malaysians have become the epitome and totality 
of what dal-wah is all about, 42 In this connection, 
three organisations are usually referred to: ABIM 
(Angkatan Belia Is 1 am Malaysia or Muslim Yout h 
Movement (? f Malaysia); Darul Arqam (House of Arqam), 
named after Arqam bin Abi Arqam, a companion of the 
Prophet (s. a. w. ), and Tama'at TabliZh. 
In addition, daýwah as commonly understood in 
Malaysia, is linked with the individual, that is, to 
say whether a person is affiliated or sympathetic 
towards a certain religious organisation or not, Thus, 
in terms of da-wah, a person is said to be "an ABIM 
supporter"; a member of Darul Arqaml or 11 a Tabligh 
sympat hi zer". 43 Apart from this, a person is bound to 
be dubbed 'da"-wah', if he or she exhibits types of 
behaviour now generally identified with the popular 
images of dal-wah. For example, if a person appears in 
turban, jubbah and sandals, while at the same time 
wearing a long beard, he is quick to be labelled a 
Tabli, crh man". 
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Nonetheless, dal-wah as a missionary or propagatory 
activity is nothing really new in Malaysia. It was the 
means through which the Malays were converted to Islam 
in early Malacca and for that matter in other parts of 
the peninsula. 
In the early sixties, there were already freellance 
missionaries operating among the Muslim population of 
Malaya. Most of these people were the products of 
local madrasahs, or 12ondoks, while some had had their 
training at al-Azhar or other religious centres 
abroad. With enthusiasm, they began to espouse Islam 
ancd urged the Malays to uphold the teachings of the ý. J
the Qur'gn and hadith. 44 In this context, they not 
only worked for the purification of Islam from 
superstitions but also for a total liberation of the 
Muslim Malays from an unislamic "mental bondage". 45 
Receiving neither salary nor other monetary rewards 
from the society they served, these preachers 
regularly organised kuliah subuh (early morning 
lectures, that is, after the dawn prayer) and kuliah 
maq, hrib (lectures after the early night prayer) and 
even held weekend Classes. 46 Some of them were also 
active in institutions of higher learning where they 
delivered talks on the principles of Islam and their 
practicality in modern times. Among this category of 
dur-(7at were also included those who operated through 
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Islamic organisations like al-Rahmczýniyah 47 based in 11-11 
Kuala Lumpur, and Tama'at Tabliq: h. 
Beginning from 1960, PERKIM 4- 8 too started to 
propagate Islam among non-Malays. At the same time, 
such activities such as the annual Qurlcin reading 
competition, the celebration of Maulid al-Nab! and the 
broadcasting of religious programmes have not only %. J 
helped to create an atmosphere conducive to the growth 
of dal-wah activities, but also have made the whole 
country conscious of the living role of Islam. 
However, what is regarded as new, in the sense a 
change, is that dal-wah activities have developed on a ý_j 16 
large scale and have attracted more and more of the 
Malay youth and intellectuals, even those who decades 
ago used to idolise Western and Hindustani film stars 
as well as entertainers like Elvis Presley and the 
Beatles, Tohn Wayne, Marilyn Monroe, Dev Anand, Shashi 
Kapoor and the like. Furthermore, the dal-wah of the 
seventies has also brought about a change in the mode 
of dress, in that women have turned to more modest 
forms of dress, such as the mini-telekjjý 49, worn 
over baJu kurunq., that is a conventional Malay dress, 
while a minority has chosen to wear gloves, jubbah and 
purdah-50 Equally, some men have taken to the green or 
white jubbah and turbans, accompanied by skull-caps as 
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a manifestation of the Sunnah of the Prophet (s. a, 
W. ). Mosque attendance has been on the increase, 
especially among the young. 51 Besides this, there is 
the proliferation of public religious lectures and 
conferences while events of religious significance are 
announced and better-attended than ever before. 52" 
Islamic moral conduct pertaining to the relationship 
between members of the opposite sex is strictly 
adhered to in public meetings, particularly those 
organised by da6wah activists or sympathizers, much to 
the annoyance of the secularists. Of late, it has 
become quite frequent for one to hear Quranic recitals 
or nasyid (religious song) or even religious talks 
being played over the tape-recorders of passing 
vehicles instead of the usual 'pop' songs. In keeping 
with the Islamic dietary rules, those involved in 
da6wah are becoming more fastidious about food and 
this has also influenced some members of the public 
who have come under their Sway. 53 Accordingly, they 
reject any food prepared by non-Malays which they 
consider to be ritually unclean. 54 Consequently, since 
the mid-70s, this development has led to the rise of 
Muslim food producers (including some converts), 
particularly in producing foodstuffs of Chinese origin 




Frequently, da4wah in its contemporary form 
focusses primarily upon the existing Muslim 
population, turning inward to inspire a renewal of 
commitment to Islam among flagging followers. There 
are also attempts to transcend traditional modes of 
religious -teachings, which in Malaysia consist largely 
of rote learning and verbal recitations of the Qur'<ýýn, 
without really trying to understand its whole 
meaning. 55 In this instance, more and more young 
Muslims (Malays and non-Malays) are learning Arabic 
either through formal means or by attending cla?, ses 
during the weekend. S6 Lately, some of the more 
ambitious working individuals have even taken up 
diploma courses in Islamic studies offered over a 
period of three years by the Islamic Faculty, 
Universiti Kebangsaan MalaySia. 57 Also of significance 
is that, contrary to the old ways, more and more 
questions are now being asked and answers are in turn 
provided, within the usrah (study circle) and other 
forms of dacwah gatherings. This could be explained 
by the fact that most of the da-wah followers are 
drawn from the ranks of urban, educated middle class 
youth. 
As a result of the dal-wah activities, there has 
arisen a conflict. between Islam and Malay adat. Like 
the Kaum Muda of the early Twentieth Century, dar-wah 
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supporters have condemned unislamic practices such as 
the traditional Malay marriage ceremonies 59, the use 
of bomohs <folkcurers) and the performance of the 
wayang kulit <shadow-puppet play-? with itS_ Hindu 
themes. 60 This development often leads to conflict 
with other members of the MUSJiM COMMUnity. 61 
Besides this, the rise of Islamic consciousness 
has led to the growth of Islamic publications, thus 
exposing Muslim readers to various works . of 
local as 
well as foreign origin. 62 As a logical extension to 
this development, the Muslim youth are more exposed to 
the sTrah of the Prophet (s. a. w. ), the lives of the 
!ýa hc; ýi bah, r-ulamýa-' and mu. Jaddi-dCln (religious reformers) 
than ever before. 63 Perhaps as part of this change 
also, we now see more Muslims returning to traditional 
Arabo-Muslim names such as IýAbdul Rahmcý'a-n, Fatimah and 
Jam9luddin rather than choosing more fanciful names 
for their newly-born babies. 
As in the rest of the Muslim world, da r-wah in 
Malaysia lays emphasis on DTn (Islam as a 
comprehensive way of life), JiL§d (striving in the 
cause of Allah to establish the truth), criticism of 
the unislamic elements in the realm of adat and 
Western values, and the need to carry out t aj did 
(renewal of faith) and igýl, ýih (reform). 64 Contrary to 
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popular belief, ardent Muslim activists f louri--h 
better among those who lead a relatively secure 
life. 65 Among those who turn eagerly to Islam are 
doctors, engineers, university and college lecturers, 
teachers . and civil servants, In their deep love for 
Islam, they even reject the ideas of those reformists 
like Tamal al-Din al-Afghc5inf, Muhammad I-Abduh, Sayyid I 
Aýmad Khffkn, Abul Kalam Az, ýýd and so forth, who are 
looked upon as Muslim apologists because of their 
compromising attitude towards Western civilization. 66 
In short, these fundamentalists 67, once they have 
chosen to fashion themselves into commited Muslims, 
begin to interpret the world around them in accordance 
with their newly cherished value preference. As a 
generation imbued with Islamic ideals, they work 
virtually round the clock towards the Islamisation of 
the Malaysian society,. 
.1 
d. Da6wah Movements: 
The most significance manifestation of current 
Islamic revivalism in Malaysia is the emergence of 
various da-6wah movements. Most of these movements date 
from the late 60s and early 70s. 118 However, in our 
subsequent discussion, we shall devote our attention 
only to the most important of these movements, namely 
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ABIM, Darul Arqam and lama' at Tabligh. Each of these 
movements is voluntary, having a core of dedicated 
members, with an indefinite number of sympathizers who 
occasionally attend lectures and other activities and 
may influence their kinsmen and friends to do 
likewise. 
i. Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 
The first idea of forming ABIM was formulated in 
August 1969 69, that is, during the annual General 
Meet i ng of the PKPIM. 70 This movement was then 
launched in Tuly 1970.71 Subsequently, after some 
delay due to bureaucratic problems, it was registered 
under the Societies Act in 1972.7 2 Among its founder 
members were included both religiously and secularly 
educated young Muslims, who had been trained as 
Islamic workers in universities and colleges at home 
and abroad. 73 ABIM, as its protagonists put it, was 
established as a necessary solution to the greatly- 
felt vacuum in Islamic activities on a nation-wide 
level; to generate an Islamic movement as the path to 
Islamic revival in Malaysia; to implement camal jam<'ýcl 
(collective responsibility in fulfilling religious 
duties) and to carry out dar-wah so that mankind will 
sincerely submit to the will of Allah in every aspect 
of their life . 74 
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ABIM states its additional objectives as: 75 
- to uphold and strive for the realization of 
Islamic objectives in line with the teachings 
of al-Qur'En and as-Sunnah. 
- to progressively carry out Islamic da4wah 
to all people, 
- to unite and harness the potential forces 
of the Muslim youth of Malaysia at 
international level. 
- to carry out other beneficial activities 
which are not against the teachings of al- 
Qurlan and as-Sunnah. 
Since its establishment, ABIM has undertaken to 
present Islam as al-Din which encompasses all aspects 
of life necessary for the realization of Man as the 
Khallfah (Vicegerent) of Allah on this earth and for 
his salvation in this world and in the Hereafter. 76 
For this purpose, it- strives towards building a 
society based on the principle of Islam. This approach 
is entirely new to the Malaysian scene in a way that 
many people, including those in power, find most 
disturbing. 
ii. Leadership and Membership: 
Till now, ABIM has been able to draw on the 
support of the young and ' yout hf ul people, .77 However, 
its membership involve a cross-section of Malaysian 
society, ranging from academics and professionals to 
peasants, workers and trishaw-pullerS. 78 By 1986, it 
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had acquired 41,000 members and several thousands of 
sympathizers. 79 At the beginningo it won adherents 
mostly from the educated class, whether in Malay or 
English. Over the years, as its dalýwah programme has 
spread, many Arabic and religious-educated individuals 
have also joined the organisation, thus toning down 
its image of being a society dominated by the English 
and Malay-educated group. 80 
Significantly, many educated Muslim women chose to 
Join ABIM as in it they saw a chance to play active 
roles in society. 131 This is, however, not the case 
with the Darul Araam or Jamar-at Tabligh and even PAS 
which prefer to give very limited opportunities to 
their own women. 82 Currently, more than 60% of ABIMI s 
women members are professionals. 83 As members of the 
movement, they work actively in tandem with their male 
counterparts, within Hal Ehwal Wanita. ABIM (HELWA or 
ABIMI s Women Bureau), 84 In this connection, with a 
slight different of emphasis in their roles as women, 
they have organised seminars and lectures and also 
helped to run kindergartens and the like. 85 By the 
80s, ABIM's branches were firmly established at state 
and district levels throughout MalaySia. 86 
From the beginning, ABIM was led by both 
secularly and religiously educated Muslim intellect- 
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uals and professionals. Most of the thirteen original 
leaders of ABIM, including Anwar Ibrahim, its most 
famous President from 1974 - 1982, were born in the 
mid-1940s. 87 Given the structure of the educational 
system during their childhood, most of these leaders 
had primary schooling in Malay, followed by a transfer 
to an English-medium secondary school in a larger 
urban centre. 118 Later, all of th. em had some kind of 
tertiary education, either in a university, 
polytechnic, or training college. 89 Some of them, that 
is, six of the original office holders, were trained 
in religious institutions of higher learning, such as 
the Islamic College in Malaysia or al-Azhar. '10 More 
recent 1 y, an increasing number of ABIM leaders and 
lecturers have been graduates of the Islamic Studies 
Faculty of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM or 
National University of Malaysia). 91 Apart from this, 
certain individuals with madrasah and 12ondok 
backgrounds have also joined the movement. 92 In common 
with Anwar, all of these leaders were active in 
various student organisations at home and overseas 
prior to their appointment in ABIM-93 
Many of these leaders, especially those from 
overseas, have been accused by their detractors of 
being lacking in religious experience and learning. 
As part of the programme to improve their education 
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and experience, ABIM has secured the services of some 
already established and respected scholars like Syed 
Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, Deliar Noer, an Indonesian 
with a Cornell Ph. D. and till recently teaching in 
Australia, the late Prof. Ismal-Il. Ragi al-Faru-qi- of 
Temple University, Prof, Khurshid Ahmad, a prominent 
Islamic scholar and economist from Pakistan, and the 
like. 94 With their wide experience and scholarship, 
these scholars have been able to expose what they 
perceived as the fallacies of Westernism and at the 
same time to spread the message of international 
dal-wah among the exponents of ABIM. In addition, a 
deeper understanding of Islam is also disseminated 
through usrah farýu Cain classes and so forth, 
conducted through the efforts of religiously educated 
members, 
Anwar Ibrahim was initially ABIM's public 
relations officer, serving under the movement's first 
president, . 
Ustaz Razali Nawawi, now dean of the law 
faculty of International Islamic University. 9s Later, 
he rose to the post of ABIM' s Secretary General and 
was finally its President till his resignation to join 
UMNO in March 1982.96 Before the formation of ABIM, he 
was active as the president of both the Malay Language 
Society at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, and 
PKPIM. More than anything else, Anwar has been 
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acclaimed by some observers as a charismatic leader-97 
Indeed, he is. However, it is not his charisma alone 
t hat attracted the Muslim youth to Join ABIM and 
induced the religious educated group to stay with the 
movement. Rather, as a prominent ABIM activist put 
it, "ABIM' s popularity stemmed largely from the 
movement's basic philosophy that Islam was a din, a 
way of life". 913 The phrase "Islam as a way of life" 
revealed the enormous potential that lay hidden in the 
religion, as it implies that Islam is more than 
prayers, fasting, haj. 1 and zakat. 99 Simultaneously, it 
presents Islam as being a living religion that 
addresses itself to politics, economic, education and 
other social issues. Hence, for young Muslims "who 
f ound a certain hollowness in secular education, the 
approach was immensely attractive". 100 Besides, ABIM 
has also gained popularity through the efforts made by 
PKPIM that i S, in spreading its ideas among the 
Muslim youth. 101 As we have mentioned, educated Muslim 
women have also preferred ABIM to other da4wah 
organi sat i ons, as it provides them with better 
opportunities to serve the society. 
Anwar' s abilities as a leader were recognised as 
early as 1971 by the late Prime Minister, Tun Abdul 
Razak. 102 He repeatedly invited the young man to join 
UMNO and build up his political career in the 
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footsteps of his f ather, Hj. Ibrahim. 103 Iftstead, 
Anwar persistently refused the offer and preferred to 
pursue the independent course of working within 
ABIM. 104 Again in recognition of his leadership, Tun 
Razak asked Anwar to represent Malaysia at an 
International Youth Seminar organised by the United 
Nat i ons. 105 Fol 1 owi ng t hi s, he bec ame t he I eader of 
the Malaysian Youth Council and also a member of the 
United Nations Advisory Group on Youth. L06 At 
international level, Anwar 1So served as the 
representative of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
(WAMY) for the Asia-Pacific region. tO7 
As a youth leader, Anwar "has consistently argued 
t hat Malaysian Muslims must undergo a complete 
transformation emerging from religious faith and 
becoming manifested in a social system with high moral 
values guaranteeing peace, harmony and equality". 108 
Accordingly, after his election as ABIM' s president in 
1974, Anwar articulated ABIM policy in matters 
associated with social and economic issues. In this 
respect, he argued that Islam is not anti-development, 
but "development must have a moral basis. It must be 
just, not exploitative". 109 
With Anwar's departure, the presidency of ABIM was 
taken over by a learned Muslim intellectual, Siddiq 
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Fadil, who had served under the former since 1978 as 
his deputy. Despite his humble and unassuming 
appearance, Siddiq is a great orator and an 
accomplished author of several books, including the 
famous Kebangkitan Umat: Kenyataan dan Harapan and Di 
Bawah Lindungan alQurlan (a translation of the Sayyid 
Qutb's FT zilal il-Qurlan) and also 0f many 
articles. 1 10 During his early years, he had undergone 
both Malay and Rondok education. "' Following this, he 
joined the Sekolah Menengcah Agama Izzuddin Shah 
(Tzzuddin Shah Religious Secondary School) and Maktab 
Perguruan Bahasa, (Teacher's Language College). 11 2 In 
1971, he enrolled as a student at the University of 
Malaya and played a prominent role in both the 
Islamic Society of the University of Malaya and 
PKPIM. 113 With such a background, it is not surprising 
to find Siddiq fluent in Bahasa Malaysia and Arabic as 
well as English. Besides being involved in da 6, wah 
activities, he is now lecturing at the Institut 
Bahasa, Kesusasteraan dan Kebudayaan Melýý, vu (Institute 
of Language, Literature and Malay Culture), Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia-114 
iii, ABIMI s Or)zanisation and Activities: 
In pursuance of its objectives, ABIM operates 
through a number of committees. I Is These committees 
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are elected by shOrg- (consultation> in the annual 
Muktamar (General Assembly. L16 The highest Executive 
Committee is the Central Executive Committee headed by 
the President. 117 The Committee organizes projects and 
activities. At the state and district levels, similar 
kind of commit. tees have been created to assist in the 
running of the administration and planning and 
implementation of the movement's programmes. 118 In 
this respect, any form of campaigning or jockeying for 
position is totally discouraged, 
Although essentially fundamentalist in orienta- 
tion, ABIM has been able to adapt its programmes to 
the realities of a modern, multi-ethnic society. This 
perhaps explains why it has widespread support among 
Muslim youth, including some recent converts. To help 
the saudara baru (new converts) and also non-Malays to 
under-stand Islam as al-Dfn, A BIM with the cooperation 
of WAMY has been distributing reading materials in 
English and giving free religious classes every 
weekend through the programme 'Islamic Outreach - 
ABIM1.119 Further, to spread its ideas, several ABIM 
members have established a number of private schools, 
Yayasan Anda Akademik which attempt to combine the 
best features of religious and secular education, 
without really abandoning the requirements of 
national education policy. 120 What it does really is 
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to provide a balanced programme of intensive Islamic 
studies, including Arabic, as an alternative to what 
it sees as the material. istic, mechanistic western 
approach to knowledge. However, English is made 
mandatory. 12 Discipline and cadre-like training are 
also provided within the usrah, qiyam al-layl (night 
vigil) and the various kuliahs after the Maghrib and 
Subuh prayers. 
I nit ial ly, the Yayasan Anda Akademik at Pantai 
Baru was established in 1971 with the aim of 
ameliorating the drop-out problem among Malay 
students. 122 Eventually, however, this school caught 
the attention of other categories of students. Today, 
the headquarters of the Yayasan Anda Akademik at 
Pantai Baru has more than 1,200 students, while its 
branch at Kampung Baru has more than 400 pupils. 123 
The students came from all parts of Malaysia, 
including Sabah and Sarawak. Accordingly, many of them 
are provided with residence at an attached hostel or 
in certain cases are assisted to find their own 
accomodation at some nearby place. 124 Outside the 
capital, the schools have several branches, for 
instance, in Bukit Mertajam, Ipoh, Kuala Trengganu, 
Kota Bharu and so f orth. 125 Today, more than one 
hundred students from Yayasan Anda Akademik have 
graduated from the University of Malaya, while several 
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have gone on to higher studies in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 126 Equally interesting is that 
educationists from other countries, especially from 
the Middle East, have visited these schools and 
addressed the teachers and students. 127 This is 
certainly an attraction, which has been missed by most 
Malaysian schools. 
However, contrary to the assumption made by Nagata 
that ABIM has stressed "Malay exclusiveness" in the 
schools '28, the Yayas! -ýn has opened its doors to the 
non-Malay students. 129 One of the main reasons that 
these schools have become popular is that they have 
charged moderate fees, thus enabling even the poor to 
join them. 130 Another possible answer to this is that 
the teachers concerned are known for their tremendous 
dedication and sacrifices. In terms of dedication, a 
former student commented, "one of the most heartening 
features of this school is the personal attention the 
teachers Sive to the pupils, especially those who are 
backward in their studies". 131 Besides this, the 
founder teachers, including Anwar himself, were 
university graduates, yet they were ready to receive 
salaries ranging from M$150 to M$250 each, while their 
cont emporari es, with the same educational 
qualifications, were earning much more by way of 
remunerat i on f rom ot her school s. 132 At the same time, 
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among its teachers are also included volunteers from 
local universities and colleges. 133C Such behaviour as 
shown by these respective teachers could only come 
from individuals fired with a strong sense of mission, 
often caused by profound religious conviction. 
Further, to implement its tarbiyah (educational 
programme, which involves not only the imparting of 
knowledge, but also character-bui 1 ding), ABIM has set 
up more than 200 Islamic kindergartens and a number of 
nurseries throughout Malaysia. 134 These kindergartens 
are operated by ABIM members, guided by a specially- 
prepared curriculum and consolidated by a teacher- 
training scheme. i2s This development has attracted the 
attention of the Minister of Education, who recently 
studied the model of Islamic kindergarten provided by 
ABIM, with a view to adopting it for the government- 
run primary schools. "36 On the other hand, it also 
stirred up uneasiness among certain quarters within 
the Barisan administration, who claimed that these 
kindergartens are being used for political ends. In 
response, ABIM's Secretary General dismissed the claim 
and explained the purpose of having such Islamic 
kindergartenst while one of its Vice-Presidents called 
upon the government to be more tolerant. 137 
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Beyond this, ABIM has completed the designing of a 
special curriculum on Islamic education for the 
primary level, which it hoped to implement at its own 
primary school towards the end of 1986. i38 As we can 
see, all these measures taken by ABIM have embodied 
some practical aspects of its own campaigns since 
early 1972 for the improvement of Islamic education in 
Malaysia. 139 
Again as a means to publicise its ideas, ABIM has 
published a voluminous amount of literature, with some 
translations from English, Arabic and Urdu. 14O 
Original works in Bahasa Malaysia and English are also 
published and these include its official organ, 
Risalah, which until very recently was prohibited by 
the government from being openly sold, Diskusi and 
Potensi, the two monthly journals for secondary 
schools and pamphlets and books on religious problems 
in a modern society. 14' These books and other 
publications are sold through ABIM's book sales 
agency, Dewan Pustaka Islam. 142 At the same time, ABIM 
also maintains an Islamic Library at its headquarters, 
which holds over 3,000 volumes, under the charge of 
its Educational Bureau-143 
As part of its activities, ABIM organises talks, 
seminars, forums, muktamar (congresses) and interviews 
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through which it condemns the sale of alcoholic drinks 
and 'gambling (which are fully legalised by the 
government), drug abuse, beauty contests, 
prost it ut i on, corruption and so forth, 144 For ABIM. 
all these social ills are due, "to the choice and 
practice of life based not on divine morality, but on 
sensuality and as such not according to truth and 
justice". 145 As a result, it has called upon the 
government and people of Malaysia to implement 
Sharicah fully as Islam, it argued, "can soLve human 
problems and create a truly Just societyll. 146 
In an effort to develop a rib, 'ý-free economy, ABIM 
launched the XoRerasi Belia Islam (Muslim Youth 
Cooperative) on 30th May, 1977.147 The main aim behind 
this venture was to conduct economic and welfare 
services for the benefit of ABIM members in particular 
and the Muslim community in general. So far, KBI has 
been able to accumulate enough funds to give out 
short-term loans and even to help its members to buy 
land in certain areas of the country. Since April 
1983, KBI has extended its business with SANYO and 
HITACHI, two Japanese firms dealing in electrical 
goods. 148 At the same time, it has launched a special 
borrowing scheme for the buying of motor vehicles. i49 
Besides this, some ABIM members have also set up shops 
in order to provide hal, ýil food and other daily needs 
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-V of its members and Muslims at large. As an 
extension of its welfare services, ABIM set up a 
charitable trust. 'LSI. Meanwhile, ABIM Wilavah 
Persekutuan (-ABIM of Federal Territory) has opened its 
own medical centre at Kampong Pandan since late 
1980. "52 This has been made possible through the 
voluntary services provided by 15 doctors. 
iv. ABIM and ContemRorary Issues: 
Since its establishment, ABIM has addressed itself 
to practically all matters of public policy. This 
stance of ABIM is closely related to its emphasis on 
Islam as al-Din, which also makes the movement the 
most directly political of all the da6wah groups in 
the country. 153 In line with its convictions, ABIM has 
called for the full implementation of Islamic legal, 
educational and economic systems as well as political 
reforms that would end corruption and the misuse of 
power and simultaneously guarantee basic political 
freedoms. 154 For ABIM all these measures should be 
Lmplemented as part of the i! ýjl<ýNhl process, that is, 
"involving a change from fas<§d (destruction) to ! ýalgb 
(c onst r uc ti on), from detriment to betterment, a stri- 
ving for the attainment of Liaqq and good values, and 
not change for the sake of change". Is 5 In making such 
calls, ABIM leadership has taken into account the 
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multi-racial character of the Malaysian society. At 
its 1979 Muktamar Sanawi (Annual Conference), it 
passed a resolution urging the Malaysian government to 
adopt an Islamic solution to the country's communal 
problems and to create unity among the people despite 
their different religious beliefs. 156 For the same 
reason, ABIM since the late-70s has regarded race 
relations as one of its major problems and has taken 
steps to convince all sides, especially the government 
and the non-Muslims, of the superiority of the Islamic 
approach in overcoming the problem of communalism. '57 
To substantiate its argument, its leadership quoted 
SCIrat al-HuJurcýit: 13, which states, "0 Mankind! We 
have created you from a single (pair) of a male and a 
female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye 
may know each other". 158 On the basis of this verse, 
ABIM tried to show that racial variety in itself is 
not a problem but rather a means provided by Allah for 
the people to know each other and cooperate for the 
establishment of a better human society. 's9 
In this connection, ABIM also constantly pointed 
out that under the Sharl: 4ah, non-Muslims are given the 
right to practice their religions and to adopt their 
personal laws as both the Qur'an and Sunnah guarantee 
the freedom of belief and worship. 160 Further, it 
asserted that the non-Muslims were allowed to hold 
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public office or engage in economic activity, as 
discriminatory laws are repugnant to Islam. 16' To 
support this assertion, it quoted parallels from the 
Islamic historical past, for instance, the special 
treatment received by the Najran Christians during the 
time of the Prophet (S. a. W. ), the Muslims/non- 
Muslims relationships laid down by the Constitution of 
Madinah and the presence of Hindus within the Mug 
., 
hal 
administration in India were often cited. i62 
Nonetheless, this idea has not yet been received 
favourably by the non-Muslims. i63 
Nationalism too has been rebuked by ABIM. As a 
philosophy, it is seen as being disruptive and alien 
to the spirit of Islam which calls for unity among the 
Muslims based on the principles of Tawýfd and UkhOwwah 
Isl9mlyah (Islamic Brotherhood). 164 Thus, as a logical 
extension of this, ABIM categorically rejected 
nasionalisme Melayu (Malay nationalism) as being 
incompatible with the universality of Islam. 165 In 
this connection, Siddiq Fadil stated: 166 
"Malay nationalists in their justification of 
nationalism often used the phrase Malay=Islam 
and Islam=Malay. Although this phrase is 
specifically used in the Malaysian context, 
yet it still brings about a negative impact 
upon the purity of Islam as a universal 
religion. This phrase implies that Islam is 
being given the Mc: tlay ch-aracter as if it is 
solely the property of the Malays. Further, 
it means the denial of the role and 
importance of the non-Malay Muslims. Islam, 
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with such an image, will not be acceptable to 
the non-Malays. Obviously, such a form of 
Malay nationalism will Jeopardise the 
development of Islamic dakwah among the non- 
Malays". 
In addition, he unequivocably rejected the 
argument of the nationalists which emphasized that 
Malay nationalism should be promoted as a means to 
elevate the position of the poor Malays as "strong 
Malays mean strong Islam". In this instance, 
said: 167 
"Malay nationalism is claimed to be for the 
purpose of helping the poor Malays, but in 
practice, it is obvious that in many matters 
the already rich Malays are in fact getting 
considerable help, and the policy of 
promoting Malay nationalism helps to create 
millionaires out of a few Malays who are 
already rich. They also use the logic "strong 
Malays=strong Islam". This logic could be 
disputed if the Malays who are being 
strengthened are secular Malays, materialist 
Malays or Malays who do not adhere to the 
teachings of Islam". 
he 
These criticisms of Malay nationalism by ABIM' s 
leaders and also by other Muslim intellectuals caused 
the Malay nationalists within UMNO to be on the 
defensive. 168 
Another issue which is very popular with ABIM to 
this day, is the question of al-cadl (justice) in all 
spheres, especially in the economy and politics. 169 In 
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this respect, as it has been emphasizing al-Gadglah 
al-ijtimýiiyah (social Tustice) in dealing with 
economic issues, it has been branded as being 'Islamic 
Socialist' . 170 However, in the eyes of ABIM's 
activists, social justice is an integral part of Islam 
as al-Din and thus cannot be separated from the 
fundamental Islamic doctrines of Tawbid, am9nah, Jihgd 
and I-amal 5iýUiLi (good deeds). 171 For the same reason, 
its leadership criticised some prestigious projects 
put up by the government and instead called for 
thriftiness in public expenditure and the need to 
improve the general welfare of the people. 172 
SYnonymous with the call for justice is ABIM' s 
preoccupation with the issue of development. For it, 
development means an integrated programme of 
construction as well as the restructuring of human 
society both at individual and group levels in 
conformity with the teachings of Islam. 173 On this 
basis, ABIM again condemned the lopsided, that is, 
materialistic approach towards development propagated 
and tmplemented by the ruling government. 174 At the 
same time, it called for less dependency on external 
trade and foreign loans, while stressing the need to 
provide basic necessities and a more equal 
distribution of income. 175 
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Meanwhile, tarbi: ýah has also been a major issue 
with ABIM. Tust like development and other issues, it 
is articulated within the whole process of 
Islamisation, that is, the moulding of every aspect of 
human endeavour according to Islam. Thus, besides 
setting up its educational institutions and prog- 
rammes, ABIM also untiringly campaigned for a 
comprehensive system of education. In this regard, it 
called for both 4ulama' and Western-trained 
intellectuals who love Islam to cooperate with one 
another in correcting the existing secular-oriented 
system of education. 176, Further, it discussed and 
provided some ideas on how to improve teaching 
techniques by emphasizing the role of the teacher vis- 
(ýt- viS Islamic ethics and the content of the 
curriculum from an Islamic perspective. i77 
Of great significance too was ABIMI s campaign for 
an Islamic state. For example, it condemned the former 
Malaysian Premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, for making a 
plea that Malaysia should always remain a secular 
state. 17 13 As in many other issues, it blamed 
secularism 179 which in its view is originally a 
colonial import 180, for the continued opposition to 
the idea of an Islamic state. 
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Apart from this, ABIM also took up other social 
issues, for example, the need to overcome alcoholism 
and drug addiction as well as the importance of 
breast-feeding and the like. 
Politically, among other things it attacked 
corruption and the lack of political freedom within 
the country. In the early 70s, ABIM leaders were among 
those who campaigned vigorously against the former 
Selangor Menteri Besar Datuk Harun Idris, who was 
later convicted on several charges associated with 
corruption. 182 Concerning political freedom, ABIM 
incessantly criticised the use of the Internal 
Security Act (ISA) by the government as a means to 
silence its critics. 183 Instead, it called for a 
review of the Act so as to ensure justice. It also led 
a campaign of some 48 societies and associations 
against the controversial Societies (Amendment) Bill, 
introduced by the government into the Dewan Rakyat in 
March 1981, which called for all societies to register 
themselves as either "political" or "friendly", in the 
face of the gathering momentum of Islamic resurgence 
among the Muslims of Malaysia. 1114 As Von der Mehden 
put it, although this act was supposedly promulgated 
to cover all societies, its primary target was 
ABIM. 1 13 5 Moreover, by this act, the government could 
control the foreign links of associations and also any 
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group that sought to influence state policy by asking 
them to declare their status. 186 
Despite the antagonism that persisted between ABIM 
and the members'of the Malaysian establishment, it did 
riot stop the movement from cooperating with the 
authorities in some of its activities. For example, in 
1977, it jointly organised the first Asian Youth 
Seminar on Dakwah with the cooperation of WAMY and 
the Islamic Division of the Prime Minister's 
Department as well as the government-controlled Dakwah 
Foundation. 187 Again in 1978, it organised the Muslim 
YOUt h Camp for the Asia-Pacific Region with the 
cooperation of the Islamic Division; the camp was 
opened by the then Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad 
Rithaudeen. 188 
v. International Connections: 
Internationally, ABIM has gained the recognition 
of various Muslim countries, thus making it more 
significant in national politics. ABIM leaders have 
often travelled across the globe or have been invited 
to attend various conferences in the Middle East, 
Pakistan, Australia, the Pacific islands and the Far 
East. "" To maintain its contacts with foreign 
Muslims, ABIM has published the monthly newsletter 
150 
Perspective since late 1979.190 Besides this, it 
enjoyed the respect of such organisations as the 
Islamic Council of Europe, the Islamic Foundation in 
United Kingdom, the Tama'at-e Islami of Pakistan, the 
Muhammadiyah of Indonesia, the RAbitah al-'Alam alý 
Islam! of Saudi Arabia and so forth. '91 Beginning with 
Anwar Ibrahim, a number of ABIM's leaders have served 
within the secretariat of WAMY. Together with other 
world Muslim movements, ABIM observed March 16,1979, 
as Solidarity Day to mark the success of the Iranian 
Revolution. 192 This move of course stirred up the 
emotions of some people within the Barisan 
administration, who had seen it as an attempt to bring 
the revolution nearer to the doorstep of Malaysia. 193 
However, ABIM strongly denied that it had been 
influenced by Iran, though it admitted that some of 
the changes taking place there were in accord with 
Sharf'-ah. 194 
Apart from this, ABIM has maintained close ties 
with other student bodies abroad. Among them are the 
International Islamic Federations of Student 
Organisations (IIESO), the Muslim Students Federation 
of Bangladesh, the Australian Federated Muslim 
Students' Association (AFMSA) and so forth. 195 
Meanwhile, as part of its emphasis on uk, hOwwah- 
Isigmiyah, ABIM criticised the Barisan government for 
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practising 'double standards' in its dealing with 
Muslim minorities, in that it remained silent in the 
face of oppression in Thailand, the Philippines, 
India and Burma, while calling for Muslim unity at 
home and the Middle East. Again as part of its 
expression of Islamic solidarity, it vehemently 
supported both materially and morally the struggle for 
freedom of the Islamic Muj,; ýhidfn in Afghanistan, the 
Muslims of Lebanon and the Palestinians and most of 
all the liberation of Terusalem. 196 In fact, it 
sponsored the Afghanistan Liberation Fund and 
maintained contact with the representatives of the 
Muj, -ýihidin and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), long before these liberation movements gained 
any official recognition from the Malaysian 
authorities. 197 Besides this, ABIM organised an anti- 
Soviet demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy in 
Kuala Lumpur in Tanuary 1980.198 However, ABIM's 
popularity overseas and the impact of its connections 
on Islamic resurgence in Malaysia caused much concern 
among members of the ruling elite. Thus, as mentioned 
before, the government introduced the Societies 
(Amendment) Bill of 1981. Following this, the 
Registrar of Societies directed ABIM to sever all ties 
with foreign organisations. "19 In response, ABIM 
strongly denied having any affiliation with foreig ,n 
organisations, and stressed that it had organised 
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functions together with other bodies after refering to 
the government first. 200 As a result of concerted 
opposition organised by ABIM and the entry of Anwar 
into the government, the Bill finally reverted to the 
original Act of 1966 in March 1983.2 0 At the same 
ti me, the Home Minister announced that a number of 
points had been improved and almost all the requests 
made by the societies which were considered reasonable 
had been met. 202 Significantly, the major amendment 
which resulted in the controversy, that is, the 
classification of a society' as political ceased to 
exist under the new amendment:, -. - 203 With that, the 
whole affair came to an end. 
vi. The Post-Anwar Era: 
With the departure of Anwar Ibrahim, some people 
tended to see ABIM as having lost its dynamism. 204 
ABIM had also been branded by certain quarters as 
having collaborated with UMNO or of having been 
'bought off 1.2 05 These criticisms had been made 
especially by those who identified themselves with 
PAS' s struggle or by hardliners who saw ABIM' s only 
legitimacy as a movement in being radical and in open 
c onf ront at i on wi t. hII ýiwhQt 
206 Thus, some of them 
left the movement in order to be openly active in 
PAS, while others simply withdrew active support from 
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ABIM, 207 Certainly, there had been some confusion 
among ABIMI s rank and f i. le when their f ormer leader 
Joined UMNO. This was because Anwar had been greatly 
admired among his followers and the unexpected move 
was too much for those who lacked the deep 
understanding of ABIM' s orientation as a da6wah cum 
t ar b iyfth movement. 208 Secondly, most people from 
within and without ABIM saw Anwar as simply a PAS 
supporter and a would-be successor of Asri. 209 Hence, 
his sudden change was viewed by some people as 
something beyond comprehension and even as a 
treachery. 210 Thirdly, some simply did not believe 
that he could change the secular tendencies prevalent 
within UMNO and the government. 
To check the disillusionment and confusion among 
certain ABIM members, its leaders resorted to an all- 
out campaign of explaining and reemphasizing ASIMI a 
role as a non-partisan movement, with its main pre- 
occupations being the revival of Islam through the 
processes of da4wah, tarbiyah and 
JýýJý§b. 211 Of greater 
importance too was that Siddiq Fadil spelt out ABIMI s 
stand on all issues since the very beginning of its 
existence and reiteratied its position as a non- 
partisan movement. 212 Again in answering t, 0 the 
criticism that it had been less vocal under the new 
leadership, Siddiq said: 213 
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"Dal--wah Islamiah should not be static in the 
form of mere rhetoric. Amar mar-ri-if should be 
tackled more in terms of lis9n al-4al - the 
provision of services, models, suggestions 
and concrete programmes. Amar maGrof should be '_j increased in the form of problem-solving, 
with ready suggestions and practical answers 
to contemporary issues. Equally, nahi munkar 
should not be implemented only by throwing 
out abuse and provocations, nor by emotional 
condemnation from which you get full 
satisfaction when there are issues to be 
exploited. Nahi munkar should come as honest 
and constructive criticism, accompanied by 
arSuments based on data, facts (and figures, 
to be presented in the corteous language of a 
d96T, for dul-at always address themselves to 
human intellect and innate nature. Indeed, a 
d91-f is a saviour and not one who curses and 
condemns, others to damnation. Du '-cýt are 
callers and not those who simply attack, 
neither they are irresponsible opposers nor 
blind supporters, they are al-gmiriana bi'l- 
ma 6riaf wa 'n-nAhiana r-ani 'l-munkar - the 
callers of good action and the preventers of 
munkar". 
Besides this, Siddiq also ruled out foolhardiness 
in the attempt to carry out Islamipation of every 
aspect of life, when he said, "We need not be rash and 
careless". 2t4 To substantiate this, he quoted that 
isti 6,191 (hastiness) had been rejected by the Prophet 
(s. a. w. ) for it was not suitable for the promotion 
of Islam. 215 Meanwhile, ABIM' s Secretary General 
argued, "Just because there is no sensationalism in 
the way we handle things, it does not mean we no 
longer play an active role in society", 216 Further, he 
added, "Another significant reason for the change in 
style was the early realisation that ABIM cannot rely 
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on rhetoric alone Of 217 and "We wanted to offer an 
alternative and this meant sitting down together, 
thinking things out carefully and planning a 
systematic da4wah programme to show how Islam affects 
all aspects of life". 218 In explaining his past 
experiences, another founder member said, "ABIM had a 
lot of shaking and shouting to do. We had to create 
the awareness that there was a religious vacuum in the 
society. We had no choice but to be Vocallf. 219 While, 
his colleague added, "ABIM reacted harshly in the 70s 
and early 80s because the polit. ical climate was 
harsh". 220 Another reason put forward by, ABIM's 
leadership for the change in. its approach is the 
question of maturity. 221 In this regard, Prof. 
Muhammad Kamal Hassan of the UIA testified that there 
was certainly a genuine process of maturing within 
ABIM, if one analysed the speeches and private 
conversations of its leader. 222 
Aside from all these explanations, ABIM went about 
implementing its own programmes and commenting on 
issues as it saw fit. For example, under the new 
leadership, the tarbiyah process had been accelerated, 
thus leading to the establishment of more than 200 
Islamic kindergartens, and a number of nurseries, 223 
As mentioned earlier, ABIM also designed and has 
recently implemented its own curriculum and teacher- 
156 
training programme as well as publishing more Islamic 
works. 224 With regard to economic problems, it 
continued to carry out its own projects through 
KB 1.2 25 At the same time, it jointly organised a 
symposium on "Contemporary Issues and the Development 
of the Ummah" in cooperation with the multi-racial 
Consumers' Association of Penang (CAP) and the 
Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport on Tuly 13, 
1986.2 26 Among the issues discussed at this meeting 
were the problem of a narrow-minded approach in 
dealing with the needs of the people, Youth National 
Policy, economic inflation, and financial 
mismanagement and its impacts on consumerS. 227 This is 
interesting, especially with regard to the last issue, 
when it is considered in the light of the BMF (Bank 
Bumiputra Finance) scandal, which had cost Malaysia a 
loss of some $2.5M billions and was being officially 
treated with more than usual discreetness. 226 On yet 
another front, it strove to help Muslim converts and 
to spread Islam among non-Muslims through the 
programme known as the 'Islamic Outreach - ABIM1.229 
Meanwhile, in its capacity as the spokesman of 
the umrnah' that it claimed to be, it continued to 
call for the implementation of Aslamah 230 
(Islamisation) of every sphere of life instead of 
accepting the piece-meal process of Penerapan Nilai- 
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nilai Islam (Inculcation of Islamic Values) carried 
out by the Datuk Sri Dr. Mahathir' s administration 
since early 1982.231 In this context, it assertively 
called for more fundamental changes, that is, the full 
implementation of the Shari-ah vis-A-vis politics, 
economic, education, administration, defence and so 
forth. 232 Simultaneously, it campaigned for the 
eradication of things which were overtly contradictory 
to the Qur'7an and Sunnah. "'1 33 While welcoming the 
banning of Muslims from gambling at the famous casino 
at Genting Highland, it argued that the ban should 
also cover all forms of gambling throughout the 
country. 234 In the same vein, it called for the 
banning of the sale of alcoholic beverages by pointing 
out that such drinks were banned in Madinah Eat the 
time of the Prophet] and recently in Khartoum 
(Sl_lCial-l) 
.235 
Further, it emphasized that ukhowwah Isl, =ftmiyah 
should be given priority in the whole Islamisation 
programme. 236 This comment was made in the light of a 
serious crisis that has developed between PAS and UMNO 
since late 1984,2 37 Together with other responsible 
organisations, including the independent Persatuan 
C, U Ja M'; ý I (c-UlamcV Association), it tried to pacify the 
opposing parties by calling for the cancellation of a 
much-publicised debate on T. V. Malaysia and instead 
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suggested a behind closed door muzý§karah (discussion) 
to be held to end the antagonism-238 
For the same end, it reiterated its opposition to 
the use of the Internal Security Act as a means to 
stop dissension. For instance, it argued that the 
arrest of Muslim activists under the ISA would not 
solve the problem, but would aggravate the 
situation. 239 Commenting on the White Paper issued by 
the government to justify such action, it 
unequivocably argued that if the allegations were true 
and based on a sound foundation, then the people 
concerned should be brought to trial and given the 
chance to defend themselves. 240 This, it maintained, 
was in tune with Islam and should be pursued as part 
of the overall Islamisation process. 241. At the same 
ti me, it rejected the takffr (the branding of others 
as kafiron) approach alleged to have been adopted by 
certain PAS members in their dealing with their 
opponents within UMNO. 342 While stressing that Islam 
should be propagated by way / da-wah and proper 
tarbiyah based on sound as well as wise reasoning, it 
also pointed out that the takfir approach was an 
encroachment upon a Muslim's dignity and contrary to 
the da6wah of the Prophet (s. a. W. ). 243 
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In mid-1986, ABIM again attracted the attention of 
the Muslim population of Malaysia when it took 
positive steps to solve the problem created by Kassim 
Ahmad, the former chairman of - the socialist party, 
PSRM who questioned the authenticity of the 
hadith. 244 According to Kassim, who- had been trained 
only in Malay Studies, all the hadith were false and 
could not be accepted at all as the second source of 
the Sharfl-ah. 249 Instead of following others in 
calling for an outright ban on the controversial book, 
ABIM invited Kassim to defend his hypothesis in a 
closed muz9karah. 246 As the writer failed completely 
to defend his views, yet doggedly refused to change 
his stand, ABIM, as represented by its panel of 
scholars, saw fit to expose the fallacies of the 
writer concerned. Accordingly, the finding was made 
public at a press conference. 247 Following this, it 
also distributed copies of the video-tape of the 
muzakarah and published a number of articles and books 
on the issue of hadith. 248 These things were done in 
an effort to protect the Muslims from confused and 
misleading ideas concerning Islam. 249 As a result of 
this campaign, together with the refutations made by 
various r-ulama', Kassim's book has been banned. 250 
In the same year, ABIM came out in defence of a 
number of Muslim trainee nurses who had been dismissed 
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because they chose to wear the mini-telekung, together 
with long-sleeved shirts and long trousers while on 
duty. 251 In this regard, it questioned the sincerity 
of the authorities in harping on the inculcation of 
Islamic values, while oppressing those who seriously 
wanted to adhere to the Islamic code of conduct 
concerning dress and paying no attention to those who 
dressed indecently. 252 Consequently, through all these 
activities, ABIM has been able to hold its own, 
despite the departure of Anwar. Its members, including 
those who were quiet for some time, have begun to be 
active again. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration 
to say that its presence is still causing great 
concern among the nationalists and secularists. 
Darul Arqam: 
Another well-known Islamic group in Malaysia today 
is the aufi-oriented Darul Ar!; jam. Since early 1986, 
some of its beliefs and practices have been 
characterised by several respected 1-ulamd' as being 
out of tune with Islamic orthodoxy. However, strange 
as it might seem, up to the time of writing, no ban 
has been imposed on the movement even though the 
National Fatw9 Committee itself had given the fatwg 
(legal ruling) that Hj. Ashaari, al-Ar! 2aml s chief, has 
written a book which "contains teachings opposed to 
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the Islamic Syariah". 253 Probably, the Malaysian 
authorities have decided not take any firm action 
against the movement for fear of political 
repercussion. Whatever is the case, for the sake of 
convenience, in this study, we shall continue to treat 
the movement as part of the da4wah organisation, while 
not ignoring its equally important unconventional 
characteristics. 
Darul Arqam was started as a halaqah (study 
circle) by Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad (now known as Sheikh 
al-Argam) at Kampung Datuk Keramat, Kuala Lumpur, in 
1969.2 54 Until mid-1986, its activities were dis- 
seminated from Sungai Penchala, an Islamic village 
situated some 17 miles from Kuala Lumpur, among 
various sections of the Malay population. 
i. Leadership and Membershil2: 
Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad was born at Kampung Pilin, 
Rembau, Negri Sembilan in the year 1938.2S5 During 
his childhood, however, his family moved to Selangor, 
where he remained until mid-1986. After finishing his 
early Malay education, he Joined the religious school, 
Maahad Hishamuddin, 256 On the completion of his 
secondary education, he became a religious teacher at 
a number of government-run schools. But after 20 
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years of teaching, he decided to leave and for some 
time was a member of PAS and other Islamic 
organisations. 257 However, finding PAS's brand of 
politics incompatible with his own aspirations, he 
left the party in order to form Darul ArqaM. 258 Since 
then, he has been the leader of the movement. Apart 
from being a dFa4i Ashaari Muhammad is also something 
of a mystic and a poet. 259 Another noted figure of 
Darul Arqam was Ustaz Hj. Mokhtar Yaakub, who was Naib 
Sheikh al-Arqam (Deputy Shaykh al-Arqam) and also 
Mudir Shukbah al-Tarbiyah wa al-Taklim (Head of the 
Education and Instruction Department) until his 
departure from the movement in -May 1986.260 Ustaz 
Mokhtar, a soft-spoken and slight man, is the holder 
of an M. A. in Sharf6ah from al-Azhar. 26 I As Ashaari 
himself admitted, he used to be 'the main source of 
reference' for him in religious matters. 262 Another 
leading member was Hj. Akhbar Anang, a former 
economics lecturer at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
(The University of. Technology, Malaysia), who was the 
Head of the Economic Section until he and his six 
friends were expelled from the movement in 1979.263 
Other top leaders of the movement are the products of 
either pondok, madrasah or al-Azhar. However, very few 
of them have ever obtained a tertiary religious 
education. 264 These asatidhah (religious teachers) 
have been supported by some secular-educated leaders, 
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especially in the running of the economic and social 
welfare programmes. 
Darul Arqam has attracted Muslim youth from both 
urban and rural background. 26S Most of these people 
have had a secular education, ranging from the primary 
to the university level, either at home or abroad. 266 
Besides this, some civil servants, including a few 
highly placed ones, lecturers and professionals have 
joined or symphatized with the movement. 267 
Nonetheless, the movement seems to have attracted 
mostly those who are acquiescent and mild-mannered, 
and inclined to a life of religious contemplation, 
simplicity and ever-ready submission to an accepted 
authority. 268 
In line with their training, many of the members 
of the movement are somewhat inward-looking. They 
reject a luxurious life-style, forsaking the use of 
Western furnishings, televisions and other amenities 
in their own homes. However, televisions equipped with 
video cassettes and tape-players are used quite often 
for da6wah purposes, especially during an al-Argam 
publicity campaign. Al-Arqam members also invariably 
drive cars or ride motor-cycles to work. 269 
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ii. Organisational Structure and Activities: 
For the f irst f our years of its existence, Darul 
Argam only operated as a ýalaqah. It was only in 
1973, that is, with the establishment of the commune 
at Sungai Penchala, that its activities really spread 
far and wide. 270 Physically, the village itself con- 
sisted of a small community of approximately fifty 
houses, a school, a surau and a shopping centre. 271 It 
stood on a piece of land of about five acres, bought 
with its members' own money. 272 Such types of 
settlement have also been set up in Perak, Trengganu 
and Kedah as branches of Sungai Penchala. 
I Despite the existence of various syukbahs 
(departments) on economy, education, dal-wah and so 
forth, in practice, the movement seems to have been 
centred on one man. In this regard, S. Othman 
Kelantan, a lecturer and a writer, has said that the 
movement was set up along the lines of a tarlqah. 273 
As an illustration, he asserts that unlike ABIM, the 
members referred everything to their leader, the 
Sheikh al-ArqaM. 274 In f act, no activity could be 
carried out without the prior approval of this 
leader. ;275 Further, it emphasized uniformity in 
, ýibadah (the act of worship) and kept to strict 
secrecy in matters pertaining to its chosen 
165 
ar gLýfth, 276 This arrangement has certainly been able 
to instil discipline and unite all the members for the 
purpose of dacwah activities, but it cannot avoid the 
risk of being labelled as authoritarian, a charge 
often made against the Sheikh al-Ar! Qam by its former 
members since 1979. Meanwhile, Ustaz Ashaari himself 
has admitted that the movement has no constitution, 
and it is not registered. 277 Thus, a person can be a 
member simply by participating in its prescribed 
programmes, which include attending religious classes 
and the willingness to make necessary sacri. fices. 278 
The movement claims that it has been interested in 
f-radicating "elements of Jahiliyfth in Malay society" 
and "the creation of a society based on revealed 
religion". 279 However, its committed members are few 
in number, although there are thousand of sympathizers 
throughout the country, 280 Since the very beginning, 
it has been advocating a literal return to the gurlan 
and, as far as possible, tries to adopt what it 
envisages as a Muslim form of dress. In this context, 
its male members wear either green, white or black 
-jubbah and 
turbans, and women members adopt the mini- 
telekunl; 2ý and jubbah, while some even prefer purdah. 281 
Besides converging in their communes, the members 
of this movement are also engaged in a lecture 
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circuit. To publicise its cause, it has since J'uly 
1977 published the newspaper Al-Argam printed in Tawi 
script 282, accompanied by one or two short articles 
in English. 283 It also publishes a number of books, 
journals and tapes on the 'discourses given by the 
Sheikh al-Arqam. Ashaari and his assistants conduct 
classes (kelas fardhu lain) every Wednesday night in 
subjects pertaining to Quranic tafsir, tawhid, fiqh 
and so forth, which are also open to the public. 
Occasionally, al-Arqam hold its own al-ArQam. Expo- to 
exhibit its products and to attract the people to its 
cause. 2a4 On such occasions, one may see a video 
showing the Sheikh al-Argam in action, that is, 
delivering his lectures to the members of the commune. 
Of course, these displays, and the projection of the 
man himself in almost every publication of the 
movement, have led outsiders to make the charge that 
the movement thrives on a 'personality CUltI. 285 
Another feature of the movement is that it has 
emphasized economic berdikari (self-sufficiency), not 
only for its members but also for the rest of the 
Muslim community. It has managed several agricultural 
projects, including vegetable and fruit cultivation 
and cattle, chicken and fish farming. 286 These are 
made possible by the fact that most of its settlements 
are rural-based. In addition, it has set up a number 
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of mostly small back-yard industries to produce ýalgl 
products such as soya sauce, mee bread, beef and so 
forth. 287 Other products which are marketed include 
tooth-paste, talcum powder and a variety of religious 
articles such as prayer-beads and books. 2 88 Despite 
all these laudable efforts, one just cannot deny that 
the qualities of its manufactured products such as 
jam, pickles and tooth-paste still leave much to be 
desired. 289 
Since the 80s, Darul Arqam has opened its own 
clinics to provide modern and traditional medicines 
and other modes of treatment. 290 Meanwhile, its 
Welfare Section has been looking after orphans, widows 
and making marriage arrangments as well as preparing 
bodies for burial. 291 
As part of its tarbiyah programme, al-ArQam set up 
its own schools, with its headquarters at Yayasan al- 
Arqam, Sungai Penchala. 292 The school at Sungai 
Penchala was only started in 1975.293 Al-Arqam's 
schools provide both religious and secular (academic) 
education with the object of producing pious 
individuals who are also successful in the academic 
f ield. 294 Apart from teaching religious subjects, the 
schools also provide instruction in English, 
agricultural science, arithmetic and so on. 2'15 Other 
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activities include attending classes on fardhu ain 
usrah and so forth. 296 As the students originate from 
all over Malaysia, they are provided with hostel 
facilities. 
Within the commune, male-female segregation is 
strictly observed, in that male students are normally 
made to sit in front, while female students occupy the 
back part of the class-rooMS. 297 At the hostels, the 
students always cook their own food and rotate their 
own resp. onsibilities as in any other commune. 298 
However, the religious schools have not been 
registered with the Mallis Aqama Islam as required in 
each state. With regard to this, the late Mufti of the 
Federal Territory advised the Sheikh al-Arýjam to 
register his school with the religious authorities in 
his territory, 299 Another peculiar aspect of the 
school system is that all of the students' letters 
going in and out of the commune are closely 
censored. 300 The same applies to their reading 
materials to the extent that only al-Argam 
publications have been allowed at any time. 30i 
Consequently, most of these students have developed a 
narrow perspective in their understanding of the world 
at large. 
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iii. Darul Argam and Socio-Political Issues: 
As a movement, Darul Arqam has been involved in a 
number of issues, though generally people have assumed 
t hat it is not greatly inclined t0 pojitiCS. 302 
Lately, this assumption has been proven to be untrue, 
for it is noticeable that not only has the movement 
accepted government grants channeled through the 
Ministry of Social and Welfare Services, contrary to 
its earlier stand, but some of its leaders have also 
come out in support of government policy. For example, 
a top leader of al-Argam has claimed that no political 
party in Malaysia has really adopted a policy based on 
al-! Qurl c5n and hadith. 303 This statement was seen by 
many as a challenge to PAS, whose struggle has all 
along been linked with these two sources. In another 
instance, a number of al-Arqam's top leaders were 
reported to have been sent to Pahang in order to halt 
the growth of PAS' s inf luence in t he st at e. 30 11 This 
apparent tilt towards UMNO has caused some of its 
members to quit the organisation. 305 
Evidently, al-Arglam has addressed itself to some 
of the problems affecting the Muslim world in modern 
times. Among the issues discussed are the problems of 
development, economic self-sufficiency, leadership, 
unity, good moral character, asceticism and so on. 
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However, after a close scrutiny of the printed 
materials available one is bound to conclude that the 
views expressed within the organisation are rather 
unsophisticated, lacking in depth and intellectuality 
and at best a repetition of the same themes. 306 
Besides, no concrete evidence based on hard facts has 
been given when a criticism or an allegation is made 
against anyone or any group. 307 Such shortcomings do 
not help anyone to have a better understanding of the 
issues under d: iscussion, thus defeating the very 
purpose of tarbiyah as it is generally understood. 
iv. Overseas Connections: 
As a movement, Darul ArQam has maintained 
connections with Malaysian students overseas and some 
foreign groups. For example, its leaders have visited 
Australia, the United States of America, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Thailand and so on and established contacts 
with students in these countries. 308 However, it has 
not been very successful in winning over adherents 
from among those who are more critical-minded. Besides 
this, their dul; gt have visited and lectured at the 
Dargawi- Institute, Norwich, England and have also met 
other sCiff groups in Jordan, Morocco and so forth, 309 
4 
Nonetheless, the movement seems to be influenced more 
by local Nusantara traditions plus some streaks of 
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Shi'-ism, rather than pure Salgf! doctrines. This 
particular point will be discussed under a fresh 
subtitle. 
v. Controversies Surrounding Darul Arqam: 
Since the 70s, the movement has been enmeshed in a 
number of controversies. In their course, outsiders 
have dubbed it as being fanatic, out of date, anti- 
social, a polygamous association and a haven for false 
teachings. 310 Its leader. s simply took such hostile 
comments as a sign of ignorance or mere prejudice on 
the part of others towards the movement. However, 
there is no denying that some of these comments have 
brought the whole movement into question. In the 
following paragraphs, we shall be looking at some of 
these issues. 
Although the movement -for some time seemed to be 
running fairly smoothly at its various centres, 
several incidents of dissension have recently been 
reported. These leaks and exl? os6s have to be taken 
seriously in view of the fact that these statements 
were made by some of its former senior members, who 




have criticised the movement for its 
emphasis on polygamy. 311 They make the charge that al- 
Arqam' s leaders are not only taking advantage of the 
situation by marrying more than is necessary, but are 
also encouraging other members to have more than one 
wife. 3'2 -The issue has become so notorious that there 
is now a standing Joke that if one wishes to have more 
than one wife, he should join Darul Arqam. 313 
However, of all the issues which have come to the 
surface, there is nothing which is more perpl. exing 
than the case involving the relationship between Darul 
Arqam and Tarigat Muhammadiyah. 31 4 The is-sue first 
came into the open in March 1979, with the expulsion 
of Hj. Akhbar Anang, the former naqlb of al-Arqaml s 
Economic Section, and his six associates. 31 5 In this 
case, what is important is that all of these men, with 
the exception of Anwar Ismail, were once nuqabg' 
(group leaders), that is, trusted assistants of Ustaz 
Ashaari. 316 Following their expulsion, rumours 
abounded. According to Hj. Akhbar the charges levelled 
against them kept on increasing until they reached a 
total of 25.31 7 Among the charges made were that the 
group tried to wrest power from Ashaari, implementing 
economic projects without first consulting the Amir 
and the Syura that Akhbar had blocked the publication 
of Ashaari' s books and c asset te and so forth. 3181n 
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response, Akhbar and his associates distributed their 
own 46-page rebuttal, answering point by point all the 
allegations and simultaneously exposing the weaknesses 
of the movement and the false teachings associated 
with Ashaari himself. 3L9 
From this disclosure, one has been able to learn a 
great deal more about Darul Ar! 2am. The crux of the 
whole matter was the controversy surrounding the 
Tariqat Muhammadiyah and the Aurad Muhammadiyah, that 
i S. an epistle containing a collection of prayers 
which is claimed by Ustaz Taha Suhaimi, a grandson of 
Sheikh Muhammad b. Abdullah as-Suhaimi and the present 
head of Tari2at Muhammadiyah in Singapore, to have 
been received personally by his grandfather from the 
Prophet (s. a. W. ), 320 Closely associated with this is 
the controversy concerning the Mangqib Kiyai Agung 
Asy-Syeikh as-Sayyid Muhammad b. Abdullah as-Suhaimi, 
that is, a biography plus mystical adventures of the 
founder of Tarigat Muhammadiyah which has been part 
of the literature to be read and believed in by anyone 
performing Aurad Muhammadiyah. 321 
AlthOLIgh, as mentioned above, other reasons were 
given for the purge, the evidence seems to indicate 
that it was carried out because of the readiness of 
Akhbar and his friends to question the practice of 
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this unconventional tariqah- This can be deduced from 
the fact that the dismissal was executed swiftly and 
unceremoniously, that no reason was given for the 
action taken, and that no opportunity was given to 
those condemned to discuss the matter with the Sheikh 
al-ArqaM. 322 In fact, when Akhbar and his friends 
asked for an audience with Ashaari, his then deputy, 
CikSu Abdul Rahman, briefly said, "The door has been 
closed and Ustaz [Ashaaril is a firm manfl. 323 
Subsequently, other requests for a peaceful settlement 
based on Islamic principles were t urned down 
flatly. 324 Akhbar, however, learned that the decision 
to dismiss them was made in the house of Pak Kiyai Mat 
325 the spiritual adviser of Ustaz Ashaari, in 
Klang. 326 Of significance too is that the dismissal 
had come in the wake of Akhbar' s attempt to see 
Ashaari himself in order to obtain clarifications 
concerning the tarl_qah. 327 
Following the expulsion, Ashaari resorted t0 
making charges against the group, even to the extent 
of delivering personal attacks on their characterS. 328 
They were also totally ostracized, in that others were 
not allowed to speak to them at all. 329 Despite all 
the allegations, al-Arg, ýam members say that "Hj. Akhbar 
was a very energetic person who contributed much to 
the movement's economic projects and helped in the 
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settin g up of the Darul Argam clinic" . 
330 Furthermore, 
since their expulsion, Akhbar and his friends have not 
taken any step to set up their own daGwah organisation 
in competition with their former chief, thus casting 
doubt on Ashaari's charge that prior to their 
dismissal they were out to wrest power from him. In 
view of this, only a very serious issue such as the 
practice of the tariqah and all its related 
controversies could have led to these uncompromising 
act ions. 
Finding themselves exposed to all sorts of smear 
campaigns, Akhbar and his friends took the ioSical 
step of making the whole issue public, thus disclosing 
the hidden aspects of al-Arqam and its leader. Among 
the charges made were that the objective of the 
movement was hazy, that the sygra had not been 
effectively functioning as the Amir acted more like a 
dictator, and that the Amir, in contradiction to his 
own policy, had criticised other movements without 
making any effort to advise the parties concerned. 331 
At the same time, Akhbar argued that as the appointed 
editor, he had temporarily blocked the publication of 
only one of the leader's book and a cassette, because 
they contained material which in his view would bring 
about serious repercussions with other Islamic 




Regarding the tarj: qah-, his revelation seemed to 
bring to light a number of highly unorthodox beliefs 
and practices prevalent among the top leaders of al- 
Arqam. For example, they believe that the founder of 
the tarfqah, Sheikh Muhammad as-SuhaiMi 333, an Gglim 
of Tavanese descent, who died in Klang in 192 15, is the 
Im9m Mahdl. 334. that is, the awaited Messiah whose 
appearance will bring about justice and tranquility 
throughout the world. 33S In line with this belief, 
they say that the Mahdi is now in ghaybah 
(occultation) and thus he is not dead, but is in 
hiding at Alas Kotonggo (Kotonggo Forest), near the 
town of Pacitan in Central Java. 336 It is also 
believed that he is simultaneously the awaited Ratu 
Adil 337 (lust King), whose coming had been predicted 
by Tayabaya. 338 In both roles, he can be invoked by a 
devoted member of the tariqah to help him in times of 
danger, distress and to enable him to overpower his 
Y. 
ememies physically and to reduce him to silence. 339 
Despite these disclosures, Darul Arqam continued 
to grow. Pusat Islam that is, the religious affairs 
section of the Prime Minister's Department, could not 
find any Justification for banning the movement. The 
same problem reemerged in June 1986 and this time on a 
much serious scale, as it involved the religiously 
educated Naib Sheikh al-Arqam and others who were once 
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known - to be the vanguard of the movement. 
Simultaneously, another sensational piece of news, 
regarding the movement spilled out into the open, 
which was that al-Arqam had abandoned its main 
settlement at Sungai Penchala. 340 In the wake of this, 
a number of al-Argam' s former members disclosed that 
Ashaari's faction had resorted to vandalism within the 
abandoned settlement on the orders of its master, so 
as to make the settlement totally useless for Ustaz 
Mokhtar' s groUp. 341 Such was the fury that developed 
between the two opposing camps. 
As in the previous case, rumours were rife. To 
clear the air, Ustaz Mokhtar explained that he left 
the movement simply because he disagreed with the 
I-aqidah of Ustaz Ashaari and a great number of his 
followers, who claimed that the founder of Tariqat 
Muhammadi yah is the Im9m. Mahdi. 342 Following this, he 
made a full disclosure of the whole issue, thus 
confirming what Akhbar Anang and -his friends had said 
in 1979.3 43 In addition, he brought out a new point 
that the adherents of this tariqat had added the names 
of the Khulafg' al-Rashidin and al-Mahdd: to the usual 
formula for the shah, ýýdah, which they recite while 
chanting the aUrc; 5d. 344 
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Ustaz Ashaari denied all the charges made against 
him and launched an attack on his former deputy and 
the breakaway group. He asserted that Ustaz Mokhtar 
had left the movement after having failed to wrest 
power from him and also because of his inability to 
popularise Tariqat Naqshabandiyah. 34 s But all these 
counter-charges were refuted by Ustaz Mokhtar, who now 
revealed that Ashaari had evaded and even turned down 
his repeated attempts to discuss the tariqat with 
the view to correcting the deviationS. 346 
Meanwhile, other I-ulamV too had given their 
personal opinions concerning al-Ar! 2am and the 
controversial tari2at. For example, Datuk Hj. Ishak b. 
Hj. Baharom, the Mufti of Selangor, said, "it is a 
deviation (sesat) of those people who believe that 
Sheikh Suhaimi is Im9m Mahdf". 347 Hj. Harussani. Hj. 
Zakaria, the Mufti of Perak, said, "Tari! ýat 
Muhammadiyýjh is divided into two groups; one is 
correct and the other, that is, the one practiced by 
Hj. Ashaari, contravenes Islam". 3 48 Dr. Maghfur Mohd. 
Osman 3490a man of Tavanese descent, presently 
attached to Islamic Studies Centre, MARA Institute of 
Technology, stated, "Et hose] who bel i eve in such a 
matter [Sheikh as-Suhaimi being the Mahdil are 
involved in a deviation (sesat)10.3SO 
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Meanwhile, a further leak concerning al-Arqam 
became known to the public, when a cassette 351 
containing the confession of al-Arqam' s chief about 
his belief that "asy-Syeikh Muhammad as-Suhaimi is the 
promised Mahdi", which was made in front of Ustaz Taha 
Suhaimi, the tariqat' s head in Singapore, fell into 
the hands of a New Straits Times' reporter. 352 This, 
of course, contradicts all the denials made by Ashaari 
himself. As mentioned earlier, the National Fatwcý§ 
Committee had ruled that Ashaari's book contained 
teachings opposed to the Islamic Shari-ah. Despite 
all this, up to the time of this writing, Pusat Islam 
has not really taken any concrete step to ban the 
tari-qat or to declare al-Argam a deviant movement. 353 
What it had done was to issue a rejoinder clarifying 
certain points found in Ashaari's book, Aurad 
Muhammadiyah Peqanwan Darul Arqam and confirm that the 
aurad contained false teachings and beliefs and that 
the tariqat should be avoided by all Muslims in order 
not to go astray. 354 On 24th February, 1986, the 
Religious Affairs Department of the Federal Territory 
had called for Ashaari to explain his case once again 
in the light of the new developmentS. 3SS But he failed 
to turn up at the appointed hour, with the excuse that 
he had mig-raine, and instead sent his three caides to 
represent him. 356 Thus the meeting had to be 
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postponed. 357 Up to the time of this writing, nothing 
more has been heard about the affair. 
From the issues discussed, we can say that both 
al-Arqam and the tariqat have in some ways been 
influenced by Shif-ite traditions. One of these is the 
concept of taqiyah (dissimulation), that i S, the 
concealment of one' s true belief in times of danger or 
persecution. 3S 8 An instance of this is that when the 
Sheikh al-ArQam was under cross-examination at Pusat 
Islam on July 19,1979, he categorically denied that 
he believed Sheikh as-Suhaimi to be the promised 
Mahdf. 359 However, interestingly, in his new book, the 
Aurad, he states that he exercised tawa22uf (a wait 
and see attitude) in the matter. 
360 Meanwhile, in the 
tape concerned, he confessed to Ustaz Taha that he 
believed in it. 361 Besides this, the Mancý§qib of Ustaz 
Taha, differing in this from the original Tavanese 
"i - ver 
es io ri, mentioned the- di-L-appearance of Sheikh as- 
Suhaimi and the fact that he would return as the Mahd! 
at the appointed hour. This is exactly the concept of 
ral I-ah (return) popular within the Shi '-it e 
traditionS. 362 
Aside from Shicite influence, the Mancýqib of Ustaz 
Taha seemed to be influenced by Javanese-Hindu 
Mysticism. This is clearly the case in the issue 
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related to Ratu Adil as predicted by Tayabaya- Of 
significance too is the fact that Alas Kotonggo, which 
is believed to be the hiding place of the Mahdl, is 
also according to Tavanese traditional belief a 
sacred place of gods (dewa-dewa). 363 Furthermore, 
Ustaz Ashaari himself disclosed that the Khulafc! P 364 
of Sheikh as-Suhaimi for the whole of the Malaysian 
Peninsular are a number of personalities of Tavanese 
descent. 365 In any case, the traces of syncretism 
associated with al-Arqam's practices via the tariqat 
have strenghtened the Malaysians' suspicion and 
hostility towards the movement. 366 But, based in its 
new retreat at the more isolated Kampong Sempadan, 
near Karak, Pahang, it will probably be more difficult 
for the authorities to monitor its controversial 
activiti eS. 367 
Tama'at Tabligh: 
Jama'at Tabligh is an Indian-inspired movement 
which had its beginning at Mewat, an area south of 
Delhi, in 1927, when it was launched by Maul, ýn, ýý 
Muýammad Ilyc; =iS. 368 However, its founder preferred to 
call it Tahrj: k-i lmi§n. (Faith Movement) rather than 
anything else. 369 It was founded mainly to revitalize 
the fmcin of the Muslims, whom the MaulgnFa viewed as 
being apathetic and flagging in their commitment to 
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the Islamic faith. Currently, its nerve centre and 
organisational stimulus are still located at 
Nizamuddin, in Delhi. 370 Nevertheless, through an 
extensive network of missionaries (muballighin), it 
has gained a foothold in all the 'continents of the 
world. 
Jamalat Tabligh was first introduced into the 
Malay Peninsular in the 1950s, to help reinforce the 
f lagging spirits of Southeast Asian MUSJJMS, 371 
Compared to the two movements already discussed, it is 
the least structured. 372 Initially, it managed only to 
find adherents among a small number of urban Muslims, 
particularly the Indian and Pakistani Muslims, within 
the business communities of Singapore, Kuala Lumpur 
and Penang. 373 BUt, with the recent revival of Islamic 
consciousness, it has been able to win the hearts of 
more Malays than previously. 
i. Membership, Organisation and Activities: 
As a movement, lama-at directs its attention to 
males alone, although wives of followers are 
encouraged to hold their prayers and discussions in 
the seclusion of their own homes. 374 Followers of this 
movement usually wear a green or white jubbah and 
turbans or skull-caps. Each core congregation, under 
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the leadership of an amir or teacher, is loosely 
attached to a particular mosque, usually associated 
with the Indian community. 375 Presently, their two 
most important centres of congregation in Malaysia are 
the Maslid India in Kuala Lumpur and the Masjid 
Pakistan in Penang. The language of the sermon and 
lectures is still in Urdu or Tamil or less commonly in 
Arabic, but recruitment of Malay-speaking lecturers or 
translators is more common today. 376 Although it has 
been able to win the support of some educated people, 
most of its adherents are still found among those who 
are less educated and prefer a life of religious 
contemplation, remaining indifferent to the complex- 
ities of the developing Malaysian society and of the 
world at large. At the same time, the movement has the 
backing of some wealthy merchants of Indo-Pakistan 
origin. 377 
It is estimated that the movement has about 5,000 
followers in West Malaysia, but probably only one 
fifth of these are fully committed, with the majority 
vacillating on the fringes of this and other dar-wah 
'groUpS. 
378 Some of these members, including university 
lecturers and professionals, were recruited during 
their studies overseas. Tabligh 379 sessions are held 
in various retreats (usually in mosque and surau) 
beginning from the (-aý5r prayer. In such a session, 
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apart from listening to the talk given by the amir or 
his assistants, the congregation perform their 5al9t, 
recite the Qur'73n and the prescribed wa;; a'if (daily 
portion of devotional readings or dhikr) and have 
their dinner (and also breakfast) together. Throughout 
this session, one can see Islamic brotherhood, 
solidarity and humility expressed openly among the 
congregation, 380 All of this seems to encourage most 
regular attenders to remain in the movement. The 
gathering can last for a day and a night , three days 
and three night, 5 or more. On such an occasion, no 
contact with the "outside" is allowed. 381 It is also 
at such a meeting that members of the congregation are 
asked to commit themselves to a tabliwh tour of three 
days per month, forty days in a year or even four 
months in a lifetime. 382 In addition, members are 
persistently urged to include in this tour a visit to 
the Delhi headquarters. 383 this approach has caused 
some members of the public to complain of harassment 
or even for some of its own members to abandon the 
movement completely. Besides organising weekly local 
meetings, Jamal-at activists also sponsor an occasional 
grand i-itima' (gathering) which involves members from 
all over the world. 
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Essentially, the activities of the Jamal-at are 
non-political in nature, in conformity with the rules 
set down by its founder. 384 It lays more stress on 
self-purification and this has caused its members to 
be less concerned with the material well being of this 
world. 385 In this respect, the movement closely 
follows the asceticism prevalent within ýjQfj: 
traditions of the past. In fact, Maulgng Muhammad 
Ilyas incorporated certain ! ýQf! ideas and practices in 
his teachings and these remain an essential part of 
the movement. 386 The tabligh works that the Maulc; §nc; -3 
established are based on seven principles, six 
positive and one negative. 387 These are the kalimah 
(the first article of faith), ! ýalc; ýt (prayer), tac-allum 
(acquisition of knowledge) and dhikr 388 (remembrance 
of Allah), respect towards fellow Muslims, sincerity 
of niyyat (intention), that is, to perform every act 
for the sake of Allah alone, the devotion of some time 
to preaching tours, and lastly not engaging in idle, 
unlawful and unnecessary talk or actions. 389 In 
following the rule of political abstention, some of 
the Jamal-st members have even refused to participate 
in the administration of irreligious institutions. 390 
In this context, their revulsion against the 
secularist attitude entails a total rejection of the 
existing political order. It is this abstention from 
politics, which is in itself a political dimension, 
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that has caused much worry among Malay leaders within 
the Barisan government as they have always hoped to 
gain more support from the Islamically-oriented 
Malays. This orientation of the movement has also 
caused the Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (KIMMA ), 
which competes with the MIC for Indian support, to 
lose the chance of becoming a viable political 
party. 391 At the same time, those who have Joined the 
movement in the hope of finding a more comprehensive 
answer to their religious needs, eventually have to 
abandon it either for ABIM or Darul Arglam. 
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In this chapter, we shall discuss Islamic 
heterodoxy, which is still a part of the Malaysian 
scene, and in fact has had some inf luence upon the 
general development of Islam within the country. 
Currently, across Malaysia, there are numerous 
heterodox groups <kumpulan ajaran sesat) which have 
been mistakenly identified by Nagata as localised 
da6wah movements. I Despite the fact that these groups 
have had some impact upon the local scene, no one who 
is really familiar with Islam in Malaysia will be 
ready to classify them as da4wah movements-, unless as 
some times happened, for the purpose of discrediting 
other da'-wah movements, in the course of defending or 
promoting his own political ends. 
Islamic heterodoxy is not new to Malaysia or for 
that matter the whole of the Nusantara region. For 
instance, Ustaz Abdul Fatah Haron Ibrahim of the 
Usuluddin and Philosophy D epartment, Universiti 
Kebanýrsaan Malaysia, has stated that these uneducated 
groups had their beginning with the coming of Islam to 
Nusantara. 2 They spread among the local population 
through oral transmission and also by way of written 
works f ound in Malay Literature. 3 Prof. Madya 
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(Associate Professor) Muhd. Sulaiman Hj- Yassin, head 
of the same department, and also a -:. ýiQf f in his own 
right, argued that these groups were not turug 
although they had tried to link themselves with 
tarfaah activities, in order to gain legitimacy among 
the people. 3 He also added that they were simply 
promoting false teachings (alaran-alaran palsu) for 
the sake of gaining material benefits, that is, fame, 
power and fortune and also because of the distorted 
minds of their leaders. 4 In pursuing their goals, 
these people have even associated their teachings with 
the doctrine of Imam Mahd! and. have given vague B<7atinl 
6 (esoteric) interpretations to Quranic c; ýyc; ýt (verses) 
and hadith. 7 In defining deviant teachings, Mohd. Amin 
Salleh of Pusat Islam wrote that "these are 
teachings and practices which contravene the Shari6ah 
and sources of Islamic law, even though they claimed 
to be from Islam and are being taught to the members 
of the society in secret or at times openly ... In 
f act, he asserted that in Malaysia these teachings 
"exist in the form of syncretism between animistic 
beliefs, Hindu-Buddhist influence and other pre- 
Islamic practices. " 
The deviant groups exist in both urban and rural 
areas of Malaysia, each of them focusing around a 
specific leader. 10 Paradoxically, they are found most 
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frequently in Kedah and Kelantan, long considered to 
be the most "religious" of Malay States. " Upon being 
discovered, some of these groups have been labelled as 
"deviant", "confused" or "false" (somzsansz, 
menyeleweng or salah) by both religious and da6wah 
authorities and also by government spokesmen. 12 We 
shall look below at a number of cases concerning these 
deviant movements and simultaneously assess their 
impacts upon Islam in Malaysia. 
a. Tasl f m. 
One of the most famous of these deviant groups is 
the TaslTm or the Matahari movement, as it is known in 
Kedah and Penang. According to one of its former 
members, the name Taslim was derived from the word 
tasl! mFa (surrender) in verse 56 of Surat al-Ahzý-ab, in 
the Qur I c§n. 13 In this connection, according to 
Taslim's interpretation, the word tasllmg in the i§yah 
(verse) concerned means the total surrender of a 
follower, his wife and children as well as his 
property to the 'prophet', that is, the leader of the 
movement or in case of his death to his 'khallfah' 
(successor) at Kampung Seronok, Bayan Lepas, Penang. 14 
If this is not carried out, then in Tasllm' s view the 
person' s Islam is not valid at all. 15 Besides this, 
the movement is also called Matahari (Sun) as its 
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founder the late Hj. Ahmad b. Shafie, a man of 
Sumatran origin, had pointed to the sun when he was 
asked about God by Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Jarumil a 
well-known Kedah "alim, following a munc; §Zarah 
(discussion) between him and the man. 16 As a result of 
this incident, Hj. Ahmad was known as " Hj. Ahmad 
Matahari" and was banned forever from entering 
Kedah. 17 However, in making this gesture, Hj. Ahmad 
was in fact upholding the Batiniyah's do ctrine of 
wahdat al-wujCd (pantheism). "a 
Besides unconditional SUbmission to the leader, 
Taslim requires that the shah9dah be pronounced before 
the leader or his khallfah in order to validate it. 19 
Further, it rejects the Qur' cýan as mere fabrication, 
with the 'authentic one' residing in the person of the 
Oprophet' of the Taslfm; Friday prayers simply means a 
union between Adam and Eve, and thus the performance 
of the jamcýý§r-ah (congregational prayer) means to have 
sexual union; the hal-I can be performed only by going 
up the Bukit Payong, a hillock close to the house of 
the leader at Kampung Seronok, while dhikr, which is 
carried out in the dark, reaches its peak of revelry 
far into the night, with the members involved in group 
sex sessions. 20 Adultery is encouraged within the 
movement as the offspring of such unions are 
considered blessed, 21 Most interesting of all is that 
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sins can be absolved by the leader on payment of a 
certain sum of money. 22 It is argued that these 
teachings influenced those involved because of their 
sheer ignorance of Islam, their use of drugs and their 
desire for adventure. 23 
At present, the movement, which started in the 
4-0s, has been on the wane as more people learn of its 
heterodox nature and also because of more stringent 
religious control. 24 
b. Nasrul Hg-q,. 
Another group which used to promote dubious 
teachings is the Nasrul Ha! ý. According to its 
adviser, a man of In donesian origin, the name of the 
movement was derived from Nagar al-Haq(a. (The Help of 
the Truth) only in 1976.2 5 Its famous khalffah and 
patron, Datuk Hj. Abdul Samad Idris, the former 
Malaysian Minister of Youth, Culture and Sports., 
claimed that he had acquired the spiritual knowledge 
from his grandfather and parents and that he later 
perfected it after learning silat at Sawa Barat (West 
Sava) and a further study of its teachings at its 
original home in S umatra Barat (West Sumatra). 26 
Essentially, Nasrul Haq is a combination of martial 
arts and spiritual knowledge, which include the 
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performance of dhikr. In practice, it involves an 
oath-taking ceremony, the observance of good moral 
conducts and an emphasis on strong bonds of love and 
loyalty between members of the movement. 27 In this 
connection, it shares the features common to all ýjQfl 
orders and secret societies. 
In its brief life, the movement developed many 
branches, only to be pruned prematurely. Like other 
silat groups, it had its own styles and techniques of 
self-defence and modes of disciplines. 28 By 1978, its 
membership r'eached at least 300,000.29 But the fact 
I that it was sponsored in the name of Islam in an era 
of heightened sensitivity to religious niceties and 
was simultaneously under the patronage of a certain 
contentious cabinet minister caused the movement to be 
exposed to much public attention and heated debate. 30 
Religiously, it was viewed as a body which had 
overstepped the legitimate conventions of silat proper 
and was indulging in some dubious practices which 
wrongfully invoked Islam, somewhat in the manner of 
Indonesian-style mystical cults (kebatinan), as when 
its members engaged in ýjg-fl-like chanting until they 
achieved a state of trance. 3 I Further objections were 
raised when the movement's leaders began using Islamic 
titles like khalffah, giving sermoný-s, and demanding 
personal oath of loyalty, thereby encroaching upon and 
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insulting the true faith. 32 Meanwhilet daGwah 
activists rejected it as being an embodiment of the 
adat-influenced, syncretic Islam of the old Malay 
tradition that they have condemned and are trying to 
change. 33 
Initially, the movement did flourish as its patron 
had the advantage of being the -Minister of Youth, 
Culture and Sports and also an influential politician 
in his home state of Negri Sembilan. Through his 
office, he could channel financial resources and 
influence Malay youth into joining the movement, and 
also construct silat arenas and muster g 
.,, 
iant rallies 
in Kuala Lumpur, amidst much publicity and 
pag eantry. 34 On the occasion when the Nasrul H! ftcL House 
was opened in Kuala Lumpur in 1978, it was inaugurated 
by no less a prominent patron than Tun Hussein Onn, 
the Prime Minister. 35 In the speech, Tun Hussein 
praised the movement and called upon its members to 
use their arts in defence of national interests. 36 In 
view of this, some observers suggested that the 
movement at this time was seen by UMNO leaders as a 
useful weapon to counter PAS's I,, SlaM. 37 But soon it 
got out of hand. 
By mid-1978, its leader was constantly attacked by 
religious circles, particularly dal-wah activists, and 
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also by his political rivals, who feared his growing 
power. 38 He was f irst forced to relinquish the title 
of khalffah and then to ensure that none of his 
followers misused Quranic verses or mosque buildings 
for their self-defence activities. 39 Eventually, the 
movement was banned following its condemnation as 
sinful and deviant by the National Council of 
Religious Affairs. 40 Following this, the fortune of 
the minister himself began to wither, so that he lost 
power as a youth leader and finally even his place in 
the cabinet. 
c. CryRto. 
In the mid-70s, the Muslims of Malaysia were 
shocked to discover that there was yet another 
heterodox teaching spreading in their midst. This was 
the Crypto. The word "crypto" itself originates from 
Greek. 41 The choice of this name with its associations 
of "hidden and secret", as we shall see, fitted very 
well into the teachings and modus operandi applied by 
the movement in question. 
The teachings have been known to operate at 
various centres in Tel Aviv, Switzerland and 
Chicago. 42 In fact, they spread in the United States 
of America since the 1880s and are believed to have 
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been f ounded by 
J'eWS. 43 In Malaysia itselft it was 
first discovered in 1977/78.44 
The founder and leader of this movement was 
Mokhtar Hassan, who until the time of his arrest was a 
resident of east Telutong, Penang. 4 5 This English- 
educated person used to travel to Singapore, while 
serving as an employee of Datok Keramat Smelting 
Company in Penang between 1968 - 1971. Most probably, 
he had been influenced by these teachings during such 
visits, as Singapore is also a centre for Crypto in 
Southeast Asia. 46 
Essentially, Crypto is an amalgamation of three 
religions, that is, Islam, Christianity and 
JudaiSM. 47 
This is evident from its own literature and also the 
English translation of the Qurl an entitled '-Ashab al- 
Kahf', rendered of course in the fashion of Cryl2to's 
beliefS. 413 Besides this, Crypto doctrines totally 
contradict the Sharf'-ah. Among these are the claim 
that the five daily prayers are unnecessary, and if 
required they can be reduced only to two, with another 
prayer to be offered late at night in the Crypto way; 
there is no such thing as fasting; zakat is to be paid 
to Mokhtar Hassan himself; Ual-i means only 
ci rcumci si on, while free sex is encouraged and the 
leader (Mokhtar), who himself claims to be the Mahdj: 
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and r-Isi§ al-Masfh (Jesus, the Messiah), thus at the 
same time infallible (mar-FýQm), can even have sex with 
his followers' wives in the tradition of droit du 
seig-neur. 49 Mokhtar also claimed that he received the 
wahy (revelation) and that he belonged to the Je wish 
race, the greatest of all mankind. 50 Amusingly, each 
prayer (dul-al) is to be recited in Latin. 51, 
Like Taslim, Crypto was spread through secret 
contacts. Similarly, its doctrines display a clear 
influence of Shil-ite ghulFat, that is, extremism 
related to Batinj: interpretations of Islamic 
doctrines. Drugs and maq , 
ic (sibr) plus*silat were used 
to draw the intended followers. 52 Convinced that 
CryRto was a threat to the nation's security, 
especially when documents pertaining to its 
"Theocracy" were discovered, together with its own 
identity-cards, visas, money, flag and para-military 
uniforms, the government had Mokhter and his 
lieutenants arrested under ISA on March 23 and 24, 
1983.53 As a result of this, the movement collapsed. 
d. Tarigat Noor Zaman. 
Some of these dubious movements can really be 
dangerous. For example, on 16 October, 1980, a group 
known as Tarigat Noor Zaman under the leadership of 
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Muhammad Nasir 
himself to be 
Batu. Pahat, Ic 
the attackers, 
be invincible, 
members of the 
Ismail, a Cambodian refugee who claimed 
the Mahdj:, attacked a police station at 
ýhore. s 4 In this bloody incident, six of 
including Nasir, who claimed himself to 
were killed, while twenty-three other 
public were seriously wounded. 55 
To control his followers, Nasir had made use of 
si br and hypnotism. -6 Among his teachings were 
included complete loyalty to the leader as a passport 
to paradise, a change in the shah9dah, that is, 
replacing the phrase ' Muýammad RasQlu1lc; W with MQs9 
Kalj: mullgh', and the change in the rules and manner by 
which ýjalgt are to be offered. 57 
The fact that there are numerous heterodox groups 
in Malaysia has in a way hampered the smooth 
development of genuine dal-wah in the country, For 
example, some parents not only refused to let their 
children Join any da'-wah movement for fear of being 
involved in heterodox teachings, but also chose to 
attack da'-wah activities indiscriminately. Further, 
their very existence has given the opportunity to some 
unscrupulous politicians, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, to brand any da4wah movement which is 
critical of their Machiavellian ways as being deviant 
and thus requiring to be persecuted. At the same time, 
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it exposes innocent people who are interested in 
religious practices to unnecessary exploitation, while 
deepening the suspicions and misunderstanding of the 
non-Muslims towards Islam. At any rate, such a state 
of affairs has helped to increase tension that has 
been building up within the fabric of the multi-racial 
Malaysian society. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Responses Towards Islamic Consciousness. 
This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of 
the prevalent responses to Islamic consciousness in 
Malaysia, considering both the positive and negative 
aspects. As we have seen, Islamic consciousness, 
particularly that associated with the dalýwah 
phenomenon, has courted and is still courting various 
responses from Malaysians of all creeds and ethnic 
origins. In the ensuing discussion, we shall consider 
the. issue in detail and also analyse its effects upon 
the general situation vis-c'ý-vis Islam in Malaysia, 
a-Islamic Revival and the Malaysian government: 
On the whole, the Malaysian government has shown 
an ambivalent attitude towards the rising tide of 
Islam in the country. So f ar, it has adopted five 
different approaches at one time or another-, 
coercion, cooption, establishment of support groups, 
invoking the threat of internal and external enemies 
of the states and the development of symbols of 
legitimacy-' As will be seen, at times these policies 
flow into one another and may also be mutually 
reinforcing. 
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It is the fear of fundamentalist ideas more than 
anything else which accounts for the mixed reactions 
exhibited by the ruling powers in Malaysia. By 
encouraging da6wah activities, it hopes to forestall 
the growing influence of the non-governm ent da6wah 
groups, besides showing the Muslim public that it is 
after all striving for Islam. In this light, the 
government has stepped up its own dal-wah activities. 
For instance, it launched the nation-wide Bulan Dakwah 
(Missionary Month) in late 1978.2 On this occasion, 
the then Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn called upon 
the Muslims to adhere strictly to Islamic principles 
in propagating Islam and to follow the examples of the 
Prophet. 3 However, on seeing that the event had given 
rise to more Islamic fervour among the youth and that 
it had become another avenue for the spread of 
fundamentalist ideas, the government decided to bury 
it indef initely. Besides this, it has sponsored the 
anni_ial Qur'iýin reading competition both at national and 
inter-national levels, the latter held in Merdeka 
Stadium with the prime minister and other members of 
his cabinet attending. 4 The media have been widely 
used to underscore the importance of these events. 
Apparently, with the growing pressure of Muslim 
fundamentalism, the government is forced to speak 
favourably of da-wah activity and to call for the 
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adoption of the Islamic way Of life within the nation. 
On one occasion, the Minister of Law called for the 
revision of the national legal system so that it could 
be more in line with the Islamic creed. 5 Even the 
concept of national development has been increasingly 
discussed and presented to the people in religious 
terms since mid-1971.6 In this spirit, Dato' Sri Dr. 
Mahathir, the then Minister of Commerce and Industry 
within Hussein Onn's cabinet, tried to foil the 
opposition of some religious groups to foreign 
investment by arguing that the promotion of investment 
is in accordance with the teachings of Islam. 7 More 
interesting still is that government ministers too 
prefer to start their speeches with "Assalamu4alaikum" 
and some even pepper their speeches with phrases like 
"Alhamdulillah" and "Insya Allah" - utteran(: es which 
had once been the normal practice only among asý§tidhah 
and religious-minded people. Besides this, more and 
more Islamic programmes have been broadcast over the 
radio and television, . including the azan, Qurlcý: Rn 
reading and a short commentary on the 4adith. 8 Just as 
in Egypt, since the era of Nasser, ministers and other 
dignitaries are often televised while attending the 
Friday prayer at the Maslid Negara in Kuala Lumpur. 
Further, the government also took the initiative 
in sponsoring da-wah organisations and activities. By 
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the early 70s, the activities of the Majlis Kebangsaan 
Hal Ehwal Agama Islam I was expanded to encompass also 
instruction in Islam, publications of Islamic 
materials, an Islamic Research Centre (Pusat 
Penyelidikan Islam) and in April 1974, the Institut 
Dakwah dan Latihan Islam (INDAH or Islamic Missionary 
Training Institute). 1.0 The importance of this council 
was also emphasized by the appointment in 1973 of a 
Deputy Minister to oversee its activities. Such 
activities have also been the preoccupation of various 
states, where da6wah sections have become an 
established part of the religious bureaucracy. II 
However, government dar-wah, agencies differed from the 
non-government da4wah groups in that they laid more 
stress on the moral and spiritual teachings of Islam. 
In this connection, one local dar-wah observer 
argues: 12 
"Isovernment missionaries] seldom showed a 
critical attitude towards government 
pol ic ips. Rather, they generally raised 
aspects of Islam that 
* 
supported the position 
of the government or touched on Islam in a 
general manner, such as emphasizing that it 
endorsed progress, or that it was the 
religion of Allah. A few government 
missionaries [out of their own faith] who 
went beyond these limitations were considered 
unsuitable or too radical, and were 
eventually shifted to other positions or 
forbidden to teach". 
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Fearing that the rise of fundamentalism could 
endanger its own position and also brinS about racial 
conf lict, the government thus far has taken several 
steps to dislodge the f undament aIi st s from their 
position of influence in Malay society. These efforts 
range from indirect discouragement and tacit approval 
of certain other da4wah activities to outright 
condemnation and even physical prevention of their 
religious activities. The favourite themes of the 
government leaders have been to brand dac-wah activists 
as "extremists", "fanatics" or "anti-national", 
without actually naming the group or the person whom 
they have in mind. This often leads the most alert of 
the Islamists to reply that "a good Muslim is one who 
adheres fully and strictly to the precepts of the 
Qurl cýan and hadfth". 13 It is also becoming current for 
supporters of the Islamists to sarcastically refer to 
the government's emphasis on Islam as 'ketam mengalar 
anaknya berjalan betul' 14. or 'cakap tak serupa 
bikin'. 15 
Apart from branding the fundamentalists with such 
labels, the government also tries to discredit the 
dar-wah groups by harping on dakwah songsan g (false 
daf-wah), thus implying that their activities are, to 
say the least, unislamic. 16 Following the Kerling 
Incident of 1978, when a few followers of a splinter 
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group desecrated a Hindu temple, some government 
supporters took the opportunity to hit out at dacwah 
"extremists". 17 The same ambigious criticism was made 
after the attack on the Batu Pahat police station by a 
certain misguided splinter group. '8 ABIM together with 
other dal-wah organisations, also voiced their 
opposition to religious intolerance such as the case 
in Kerling. 19 Besides this, from time to time it 
pointed out that the government itself with its pro- 
Bumiputra policy had been guilty of intolerance and 
injustice. 20 
Another means of controlling dall-wah activities in 
Malaysia is the implementation of a vari et y of 
regulations such as the printing permits. The best 
example of this is when ABIM's organ Risalah was 
refused a permit for several years. 21 Simultaneously, 
efforts have been made to ban religious talks on the 
grounds of sedition or incitement. For example, in 
various states, religious councils, in conjunction 
with district officers uneasy at the activities of 
certain religious leaders, whether of the traditional 
guru or urban da-wah variety, are refusing to provide 
the requisite permits to speak publicly or at times 
even set up roadblocks along crucial access roads. 22 
On several occasions, ABIM was denied the use of a 
hall or a mosque to carry out its da4wah programmes, 
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while other bodies were advised against cooperating 
wi tht he movement. 23 
However, out of sheer desperation in the face of 
mounting opposition towards their policy, the 
Malaysian authorities, like the former colonial 
government, have at times made use of the draconian 
Internal Security Act (ISA) to silence its critics. It 
was under this act that Anwar Ibrahim, the former 
president of ABIM was detained for two years without 
trial, following the ma ss anti-government 
demonstration in support of the deprived people of 
Baling in late 1974.24 Some opposition members, 
including those of PAS, have been detained under the 
same act. 25 Even now, with the Islamisation programme 
in progress, ISA is still being used as an instrument 
against dissent. The Printing Machine and Publication 
Act of 1984 is also an extension of State control 
towards what it deems to be detrimental to the 
linational interest". 26 Another major effort made to 
control the dar-wah phenomenon was the implementation 
of the Societies (Amendment) Act of 1981.27 But a more 
coercive process was employed in the case of the 
Memali incident of late 1985, when three police 
forces, including the dreaded Federal Reserve Unit 
(Unit Simpanan Persekutuan) and the commando-like 
unit, the Police Field Force (Pasukan Polis Hutan)28 
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backed by two fully equipped armoured cars, were used 
in an attack on the much inferior group of the late 
Ustaz Ibrahim Mahmud (nicknamed Ibrahim Libya), a 
respected religious leader and a supporter of PAS, at 
Kampung Memali, Baling, Kedah, 29 
Meanwhile, the cooption of individuals or groups 
known to have been critical of the government and the 
development of supportive networks used in the dealing 
with the Islamic revival have been far more frequent 
in Malaysia. One great leap in terms of cooption was 
the recruitment of Anwar Ibrahim, the former ABIM 
leader, into UMNQ and also the federal cabinet. 30 This 
move by Datol Sri Dr. Mahathir was nothing new in 
Malaysia. In f act, the same tactic was used by the 
late Tun Razak when he created the Barisan. 
Nevert hel ess, this latest move brought into the 
government a serious potential political and religious 
foe as well as providing it with a legitimate and 
recognised Islamic spokesman known for his charisma 
and independence. 311 Anwar, on his part, rose rapidly 
to become the present Minister of Education and one of 
the most influential UMNO Naib-Presiden (Vice- 
Presidents). 32 Equally importance, he has been a 
principal actor in the campaigns against political 
opponents such as PAS. 33 In another case, an al-Argam 
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delegation was invited to lecture to a group of the 
Police Field Force on the theme of "divine service 
through defence", back in 1981.34 
Apart from setting up or expanding their own 
religious agencies as mentioned in the previous pages, 
the Malaysian authorities also support a number of 
dal-wah organisations. Such bodies include the Yayasan 
Dakwah Islamigh Malaysia . 35 (YADIM or Islamic Dakwah 
Foundation of Malaysia), which for a number of years 
was headed by the Speaker of the Dewan Rak-yat the 
late Tan Sri Syed Nasir 'Ismail, PERKIM led by Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
the United Sabah Islamic Association 36 (USIA or 
Persatuan Islam Bersatu Sabah) and Anqkatan Nahdatul 
Islam Bersatu (BINA) of Sarawak. 37 
Until today, the most important and influential 
agency in league with the government for the promotion 
of Islam is the revitalized PERKIM, which concentratie-s. 
its efforts mainly towards the conversion of non- 
Malays to Islam. 38 Since 1974, it has been led 
personally by the Tunku, with the help of some 
dedicated non-Malay dul-9t, including the late Hj. 
Ibrahim Ma '31t Hj. Adam Chao, Hj. Hussein Yee Loan 
Yuan, Hj. Ishak Ma, and the Indian-born Yasin Muhammad 
Sultan and Puan Marhaban. Besides this, EEERKIM has 
232 
also engaged assistant muballighs to carry out da-wah 
among the Malays, Orang AsI i (Aborigines> and 
Europeans. 40 
Besides da4wah, PERKIMI s main activities include 
the provision of material welfare and assistance to 
needy Muslims, promotion of Islam through education 
and publication, coordination of activities with other 
Islamic associations, strengthening of national unity 
and loyalty through the official religion and so 
forth. In terms of welfare and educational activities, 
PERKIM has provided its services largely in 
kindergartens and medical clinics, which cater to 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. " Adult education 
programmes are also provided, while special 
instruction on Islam is available for new converts. 42 
Through its clinics and three mobile medical units, 
PERKIM provides free medical services to needy 
Malaysians. 43 To step up its dal-wah activities, PERKIM 
set up various branches throughout Malaysia, with its 
headquarters now situated in a five-storey complex at 
the junction of J'alan Maxwell and Talan Ipoh, Kuala 
Lumpur. 44 To finance the building of this headquaters, 
the Tunku sought financial aid from various Arab 
countries and individuals as well as raising local 
f und S. 45 Similarly, to acquire enough money for the 
running of the organisation and its multiple 
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programmes, PERKIM has set up its own businesses, 
which include 'City Perkim Book Centre', 'Fileman Sdn. 
Bhd. ', 'Taman Willis Sdn. Bhd. ', 'Usaha Perkim Kedah', 
' Usaha Perkim Pulau Pinang' ,IC. P. Fast Food 
Sdn. 
Bhd. 1j and 'Institut Perkim-GYoon' .46 In addition, 
funds are raised through Pustaka Perkim' ,a PERKIM 
bookshop and the buying of shares in such institutions 
as Bank Islam (Islamic Bank). 47 So as not to remain a 
mere recepient of funds, PERKIM also fulfils its 
obligations by donating its proceeds to Tamiah, an 
Islamic organisation in Singapore, the Women's 
Rehabilitation Centre at Bercham, Perak, the Attaqwa 
Religious School in Chiengmai, Thailand, and the 
financing of the publication of the QurliýRn in Braille 
for the Persatuan Oranv: Buta Malaysia (Association for 
the Blind, Malaysia). 48 
Also, for the purpose of enhancing its dar-wah 
activities, PERKIM has established its own Institut 
Dakwah PERKIM (IDP or PERKIM Dakwah Institute), which 
by 1984 had produced 362 muballighin (missionaries) of 
all nationalities, including 14 Kampucheans, 2 
Filipinos, 5 Koreans and 2 Chinese from Hong Kong. 49 
Some of these students from IDP were directly financed 
or cc-sponsored to further their studies at Kole. 1 
Islam, (Islamic College), Kelang, Universiti Islam 
Antarabangsa (International Islamic University), 
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Islamic College in Jakarta and even al-Azhar, Islamic 
universities of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya. sO To 
dat e, PERKIM has set up two Islamic settlements, 
Wangsa Maju PERKIM Wilayah Persekutuan, and 
Perkampungan Islam 51, Sungai Dua, Pahang, for the 
converts. 52 As a result of PERKIM's efforts, there 
were in 1984 some 60,000 Muslim converts or Saudara 
Baru (New Brethren) as they are locally known. S3 The 
majority of these are Chinese. 54- As one of its 
proj ect s, PERKIM has also aided Kampuchean Muslim 
refugees and even successfull7 arranged for their 
permanent settlement in Malaysia. ss This particular 
effort has gained the support of the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) since 1975.56 
To propagate Islam and its related projects 
effectively, PERKIM publishes a Chinese-language 
magazine, Noor Islam Suara PERKIM in Malay, Islamic 
Herald, a bi-monthly English magazine and scores of 
booklets and newsletters in Chinese in Chinese, Tamil 
and English. " In 1985, through the efforts of a 
Chinese-born Muslim, Shamsuddin Tao 580 PERKIM 
published a Chinese tafsfr of the Qur'ýýin. " Meanwhile, 
in league with Rgbitah al-cAlam al-Islc7aml PERKIM set 
up the Regional Islamic Council for South-East Asia 
and the Pacif ic (RISEAP) in 1980, with its 
headquarters based in Kuala Lumpur. 60 This move has 
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unmistakably confirmed Malaysia's place as an 
important Islamic centre for da-wah in the East in the 
latter part of this century. 
Ef forts to legit imise UMNO' s and the government' s 
position vis-A-vis Islam have been stepped up since 
the beginning of 1982, with the start of Dr. 
Mahathir's premiership. The whole process has been 
dubbed as Islamisation, which according to Dr. 
Mahathir means the inculcation of Islamic values in 
the country's administration and not the enforcement 
of Shari, '-ah to cover also the non-Muslims. 61 At the 
same ti me, he asserted that "these values cýa re 
universal and can be accepted by all parties". 62 
Aside from the daý'-wah programmes already 
described, Mahath ir' s era has seen the establishment 
of Bank Islam (Islamic Bank>, with branches operating 
in some major towns of Malaysia 63 Universiti Islam 
Antarabangsa <UIA or International Islamic 
University), Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian 
Berhad (Islamic Insurance Company Private Limited of 
Malaysia), extensive involvement in international 
Muslim organisations, efforts to make Islamic 
religious holidays national in scope, greatly 
increased religious programming on state-run radio and 
television and constant media attention to 
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religiously-oriented activities of the prime minister 
and other UMNO cabinet members. 64 
The Bank Islam a major institution in the drive 
towards the Islamisation of the Malaysian economy, was 
opened in Yuly, 1983,65 Although it was established 
for the purpose of promoting non-fiba transactions, 
thereby encouraging more Muslim participaton in the 
nation's economy, it has also interestingly drawn the 
support of a small number of non-Muslim depositors. 66 
Structurally, it is similar to commercial banks except 
for the addition of a parallel supervisory council of 
Gulama' to ensure that the bank's activities conform 
to Islamic LaW. 67 Besides this, it is run on the basis 
of mudarc; ýbah (joint-partnership) between the bank and 
its clients, where both of them equally bear the 
success or failure of a venture. 68 As for the capital, 
it is provided by the federal government, various 
state Religious Departments, PERKIM, Tabung Hal i69, 
State Islamic economic agencies like Islamic economic 
foundations and Bayt al-Mal and other Islamic 
organisations. 7 0 Following the lead set by the bank, 
the Minister of Rural and National De velopment 
proclaimed that the Cooperative Movements involving 
Muslims would seý-k an Islamic credit system. 71 Moving 
along the same lines, Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi 
Islam Malaysia (YPEIM or Islamic Economic Development 
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Foundation of Malaysia) has implemented the Amal 
lariah (Islamic Social Welfare) scheme, whereby Muslim 
employees are encouraged to voluntarily contribute a 
minimum of $I/- M per month to the foundation. 72 To 
avoid any untoward incident such as fraud, for every 
contribution made a receipt is issued through Bank 
Islam. or Tabung Haji. 73 A Board of Trustees, headed 
by Dr. Abdul Halim b. Hj. Ismail, the Managing 
Director of Bank Islam, was also appointed to run the 
foundation. 74 As for Takaful, it was launched in June 
1985, with an initial capi t al. of $10/- million 
MalaySian. 75 The insurance covers both general and 
family matters and transactions are based on 
muýarabah. 76 To guarantee that every transaction is 
carried out in line with Islamic regulations, a 
Sharicah Committee led by Prof. Ahmad Ibrahim of UIA 
was appointed to oversee the whole activities of the 
company. 77 
The UIA started its first academic session on July 
18,1983 at its temporary campus in the former Islamic 
College in Petaling Taya near Kuala Lumpur. 78 It -is 
sponsored and owned Jointly by a consortium of Muslim 
nations, with Malaysia being the host country and a 
co-sponsor. 79 Since Tune 1987, a diploma course in 
education was added to the. two existing disciplines of 
law and economics. 80 In explaining the difference 
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between the UIA curriculum and that at other local 
universi ti es, Tan Sri Prof -I Abd al-Rauf, its 
Egyptian-born rector said, "we try to inject relevant 
Islamic values in the study of other [traditionally 
I secular' I subjects". 81 In short, the UIA presents a 
unified approach to Islamic education 82, with both 
Arabic and English being the media of instruction. 83 
Other educational measures taken to inculcate Islamic 
values in Malaysia include the introduction of a 
course on Islamic Civilization in all universities and 
Coll eges, the establishment of an Islamic Teachers' 
Training College in Petaling Taya, increased 
instruction in and use of Jawi. script and the adoption 
of an integrated approach to teaching Islamic 
knowledge in schools. 134 
Besides making changes in economic and educational 
spheres, Mahathir's administration has also taken 
steps to institute reforms in legal and Judicial 
matters. For instance, a decision was taken to upgrade 
the position of kadis and Sharl4ah courts to the level 
of magistrates and civil courts, and to implement 
Penal Code Amendments 85 directly related to 
rel igi on. 86 The Malaysian government also set up a 
national steering committee on zakat to streamline the 
administration and enforcement of the collection of 
tithes under Islamic LaW. 87 Further, a committee has 
239 
IV 
begun drafting a law to ensure the correct display of 
h. alal. signs so as to protect the Muslims from being 
deceived by irresponsible food manufacturers. " 
On yet another plane, religious discipline has 
been enforced in the armed forces, with some British 
military customs, such as the firing of a volley and 
the sounding of the Last Post during the funeral of a 
Muslim soldier, which were found to be incompatible 
with Islamic beliefs, being replaced with Islamic 
prayers. 89 At the same time, a religious corps has 
been established, thus helping to assimilate Islam in 
the administration of the armed forces, while 
religious education is stressed during the six-month 
or one year training for officers and men. 90 To ensure 
that the Islamisation programmes run smoothly, the 
government set up a ShCir, ý Council whose members 
consist of Muslim scholars of different political 
persuasions. 91 Anwar, besides being the chairman of 
this council, is the main force behind the 
Islamisation programmes that have been progressing in 
the recent years. In this connection, the Malaysian 
authorities have been very fortunate in receiving the 
support and expertise of Muslim scholars from within 
and without for their Islamically oriented programmes. 
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Indeed, some of the changes made in recent years 
have gone beyond the symbolic gestures of the previous 
period. For example, some of these projects like the 
Islamic Bank, Takaful UIA, the establishment of the 
Islamic Teachers Training College and the Shorg- 
Council can no longer be perceived as mere 
concessions. Certainly, these new developments have at 
times thrown the government's opponents, especially 
PAS into disarray. The latter has to show itself to be 
really more Islamic rather than to, depend on rhetoric 
alone. This problem will be pursued in greater detail 
later in this discussion.. 
However, the Islamisation programmes have not been 
free from criticism, especially by those in the 
opposition. Some of them questioned the piecemeal 
process of the whole exercise. Beyond that some people 
still see the programmes as attempts to out-manoeuvre 
the government's Islamic opponents in view of the fact 
that mismanagements such as the BMF afýair, personal 
rivalries 92# the luxurious life-style of the 
nouveaux riches and the liberal use of money to gain 
support 93 continue to be common practices among UMNO 
members, including those in the top echelon. For the 
same reasons, the recent claim made by some UMNO top 
leaders that the party was the third largest Islamic 
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party in the world was rejected by its opponents. 94 
Slogans such as I leadership by example' (kepimpinan 
melalui teladan> and 'clean, efficient and trust- 
worthy' (bersih, cekap dan amanah) which were 
popularised by Dr. Mahathir have also exposed the 
government to the ridicule of its opponents who point 
to the continuing factional rivalry within UMNO 
itself, the leadership squabbles and the financial 
mismanagement that beset its senior partner, the MCA 
99 and other components of the Barisan. At any rate, 
the Islamic stance taken up by the Mahathir 
administration has helped to accelerate Islamic 
consciousness and in turn to stimulate general demands 
for more chanSe towards the implementation of an 
Islamic order in Malaysia. 
b. Resl2onses of Political Parties: 
Outside government circles, there are varying 
degrees of responses towards Islamic consciousness. An 
important example of this is the case of PAS. In the 
wake of the present Islamic revival, the party has 
been able once again to gain some ground, though it is 
still far from regaining power in any of the states. 
Since its recovery in 1982, it has managed to win the 
support of more younger Muslims, including Western- 
trained intellectuals, professionals and members of 
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well-established UMNO families. 96 However, as might be 
expected, accompanying this rejuvenation of PAS there 
has been a clear-cut radicalisation of its leadership 
and a major part of its rank and file. As part of this 
new mood, the party' s 'Young Turks' like Ustaz HJ- 
Abdul Hadi Awang, Ustaz Hj. Fadhil Nor and Ustaz 
Nakhaie Hj. Ahmad, all of whom were formerly prominent 
members of ABIM with the support of the Dewan Ulamak 
(CUIa mc; 71, Council) ousted the I Old Guard' under the 
much mellowed Dato' Muhammad Asri following the defeat 
of PAS in the 1982 General Elections. 97 Under the new 
leadership, PAS has also discarded its nationalist 
mantle for that of universal Islam and a more 
fundamentalist approach. 913 In line with this new 
image, it has sharply attacked ethnocentrism, that is, 
Malay nationalism, which it identifies with I-aýýabfy, ýh 
and thus declares unislamic. 99 At the same time, the 
new leadership has shown its admiration for the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 100, and its concern for the 
Muslims of Afghanistan and Palestine and those in 
Muslim minority countries. '01 In this connection, like 
ABIM, the present PAS is committed to an untainted 
Islam, an Islam which is pure and pri st ine. t02 
Similarly, it shares with ABIM the same rhetoric about 
the evils of secularism and all other Western 
ideologies. 103 
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Another important feature of the post-Asri PAS is 
that it places more stress on the role of the Gu1a mýa- I 
in determining the policies to be followed by the 
party. 104 This led its former president, the ousted 
Asri, to make the bitter accusation that the Gulamc; V 
were "obsessed with the idea of Shil-ite rule and 
I aiming to] adopt the [Iranian] system by violent 
means if necessary". 1.05 The then PAS Youth chief, 
Mustaffa Ali retorted that ... The reason Asri and 
others have been raising the Iran issue and the Sunni- 
Shi r-ite problem is because they want to cling to 
power, not because they believe that the ulamas are 
imposing Shil-ite philosophy on their Sunni followers. 
We are all Sunnis. There is no reason for us to follow 
the Shicite principle". 106 The Shil-ite issue also 
seems to be a popular political ploy waged by UMNO and 
its controlled media to discredit the PAS in the eyes 
of Malaysians, in the wake of some disturbing reports 
about Iran coming from Western media. However, there 
is nothing to suggest that the party has adopted a 
Shiýite or Iranian political system since otherwise it 
would not have attracted the attention of some non- 
Muslims, mainly Chinese, since early 1985.107 
In this regard, to match its own rhetoric for 
universal Islam with action, PAS organised a symposium 
on "Islam and National Unity", among whose 
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participants were included Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, a- 
respected ex-parliamentarian and Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, 
a Muslim convert of Indian descent and President of 
Aliran (a Penang-based multi-racial and more socialist 
oriented reform movement). 108 Again as a move to outdo 
UMNO, it appointed a Chinese Muslim convert as head of 
the PAS Kampung Baru branch and following that another 
Chinese convert, Kamal Koh, who had been recently 
elected a member of PAS Youth Executive Committee, as 
head of the PAS Siputih branch. 109 In another 
unprecedented move, it established in mid-1986 a 
number of Chinese Consultative Councils (CCCs), that 
is, liason committees that linked PAS to the Chinese 
community at state level and through them tried to 
gain the support of the Chinese towards PAS in the 
1986 General Election. 110 Such an unexpected move 
caused the embarassed UMNO to condemn the party 
vehemently with the support of its controlled media, 
especially the Utusan Group. "' 
As we have seen, the changes within PAS brought it 
into serious conflict with its traditional foe, UMNO. 
Among the issues which bitterly split the two 
important Malay parties were the implementation of 
Islamic law, and the related subjects of Islamisation, 
secularism, takfj: r 1.12, nationalism, cooperation with 
non-Malays, the BMF the ISA and so on. Concerning 
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Islamisation, PAS rejects it as aI mere cosmetic' and 
instead calls for the full implementation of Islamic 
Shari'-ah. 113 It also condemned secularism and depicted 
its protagonists within UMNO as being guilty of 
spreading 'deviant teachings' (alaran-aAaran sesat), 
an accusation which was often levelled against it by 
UMNO itself. 114 The situation was aggravated when UMNO 
charged that PAS leaders in contradiction to the 
Islamic principle of tasammuh (tolerance) had branded 
its members as k, a'-firiDn (unbelievers). This takffr 
issue was blown out of proportion by the vested 
interests within the media so that even the non-Malays 
for the first time became aware of and interested in 
the matter. Lis In this case, PAS were often projected 
as the 'villiansl. "& On se ve, ra1 occasions, the 
government-run T. V. Malaysia showed its own edited 
films calling for the Malaysian Muslims to unite, 
while simultaneously claiming that PAS were 
propagating disunity through the takfj: r issue which 
was linked to some other subsidiary issues like the 
two-imam affair (isu dua imam) 117, separate grave- 
yards for PAS members and so on. 118 Meanwhi 1 e, an 
independent study of the issue of disunity among the 
Muslims in Malaysia, a part of which includes the 
takfir question, carried out in 1983 by ABIM in 
cooperation with the 'ýýUlama' Association of Malaysia, 
al-Argam Persatuan Timur Tenqah (Middle Eastern 
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Association) and academics of several local 
universities disclosed that there was really a split 
among the rural Malays of Trengganu and Kelantan and 
that this was caused by a number of factors including 
the unf air practice of distributing agricultural 
subsidies such as fertilizers and so on only to UMNO 
members and supporters. 11 9 The same explanation was 
given by another writer, who also added that there 
were cases where the state authorities dismissed PAS 
members from the Tawatankuasa Kemajuan dan Keselamatan 
Kampunw (TKKK or Village Development and Security 
Commit tee) in order to make way for UMNO nominees. 120 
Such practices, argued the same writer, were probably 
engaged in because UMNO leaders regarded development 
as a 'favourl that should be appreciated and should be 
reciprocated by undivided loyalty to the 
government. 121 
The issue of having separate burial grounds 
occurred as a result of some misunderstandings on the 
part of certain people. In Tuly 1982, there was a case 
where a PAS supporter at his own request was buried on 
a piece of his own land, which was ungazetted as a 
burial ground. 122 However, this was interpreted by a 
number of UMNO supporters as an unwillingness by PAS 
members to be buried together with UMNO men at the 
officially gazetted grave-yards. 1.2 3 According to Azmi 
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b. Moh d. Ali of the Law Faculty, Universiti Malaya, 
this issue of separate burial grounds was an isolated 
affair, which was sensationalized by the local 
press. 124 
The two-imam affair occurred partly because the 
Religious Affairs Department of TrenSganu had 
dismissed the local PAS-oriented imam of Masjid 
Kampung Gong Pasir, who had served at the mosque f or 
the last 18 years and replaced him with UMNO 
supporters. 125 Surprisingly, the dismissal letter was 
signed by Dato' Bendahara Dalam, the Commissioner for 
Religious Affairs of Trengganu's Religious Affairs 
Department and not by the Sultan himself, who usually 
decides in cases of appointment or dismissal of a 
religious official. 126 Concerning the question of 
takfir and social boycotts some sources revealed that 
these were mutually enacted, involving some ordinary 
members of the two parties in the east coast of 
Peninsular Malaysia, and not, as alleged, the fault of 
PAS alone. i 27 
The tragicomedy of the UMNO-PAS rivalry did not 
stop at this level. In fact, matters came to a head 
when UMNO through its belligerent president issued a 
challenge for a debate with PAS in late 1984 
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concerning the takfir issue and the related problem of 
Muslim disunity in Malaysia. 128 However, a direct 
televised confrontation of the two parties was avoided 
when on the initiative of several Muslim 
organ isat ions, including ABIM the Yang Di Pertuan 
Agong intervened and stopped the schedule debate. 1.2 9 
The pret ext f or stopping the debate was the 
preservation of Muslim unity, At any rate, the move 
clearly brought relief to UMNO for the Tunku himself 
had said, "PAS will have nothing to I ose, but 
everything to gainll. 13O 
On the political fr, ont, the cancellation of the 
debate did not reduce the antagonism between the two 
par-ties. As a result of a heated campaign in the local 
election for Padang Terap Constituency, a bloody clash 
broke out at Lebuk Merbau between PAS and UMNO 
supporters. 131 One PAS party worker was killed and 
this embittered the party, while others also were as 
puzzled when the prime minister went on television the 
next day and blamed the opposition party for the 
disturbance, though the facts had shown, according to 
Muzaffar, that it was started by a group of strong-arm 
men associated with the ruling party. 132 The political 
atmosphere continued to rise, with charges and 
counter-charges being made until it culminated in the 
tragic Memali incident of November 1985.133 Meanwhile, 
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with mounting opposition and instability within UMNO 
itself and with similar problems f aced by its 
components within the Barisan as well as the 
continued threat of economic recession, UMNO decided 
to call a truce and hold a muzakarah (discussion) with 
PAS, an idea which had been proposed as a replacement 
for the debate since late 1984 by ABIM and other 
Islamic orSanisations and individuals. 134 Thus, by 
mid-1986, UMNO represented by both Mahathir and Anwar, 
met and held secret discussions with PAS leaders, 
comprising the President, Hj. Yusof Rawa, Hj. Fadhil 
Nor and Syed Ibrahim, concerning the possibility of 
ending the hostility and workinS towards Muslim unity 
within the country. Despite these friendly exchanges, 
nothing concrete really developed out of the meeting, 
Away from politics, PAS under the new leadership 
developed its own economic and educational programmes, 
although UMNO constantly claimed that it had done 
nothing for Islam. For example, PAS Temerloh branch, 
Pahang, has offered shares worth about $M1,5000 per 
share to all members of the party throughout 
Malaysia. 135 According to the Assistant Commissioner 
of PAS for Pahang, "every member of PAS who buys the 
share concerned will be able to own a piece of land 
with an area of 1/4 acre". 136 7he same kinds of scheme 
for the establishment of modern self-contained Islamic 
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settlements have been started in Kedah, Perlis and 
Pulau Pinang. 137 Since 1985, the Batang Padang PAS 
branch in Perak has operated Darul cAitham, a school 
for orphans, which provides both academic and 
religious subjects. '313 Besides this, PAS members run 
some other schools, for example, the Madrasah Masriyah 
of Bukit Mertajam 139, Yayasan Budi and Institut 
Berale, an, which are open to all Malaysians. In f act, 
the idea of setting up an Islamic university, which 
was t hen called Universiti Rakyat (Peoples' 
University) was passed at the conference Organised by 
the educational wing of Hi-cbul Muslimin (a forerunner 
of PAS) at Bukit Semanggol in 1948, bef ore it was 
taken up again in the 60s and the 70s by PAS and the 
Muslim students and finally implemented by the 
Mahathir administration. 140 
In terms of publication, in recent decades, PAS 
activists have set up a number of their own publishing 
companies. Apart from continuing with its old organ, 
Suara. Islam, PAS on the initiatives of its younger 
members, has published the newspapers Gema Pemuda of 
PAS Youth Council, Harakah Berita PAS of PAS Tambun, 
Perak, and scores of books, newsletters and casettes. 
Under the new image, these newspapers and newsletters 
seem to carry comparatively serious 
discussions or 
exros4s on various subjects like the Official Secrets 
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Act (OSA) Amendments of 1986, Singapore and the 
Zionists, the Muzakarah PAS-UMNO crises within UMNO, 
reports and speeches from PAS's 0 Wn muktamar 
(conferences), international issues and so on. 141 For 
its part, UMNO despite its Islamisation programmes, 
continues to publish a more popular version of its own 
organ, Merdeka, which even carries business 
advertisements, a few special pages of comic strips 
and special items on such topics as 'Joan Collins and 
DynasLy' and 'Christopher Reeves and his role as 
Supermanl. 142 
The non-Muslim parties understandably are unhappy 
about the new Islamic trend in the country although 
they seldom, if at all, air their concern openly. The 
DAP, a dominantly Chinese opposition party, for 
example, protested against the attempt of the Negri 
Sembilan state government to ban Malays from working 
in bars. 143 In another case, Karpal Singh, a leading 
member of the same party who never agrees with the 
government, supported UMNO when the prime minister 
criticised a certain party for trying to establish a 
mullah form of government in Malaysia. 144 
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c. Individual Responses to Islamic Consciousness: 
At individual level, responses towards Islamic 
consciousness come in various shades of opinion or 
reactions. Despite his contributions t0 Islam at 
national and international 1-evel, while in power and 
outside it, the Tunku has remained very much a 
controversial figure vis-A-vis Islam in Malaysia. For 
example, during his 80th birthday party celebration, 
he warned that Malaysia should never be turned into an 
Islamic State. 1 4-5 He also stressed that attempts to 
introduce Islamic laws and morality laws must never be 
allowed. 146 Naturally, such comments brought 
criticisms from PAS 147 and ABIM. 148 However, 
undaunted by such reactions, the Tunku unreservedly 
dismissed the penal law concerning the caning of those 
found guilty of drunkenness and khalwat as obsolete, 
following the decision of Sharicah Court of Kota Bharu 
to implement it in January 1987,1 4-9 In response, the 
head of UMNO Youth stated that "such a negative 
statement comes from those who have inherited a 
colonial mentality, which regards the Sharicah as 
unsuitable for the present eral'. IsO Meanwhile, the PAS 
president condemned the opinion as something that "can 
destroy one's faith". Is' Finding his stand abhorrent, 
a number of PERKIM' s leaders urged the Tunku to 
relinquish his post as the president of the 
253 
organisation for the reason that his remark had 
tarnished the image of the body concerned. 152 
Another arch-secularist, Tun Hussein Onn, the 
third Prime Minister of Malaysia, supported the Tunku 
in his call not to make Malaysia an Islamic State. 153 
Like the former, he has a long history of disagreement 
with Islamic fundamentalism. For instance, in the mid- 
70s, he had one of his daughters deprogrammed with the 
help of - an ustaz, after she returned from England 
dressed in a mini-telekgnZ. 154 In his latest 
outburst, he called upon UMNO to reject "super 
leaders" who would move the party away from a moderate 
stance and turn it into an organisation with extremist 
views on religion and nationalism. Is 5 Significantly, 
this call came as the party was approaching its own 
internal elections and just less than a month after 
the penal law had been implemented in Kota Sharu. 
Besides the two former premiers, Tun Mohamed Suffian, 
the recently 'retired Lord President of the Malaysian 
Court, also strongly opposed the move to introduce a 
wider application of Islamic laws as demanded by 
various Muslim organisations. '56 Of late, he has 
commented that it is unfair to dismiss the Malaysian 
Constitution as unislamic. 157 It might be argued that 
the three individuals concerned represent the old 
Western-oriented Malay elite' who find the current 
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situation engulfing the Muslims, especially the youth, 
unpalatable as far as their 0 w7n beliefs and 
experiences are concerned. 
On the other si de of the picture, we f ind 
individuals who reacted favourably to the new 
situation. For example, Prof. Datuk Ahmad Ibrahim 
suggested that a clause should be included in the 
Constitution to the ef fect that, "if there is any law 
in Malavsia that contravenes the Sharlr-ah, then such 
law is null and void to the degree that it is so". I s8 
He also advocated that Islamic Law should be respected 
and accepted in toto, though its implementation could 
be undertaken gradually. ts9 Prof. Dr. Muhammad Kamal 
Hassan, also of UIA is of the opinion that 
development should be based on Islamic principles, 
involving both spiritual and material dimensions so as 
to ensure al-falah (the ultimate success). 160 
Likewise, he counselled that Islamic values should be 
instilled into the Malaysian educational system at all 
levels so that a more integrated approach could be 
pursued f or t he sound devel opment of soc i et y. 161 In 
another case, Prof. Madya Dr. Abdul Rashid Hj. Dail of 
the Islamic Faculty, UKM, made a critical analysis of 
the Fourth Malaysia Plan and in conclusion suggested 
that economic development in Malaysia should be 
pursued along Islamic principles. 162 Also, in harmony 
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with the new mood, Tun Dato' Hj. Mohamed Salleh Abbas, 
the Lord President of the Malaysian Court, suggested 
that both the civil and Sharf'-ah courts should be 
united as an initial step towards the Islamisation of 
National Law. 163 Such a suggestion is of importance 
indeed, in view of the fact that the head of the 
Malaysian judiciary has lately come out in support of 
the Islamisation programme, particularly in the field 
of law, which in the seventies was the concern only of 
PAS and Muslim youth. 
Besides the two categories of people mentioned, 
there are also individuals who remain on the fringes 
of Islamic soc i et Y, completely unassociated with 
either the daGwah stream or with the Islamic 
establishment, r-ulam5,, ýR-Qff or otherwise, but who 
still address themselves to certain Islamic issues. 
Within this category falls Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, the 
president of Aliran Kesedaran Negara (commonly called 
Aliran). As a social scientist, devoid of any basic 
religious training, Muzaffar tends to see Islam from a 
clearly materialistic standpoint, with its spiritual, 
dogmatic, theological and ritualistic dimensions being 
blurred in his mind-', ' 4 At best, one can say that he 
is a modernist. No doubt, Aliran under his presidency 
had done some good in informing the people about 
certain cases of abuses and malpractices within the 
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country, but in dealing with Islamic issues its views 
are still shrouded in confusion. For example, Muzaffar 
persistently claimed that some Muslim ladies have 
adopted the mini-telekung and other modest forms of 
dress for the preservation of their 'Malayness'. 16 s He 
has also given the same explanation for their (and 
male Muslims') preoccupation with ha1 cýýa 1 food. 166 
However, anyone who is really familiar with the local 
dal-wah phenomenon cannot discount the fact that these 
changes have come about as a result of soul-searching 
and deep religious conviction. Otherwise, why would 
such educated ladies be ready to face all the 
persecutions such as those of certain Muslim nurses 
167 and students 16 139 who have accepted expulsion 
from their respective vocations rather than abandon 
their newly found attire?. Besides this, the Qurl c; ýn 
169 and fiqh 170 literature have provided the guide- 
lines for halal food and also on I-awrah (modesty) to 
be observed for both Muslim men and women. Another 
individual of this category is Kassim Ahmad, the 
former chairman of PSRM, who tried to popularise the 
idea of Islamic Socialism' (Sosialisme Islam), as an 
ideology to solve the socio-economic problems of the 
MUSJJMS. 171 In early 1986, Kassim created an uproar 
among the Muslims of Malaysia when he wrote a book 
criticising the 4ulam<; ý' and rejecting the authenticity 
of the hadith as one of the sources of Islamic law. 172 
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Despite the commotion they caused, these individuals 
have remained marginal within Malaysian society and 
their impact seems to have been minimal. 
d. Non-Muslims and Islamic Consciousness: 
Prior to the 70s, the non-Muslims generally were 
either indifferent to or not really aware of the 
Islamic presence since the sort of activities the 
State organised were largely ritualistic or symbolic 
in nature. Such activities as mosque-building and 
Qur'an-reading competitions qid not affect the non- 
Muslims directly. i73 But with the State focusing more 
on the implementation of social values and the setting 
up of Islamic institutions in the economy and in 
education, the situation has changed. In this regard, 
the rise of Islamic consciousness among the Muslims in 
the last decade appears also to have stirred up a 
parallel development of religious consciousness of 
some kind among the non-Muslims, particularly in the 
urban areas. 174 
This phenomenon is perhaps more noticeable in 
urban areas than anywhere else, because it is there 
that wider contacts have taken place between the 
various ethnic groups of diverse religious 
backgrounds. Obviously, such contacts breed more 
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awareness among them. Moreover, it is usually in these 
areas that any idea, religious or otherwise, can 
easily spread with the availability of education and a 
more advanced system of communications. It is also 
there that the government has introduced more 
institutional changes designed to promote Islam as a 
state religion. Given such a setting, coupled with the 
ever-present communal distrust nurtured during the 
colonial era and often instigated by vested interests 
within the media and political parties, it is not at 
all surprising that any sign of stirring within a 
particular community is bound to generate a similar 
reaction in others. 
The Chinese, who form the largest non-Malay 
community in Malaysia today, are not religiously 
homogeneous. Some of them are Christians, while the 
majority are Buddhists, Toaists or Confucians or 
combinations or local varieties of these, Muslims, 
Bahais and Free-thinkers (a local name for Atheists). 
Generally, the Chinese are by nature religiously 
eclectic, 175 Nonetheless, it has been observed that 
those educated individuals who have accepted Islam or 
Christianity after having undergone a spiritual quest 
of their own, tend to be more committed to their new- 
found religion. It is equally true that except for the 
committed Chinese Muslim converts or those with no 
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political inclination, the Chineset despite their 
different religious affiliations, have joined together 
in their opposition to any programme that they 
perceive as endangering their own interests. Thus, out 
of fear, they have united with other religious groups 
under the leadership of Rev. Paul Tan Chee Ing, a 
young Jesuit director of the Catholic Research Centre 
in Kuala Lumpur in opposing the government's 
Islamisation programme. L76 In another case, the MCA 
which is affiliated to UMNO and the DAP a main 
Chinese opposition party, have in spite of their 
constant antagonism, concertedly attacked the QCCs for 
endorsing PAS's idea of an Islamic State. 1771nt he 
estimation of these parties, and also other Chinese 
groups, an Islamic State would mean unequal 
opportunities for non-Muslims and a perpetuation of 
Muslim dominance. 178 
Anyway, there are certain individuals amonS the 
non-Malays who simply do not see any problem for their 
ethnic groups if they are willing to assimilate 
themselves into the Malay society. For example, Prof. 
Khoo Kay Kim, a well-known local historian, said that 
"the Federal Constitution itself was very liberal in 
determining the status of an individual as a Pribumi 
I that i S, Bumioutral". 179 He added that, 01 it 
recognised as Pribumi those who embraced Islam, 
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practised Malay customs and spoke Malay" i Is 0 and "As 
such, it is up to the Chinese to adjust to the 
requirements". 181 Regarding assimilation, he argued 
that "one reason why not many grouses were heard from 
this community [the Malacca Baba community] 182 on 
their position was that they could adapt to the local 
Malay Pribumi community". 1.83 Further, he asserted, 
"The Baba community was even willing to forsake some 
of their original cultural traditions and absorb 
almost all aspects of the way of life of the Malay 
Pribumi community". 184 Meanwhile, Tun Tan Siew Sin, 
the former MCA president and the Finance Minister in 
the Tunku cabinet, said that his family which had 
originated from mainland Ch ina could accept Malay 
customs and dress like Malays without any 
difficulty. 185 
In the Chinese community at large, there is a 
striking revival of the innovative Theravada Buddhism 
a rev, ý \40 and also/of the more traditional Chinese variety of 
Mahayana Buddhism. 18 6 The former, which historically, 
has only rarely been associated with any of the 
Chinese religions or with Malaysia, appeals most to 
the middle class, urban and young educated Chinese, 
who abhor the traditional syncretic form of Mahayana 
Buddhism. 187 This new development comes about among 
the educated Chinese as a result of their awareness 
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that they need a more innovative rational religion to 
reassert their own identity and socio-economic 
survival in the wake of the changing situation vis-A- 
vis the Muslim Malays of Malaysia. LS8 
With the support of their brethren from the 
neighbouring Theravada Buddhist states of Thailand, 
Burma and Sri Lanka, they emphasize that the basic 
tenets of their faith are universalistic and 
applicable to a multi-ethnic country like Malaysia and 
beyond. 1.89 This brand of Buddhism too condemns such 
vices as corruption, lotteries, drug taking, excessive 
drinking and the behaviour of the self-interested 
elites. 190 Simultaneously, it endorses selective 
technical and other forms of modernisation associated 
with the West and unapologetically draws its economic 
ethics from Schumacher's concept of "small is 
beautiful" 191 and his chapter on "Buddhist 
economics". 192 In these respects, its orientation as 
compared to the Mahayana Buddhism of the traditional 
Chinese community is solidly materialistic. 193 
Whatever the case, the revival of both forms of 
Buddhism among the Chinese, with the emphasis on 
ethnic identity, serves to widen the gap between them 
and the rest of the Malay/Muslim community, who have 
been more occupied with Islam itself. 
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The Indians, who make up the third largest ethnic 
group in Malaysia, are also religiously diversified. 
The majority of them are Hindus, with others being 
Mus I ims, Christians, Sikhs and Bahais. However, 
religious revival is less evident among the Hindus 
than the Chinese. 194 Nonetheless, among the young and 
educated Indians, there is concern for a more 
intellectual and enlightened "rational" variety of 
religion, that is , one capable of giving meaning to 
the new kind of life-styles of today's middle-class, 
which feels alienated from the religious 
traditionalism of the old generation. 195 On the other 
hand, the Indians as a community appear to be less 
vocal about Islam than the Chinese. On one occasion, 
the Indian press did make a sweeping comment against 
Muslim extremism following the Kerling incident of 
1978.196 In 1980, the Tamil language daily, Tamil 
Malar, published an article slandering Islam, thus 
leading to its banning by the Malaysian 
aut hor iti es. 197 But soon, it was allowed to resume its 
publication under a different name. 
Among the Christians, there is apparently a 
revival of religious awareness, especially among the 
Chinese and Kadazan, the main Bumiputra group of 
Sabah, East Malaysia. It has been particularly 
striking in the increase of the charismatic Christian 
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movement in the form of such Christian sects as the 
Pentecostalists and Seventh Day Adventists and in more 
syncretic combinations of Christianit-y and traditional 
Chinese elements. 19s Some local Catholic churches have 
also been influenced by the new trend in that priests 
have been given formal dispensations to practice 
exorcism of spirits. '99 
Also of signif icance is that the local Christians 
seem to receive the support of their brethren from 
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere in 
their attempts to exert their identity and gain more 
converts. Utusan Malaysia, a popular Malay daily 
reported that the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia 
had stated that the government would act firmly 
against illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries 
who tried to propagate Christianity among the 
MUSJJMS. 200 Recently, in Tanuary 1987, Datuk Dr. Yusof 
Noor, the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister's 
Department in charge of Religious Affairs revealed 
that he had received a cheque via the post amounting 
to $10 millions Malaysian in an attempt to induce him 
to allow the Pentecostalist Christians to hold a 
"Pentecostal World Conference" at the prestigious 
Pusat Daqangan Dunia Putra (Putra World Trade Centre) 
in Kuala Lumpur in J988.201 This meeting is scheduled 
to bring together ten thousand Christian adherents of 
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the movement to the Malaysian capital. 202 However, 
the application for the meeting was rejected by the 
management section of this UMNO complex and the cheque 
concerned was handed over to the police by the Deputy 
Minister for further investigation. 203 Obviously, the 
reports mentioned indicate that the Christians are 
trying to generate more widespread religious activity 
within the country and these moves have naturally 
stimulated nervousness among the Muslims in the heat 
of the current Islamic reawakening. 
Meanwhile, to allay the fears of the non-Muslims, 
the Muslim leaders within the government explained 
that the Islamisation programme was intended to instil 
universal Islamic values in society and that the non- 
Muslim minorities had nothing to fear as their 
interests would be safeguarded. 2- 04 Besi-des this, 
Sanusi I uni d, the UMNO Secretary-General added, 
"Islamic laws and Islamic institutions are for the 
Muslim community only. The Indians and Chinese should 
fear PAS, not UMNO". 20s Nonetheless, the non-Muslims 
are far from satisfied with such assurances. 206 In 
fact, their apprehension was intensified with the 
recent implementation of an Islamic penal code in some 
Malaysian states, though the measures taken in such 
cases fall below the penalties prescribed by the 
Shari'-ah. 207 At the same time, the alarms raised 
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against a wider implementation of Islamic law by 
several Muslim secularists within the country have 
encouraged a hardening of attitude among disenchanted 
non-Muslims towards the whole process of Islamisation. 
e. 'Islamic Consciousness and the Arts: 
It should be noted that the rise of Islamic 
consciousness among the Muslims of Malaysia has also 
spilled over into the realm of the arts, particularly 
in literature. As a result, some preliminary 
discussions have taken place concerning wh. at 
constitutes Islamic literature among some Muslim 
intellectuals and literary figures since the mid- 
70s. 208 
Islam has had a place in Malay literature since 
the days when Islamic learning flourished in Acheh 
(1511 - 1650) and Tohore (1650 - 1800). But until the 
1970s, no serious effort was made to define what 
really constituted Sastera Islam (Islamic Literature). 
Instead, R. O. Winstedt and other scholars who followed 
him merely classified Sastera Melayu Islam as Arabo- 
Persian works which were adapted and translated into 
the Malay language, without even considering the 
question of the value system (Islamic or otherwise) 
that these works projected. 209 
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With the development of modern Malay literatýire, 
the influence of Islam began to wane and almost 
disappeared until the early 70s. In the 50s, the main 
trend which dominated the literary scene in Malaya 
(including Singapore) was that of a revolt against 
tradition which was a philosophy borrowed from the 
West. 210 This was basically the idea propagated by a 
group of writers known as Asas 50 (AnFkatan Sasterawan 
50 or Generation 50 Writers), whose slogan was 'Seni 
untuk Masyarakat' or ' Art for Society' . 21 1 In their 
literary struggle against imperialism, exploitation, 
and the class system found within society, these 
writers did not fall back on Islam Der se, but rather 
upheld socialistic, existential, humanistic and 
rationalistic tendencies. 212 Finding this trend too 
radical and unsuitable to their more hedonistic taste, 
a number of writers led by Hamzah Husain broke away 
from Asas 50 to form the association known as 
'Persatuan An); ýkatan Persuratan Melayu Baru' or 
'Association of New Generation Malay Writers' in 
1954.213 This secessionist group wrote under the 
slogan 'Seni untuk Seni' or 'Art for Art's sake*, thus 
concentrating on romanticism rather than appealing to 
the mental faculty. 214 Despite the emergence of a few 
new writers with religious training in the 60s, the 
trend remained more towards nationalistic and other 
secular tendencies. 215 
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However, the rise of da4wah has brought some 
changest though still at the preliminary stage, within 
literary circles. Polemics began to take place between 
those who subscribed to the idea of the West as the 
conveyor of modernism in Malay literature and those 
led by Prof. Syed Naguib al-Attas, whose contention is 
that it is Islam with its TawhidiC 216 world-view and 
nothing else that promotes modernity within Malay 
culture, which also includes literature. 217 
Simultaneously, ideas proposed by Naguib al-Attas 
began to spread and challenge the status quo through 
student bodies like PKPIM, various Muslim student 
societies and some members of GAPENA ((-'Tabunqan 
Persatuan Penulis Nasional. Mala ysia or Union of 
National Writers Associations of Malaysia) and 
ABIM. 21 11 The culmination of these efforts to promote 
Sastera Islam was the formation of GTAPIM (Gabunqan 
Penulis Islam Malaysia or Union of Muslim Writers of 
Malaysia) on 30th. May 1976.219 Among the prominent 
writers who have been producing Islamic oriented works 
in the form of novels, essays, poems and short stories 
are included Prof. Datuk Hj. Shahnon Ahmad, S. Othman 
Kelantan, Ustaz Uthman el-Muhammady, Nahmar Jamil, 
Norhisham Mustaffa, Shafie Abu Bakar and Mana Sikana. 
By the early 80s, GAPIM had ceased to function as a 
number of its top committee members were more inclined 
towards politiCS. 220 
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Upon its premature death, those individuals who 
were really interested in making literature in 
Malaysia more Islamic in spirit as well as in content 
set up a new association called Persatuan Penulis- 
Penulis Islam (Association of Islamic Wriýers) in 
1984,221 In Tune 1987, the Education Minister made an 
announcement that an Islamic Literary Award would be 
introduced from that year with attractive cash priz. -les 
for local Islamic novels and literary works in Bahasa 
MajaySia. 222 With such an impetus, it seems that 
Sastera Islam will have a bright future in Malaysia. 
On the other hand, the rise of the dar-wah 
phenomenon brought direct attacks upon traditional 
Malay art forms such as the wayam z kulit- (shadow 
puppet plays) and dance dramas (bangsawan and Malyong) 
on the grounds that like much of Malay adat they 
contain non-Islamic, that is,, " Buddhist and Hindu, 
elements and themes. 223 Sim 
arisen to visual arts such as 
photography which depict the 
manifestation of idolatry or a 
a result of this, some 
universities and colleges are 
ilarly, opposition has 
painting, sculpture and 
human form as being a 
form of pornography. As 
arts departments in 
experiencing a decline 
in intake of Muslim students, save for those dealing 




Meanwhile, the Malay martial arts (silat) has also 
COme under serious questioning in ce-t-tain da6wah 
quarters, especially when it involves the invocation 
of spirits or the use of' amulets or of Hindu or 
"pagan" rituals as a prelude to the performance. 22S 
However silat as a form of exercise and self-defence 
minus all the extra 'help' mentioned is welcomed and 
even taken up by some dacwah individuals. 
f. Islam and Foreign Polig_y:. 
Since its independence, Malaya' s (later Malay- 
sia, s) f oreign policy has been pro-Western in 
orientation, with the maintenance of strong ties with 
Britain and the Commonwealth. 226 This was to be 
expected as the Tunku and his most senior colleagues 
in the cabinet were British-educated and had fond 
memories of the British democratic system and way of 
life, the more so in that Britain had granted Malaya 
its independence through a peaceful transfer of power. 
In late 1963, following the violent Indonesian 
Confrontation against Malaysia, which it claimed to be 
a neo-colonialist project of the British, the Tunku's 
administration was forced to make contact with African 
countries and to revive its links with the Muslim 
world, while remaining close to the West to safeguard 
its sovereignty and independence. 227 As Malaysia wooed 
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Muslim and Afro-Asian countries during the Indonesian 
Confrontation as a means to counter Indonesian 
diplomatic offensives, its foreign policy in the 60s 
became more Islamic and its relations with Britain 
became less paramount. As part of this new 
development, Malaysia hosted the regional conference 
of the World Muslim Congress in 1964,228 To offset 
Indonesian diplomatic and propaganda offensives, 
Malaysia opened diplomatic missions in Morocco and 
Nigeria in 1965 and 1966.229 At the same time, 
Malaysia called for Muslim unity and supported the 
Islamic cause to restore AL-Agisa Mosque to its pre- 
June 1967 situation at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' 
Conference in leddah in 1970.230 However, all these 
diplomatic initiatives could not dislodge the special 
relationship that PAS had with religious dignitaries 
in various Muslim countries. Thus, outside official 
circles, the Malaysian government still had problems 
in trying to maintain a good Islamic image as compared 
to most PAS leaders, who had the advantages of being 
religiously educated and representing an Islamic party 
as well as being able to converse with their co- 
religionists in fluent Arabic. 
As dacwah became an important phenomenon in 
Malaysia, the Malaysian government under the late Tun 
Abdul Razak tried to cultivate closer ties with the 
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Islamic world community. As part of this policy, more 
visits were made to the Middle East by Malaysian 
leaders; Malaysia also supported the Islamic 
Secretariat (whose first Secretary-General was t-he 
Tunku himself) and took the initiative to host the 
Fifth Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in 
1974.231 Besides political reasons, Malaysian leaders 
have looked hopefully to the Middle East as a source 
of trade, investment and economic aid. So far, there 
has been only a small growth in these areas. At any 
r at e, the pro-Islam and pro-Arab policy earned 
Malaysia a loan of $M25.1 million from Libya, in 
J'anuary 1977.232 
With the ascendancy of Mahathir as the Prime 
Minister of Malaysia in J'uly 1981, the role of Islam 
in Malaysian foreign policy became more important. In 
terms of priority, the Islamic world was placed in the 
same bracket as East Asia, that is occupying a second 
rank after the neighbouring Asean states of Singapore, 
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and later Brunei, 
with the West given the last consideration, 233 In line 
with this policy of cultivating closer political, 
economic and cultural relationships with the Muslim 
world, Mahathir visited the United Arab Emirates, 
Bahrein and Oman soon after his assumption of office; 
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preceded in time by the state visit of the Yan,, z Di 
Pertuan Aýzonq to Saudi Arabia. 234 At the same time, 
the Prime Minister granted full diplomatic status to 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and 
declared in no uncertain terms Malaysia's support for 
the PLO and the legitimate Arab struggle against 
Zionist aggression and for the return of occupied Arab 
lands. 235 For the same reasons, Malaysia's Foreign 
Affairs Ministry declared March 21 as "Afghanistan 
Day" and the country itself has contributed a total of 
$M420,870 to a special fund for Afghan refugees. 236 
Subsequently, in 1985, the Malaysian government 
offered Kuala Lumpur as the point for global distri- 
bution of news on the MuJIhidin struggle, after 
allowing the Afghan resistance movement to open an 
office in the federal Capital. 237 These particular 
moves were unprecedented in that Malaysia was the only 
nation to grant such an official recognition to the 
Mulahidin. 238 In yet another case, Malaysia through 
the RISEAP 239 has agreed to subsidise Muslim pilgrims 
from Tapan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan to Mecca 
in what has essentially been a Malaysian scheme. 240 
This was an extension to the services already accorded 
to the Muslims of Australia and New Zealand, 241 All 
these efforts were made partly to bolster the support 
for UMNO among the Islamic fundamentalists. 242 
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Further efforts- to promote Islamic cooperation 
were made when Malaysia helped the Republic of the 
Maldives to build a "floating" mosque and an Islamic 
centre in Male, the country's Capital. 243 In 1985, 
additional assistance was given to the Maldives in 
various fields apart from the existing technical aid. 
244 For her part, Malaysia has also benefited a great 
deal from espousing such a policy. For example, Kuwait 
offered petroleum technology training to her students, 
besides undertaking to bear the full cost of 
reconstructing the Madrasah al-Mashhur in Penang at a 
Cost Of $M800,0()0/-, 245 Malaysia and the United Arab 
Emirates have also agreed to make greater efforts to 
increase the total volume of trade foll owing the 
inaugural meeting of the Joint committee of the two 
countries in October 1984.24.6 On the same occasion, 
Malaysia requested the UAE to make available 20 Arabic 
language teachers as well as places for Malaysian 
students t0 study Arabic in the country. 24-7 In 
addition, Malaysia has joined the Islamic Education, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (IESCO) at a 
ceremony in Kuala Lumpur, in an attempt to cooperate 
with other Muslim countries in eradicating 
illiteracy. 248 Equally important are Malaysia's ties 
with Pakistan. For instance, during President Zia al- 
Haq's five-day visit to Malaysia in November 1982, 
both countries signed an Economic and Technical 
%W 
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Cooperation Agreement .249 At the same time, Pakistan 
agreed to -provide more places in its institutions of 
higher learning for Malaysians and also promised to 
provide doctors at the request of Malaysia, 2SO 
An exception to the rule are Malaysia's ties with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Although trade links and 
diplomatic relations have been forged between the two 
countries 251, Malaysian authorities still keep a firm 
check on the infiltration of Shi r-ite revolutionary 
ideas and have closely monitored the visits made by 
members of the Muslim opposition party to Iran. 252 As 
for PAS and other Islamic groups, their links with the 
1-ulamcil and Muslim activists in the Islamic world and 
beyond remain intact, despite what the Malaysian 
authorities have done to improve their relations with 
the Muslim countries. 
Another exception in terms of Malaysian foreign 
policy is its readiness to preserve goodwill among 
Asean countries even at the price of offending some 
fellow Muslims. In this regard, its stand concerning 
Muslim minorities in these countries has at best been 
ambivalent. Despite its calls for Muslim unity and 
cooperation a. s well as its defence of the Palestinians 
and Afghan mu -Va- 
hidIn causes, it has been less 
ent husi ast ic in supporting the Patani Muslims of 
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Thailand and the Moro of the southern Philippines. For 
instance, in an attempt to avoid straining its 
relationshi, p with the Thai government, Malaysia Joined 
Indonesia in preventing representation of Patani 
Muslims at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference 
in Tripoli, Libya, in 1977.253 In the same conference, 
it attempted to tone down a resolution condemning the 
Philippines on the Moro problem. 254 
In the 80s, for the same reason, the Malaysian 
administration has continued the policy of its 
predecessors vis-A-vis the Muslim minorities in the 
Philippines and Thailand. 25s This was also extended to 
the case of Burmese Muslims, who were excluded from 
participating in the government-sponsored Inter- 
national Dakwah Conference in Kuala Lumpur in the 
interests of diplomatic relations with Burma. 256 Such 
an attitude naturally caused the government to incur 
the criticism of a number of Muslim groups within the 
country. 
From the above discussions, it is clear that 
Islamic consciousness in Malaysia has thus far given 
rise to varied interpretations and responses in 
various quarters. Whatever the case, during the last 
two decades Islam has been propelled to the centre- 
stage of Malaysian life. At this Juncture, it seems 
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unlikely that it will sink into oblivion or even play 
a more subordinate role to other systems. 
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The 1986 General Elections and After. 
In this chapter, our discussion will be focused 
on recent developments in Malaysia, particularly the 
events surrounding the 1986 General Elections and the 
period following it. In this regard, we shall assess 
the position of Islam in the recent UMNO-PAS rivalry 
and the internal struggle for power within UMNO 
itself. 
a, The UMNO-PAS Rivalry 
Amidst political instability, as a result of a 
power struggle within UMNO, the BMF scandal, 
leadership squabbles and mismanagement of cooperative 
societies within the MCA, the Memali. incident and the 
Sabah political contests 1, as well as the general 
economic recession besetting the country, Mahathir 
decided to call a snap election. 2 Accordingly, the 
Malaysian General Elections were held on 2nd and 3rd 
August 1986, despite protests from several Muslim 
organisations and individuals that it was unjustified 
and inappropriate to hold elections while about 
thirty thousand Muslims were away on hall. 3 As usual, 
PAS was the main Muslim/Malay opposition party to 
enter the fray with the determination to wrest power 
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from UMNO in the name of Islam. However, slightly 
differently from the previous situation, PAS this time 
carried with it the support of the various CCCs. 
Nonetheless, it failed to get the cooperation of the 
small parties, Nasional Malaysia Parti <Nasma), Partai 
sosialis Rakyat Ka 1aYsia ePER-M) and the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) right to the end of the 
election period, even though they had signed an 
electoral pact twith PAS to fight against the BN on 
14th Tuly, 1986.4 Meanwhile, the DAP provided the 
Chinese-dominated opposition to BN. 
Among the issues bitterly fought out between the 
P AS and UMNO were the questions of development, an 
Islamic state, takfir, a fatwc; ý on whether those killed 
in the Memali incident were shuhadc; V (martyrs), the 
University Act 5, corruption, PAS cooperation with 
unislamic parties, discrimination against the hijab 
and so forth. 6 It is also interesting to note that 
Just four days before the election, the Prime Minister 
himself openly said that priority in terms of 
development and the allocation of funds would be given 
to Barisan areas. 7 In another case, the Minister of 
Agriculture ordered the Fisheries Department to 
reissue licences to operate 1ýukat ftollo (Apollo 
nets), that is, a form of drifting-net for fishing in 
the open sea, which were banned in November 1984 on 
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the grounds that they deprived the small-time inshore 
fishermen of their livelihood. 8 Within the same 
period, some government sources also revealed that all 
state muftis would be appointed as executive committee 
members of state cabinets after the election. 9 Besides 
this, a member of the Barisan top leadership pledged 
to raise the income of the Kelantanese if his 
government came to power in the election. 10 However, 
the most interesting of all the issues brought against 
PAS was- the allegation that some of its local leaders 
in Selangor were running a slave camp at Rasah, near 
Kota Kubu Baru, about 64 kilometres from the Malaysian 
capital. " An interview with two #victims, was 
televised all over the nation. i2 As the campaign 
heated UPI some university students lef t their 
campuses in order to campaign for PAS. 13 
The results of the elections came as a shock to 
PAS and even surprised UMNO itself as a few days 
before the polls it had expected that PAS would 
increase its seats in Kelantan, TrenSganu and Kedah. 14 
On the contrary, PAS managed to retain only one of 
the parliamentary seats which it had had before the 
polls and 15 State seats (10 in Kelantan, 2 in 
Trengganu and 3 in Kedah). 15 However, the percentage 
of votes it obtained in its traditional areas of 
support remained constant, ranging from 44 - 47% in 
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Kelantan and 38 - 41% in Trengganu for the 1978,1982 
and the 1986 elections. 16 PAS also fared better in 
Kedah this time, polling some 36% of the total valid 
vote compared with 32.7% in the 1982 election. 17 
Simultaneously, its percentage in votes also increased 
in the West coast states of Malacca, Tohore, Perak and 
Selangor. 
In an attempt to explain the PAS electoral 
defeat, a number of factors were cited by some 
analysts. A local academic argued that it was because 
of poor strategy, that i S, that PAS spread its 
resources too thinly instead of concentrating on its 
traditional strongholds. 18 Others offered different 
reasons, f or exampl et hat PAS' sf ai 1 ure st emmed f rom 
its lack of an organisational structure in that 
conflicting policy statements were made by its leaders 
and there was no one who could coordinate official 
policy; lack of discipline among party members in 
terms of making public pronouncements and taking 
actions; recent constituency adjustments which diluted 
PAS' s. strength in certain areas; the timeless 
"Protector" mentality in the Malay community which 
prevents it from adopting an evaluative and critical 
attitude towards the UMNO leadership; Barisan's 
ability to control information flow to. the rural areas 
so that the electorate there had hardly any access to 
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reports and analysis on the various scandals and only 
received whatever information the authorities wanted 
them to have; and PAS' s inability to exploit issues 
and relate its policies to the practical needs of 
the people. 19 But most observers agreed that PAS', s 
greatest blunder wee; to form the Opposition pact and 
to issue a joint declaration with Nasma 2SRM and SDP 
concerning the setting up of an Islamic State which 
the latter parties for ideological reasons could not 
defend. 20 Equally problematical in this respect was 
PAS' s- strategy of associating itself with the non- 
Muslims within the CCCs, which was really a novel 
idea, but had come too s oon for the rank and file, 
especially in the more traditional east-coast states, 
to be able to comprehend it, let alone digest it, This 
was the more so in that UMNO with its strong 
propaganda machine could severely embarass PAS over 
this issue, given the fact that PAS in the past had 
vehemently condemned such a strategy. Not to be 
forgotten also was the lure of material benefits and 
the relative stability which the UMNO-dominated 
government had provided and was promising to provide 
in the future. Among the conservative-minded Malays 
(including some members of the bureaucracy), the 
radical style of PAS campaigning in certain areas, 
like the shouting of "Allahu Akbar" and the use of the 
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slogans like "PAS Parti Allah" (P AS, the Party of 
Allah) was enough to scare them Off. 21 
As for UMNO, besides having strong financial 
resources, it also had the advantage of inducing some 
Islamic-educated members of the elite to be its own 
electoral candidates, thus adding more weight to its 
claim to be protecting Islam and to want genuine 
Islamisation. 22 Further, it had the backing of HAMIM, 
an Islamic-based party led by the former PAS chief, 
who because of his own experience was more than eager 
to deprive his now staunch enemies of any power. 23 The 
effectiveness of non-Muslim parties' campaigns, 
including those of the DAP concerning the danger of 
Islamic fundamentalism and an Islamic State were 
highly influential in robbing PAS of the possibility 
of obtaining non-Muslim votes, thus helping the 
Barisan to attain a two-thirds majority. 24 Sensing the 
potential threat of PAS to its well-being, UMNO 
throughout the campaign period concentrated its 
attacks on that party so that the DAP was less 
troubled and was able to capture 24- seats, making it 
the strongest non-Muslim opposition party in the 
Malaysian Parliament. 25 
As one writer put it, the recent election was 




Besides other factors, PAS was defeated because it 
tried to work with the non-Muslims through the CCCs. 
it seems that young educated MI. -I S 
11 Ms are more 
receptive to an Islamic identity, while older Malays 
have difficulty separating the tWo. 27 Nonetheless, 
PAS still ha-s a future role to play in Malaysia and it 
can be more effective if only it can be more 
organised, sensitive and truly sophisticated in 
handling issues and recognizing Muslims' needs, which 
also include material stability and not mere rhetoric. 
In terms of overt public policy, PAS has howevpr 
succeeded in its role as an opposition party. its 
constant challenges and criticisms have pushed UMNO 
into a more Islamic mould, prompting it to recruit an 
increasing number of Islamicists and appointing them 
to influential positions. " 
By late 1986, both UMNO and PAS had set up their 
own branches in Sabah. 29 Probably, if peace is not 
restored between the two parties, the battle to win 
the hearts and minds of the Muslims and non-Muslim 
Bumil2utras will be extended to East Malaysia. 30 
Further, things will become more complicated as both 
parties find themselves at odds with the ruling party, 
PBS. 
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Following the elections, PAS. also t ri ed to 
reassess its position. In the latest Muktamar at the 
Markaz Tarbiyah PAS Pusat (National Training 
Headquarters of PAS), its president emphasi. -ed the 
need for taldid hadarf (renewal of civilization), that 
is, to revive seriously the tradition of acquiring and 
disseminating knowledge; to improve the faith of the 
people and to provide more constructive traininS for 
its nuqabE-I so that they would be able to arouse 
Islamic awareness within the SoCiety. 3i Simul- 
taneously, he reminded PAS's members to give the 
responsibility of running the party only to those who 
were committed to PAS' s. f ikrah (ideas) and manhaj 
(method of operat ion). 32 He also added that no other 
trend should be brought into PAS, thus signaling that 
extremism and different methodology as practised by 
some new members of PAS, often associated with the 
Islamic Representative Council (IRC), a student 
organisation which originated in Britain, should not 
be allowed to dominate the party. 33 An outcome of this 
was that a popular and able religious-educated former 
student leader was elected to be the new head of 
PAS' s Youth Council, with the former deputy chief of 
this council, a leading IRC figure, being given a less 
commanding position. 34 Also of significance was that a 
number of veteran PAS members who had left the party 
in the wake of the conflict of the late 70s reattended 
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the muktamar, thus indicating that the party was 
regaining its Support. 3S In yet another perspective, 
PAS decided to continue its contact with the Chinese 
community through a new Chinese party to be formed 
following the dissolution of the CC-CS. 36 Therefore, it 
remains to be seen how far PAS will be able to recover 
from its latest setback and play a more effective role 
in realising its religious goals in Malaysia. 
b. The strugZle for power within UMNO: 
Since the 60s, UMNO had been affected by 
factionaliSM. 3 7 However, the internal struggles seem- 
ed lately to be so acute that nothing more could be 
done to shield these unhealthy trends from the pub- 
lic' s view. The events that developed within UMNO in 
the 80s had their beginnings in the late 60s and the 
70s, As a result of the implementation of the DEB 38 
following the May 13th Incident of 1969, more Malays 
than ever before became rich. This new found affluence 
created a small group of nouveaux riches often 
associated with UMNO or sympathetic to its causes. 
However, often lacking in religious training and 
guided more by material considerations, these 
individuals were more generally motivated by personal 
gains and this led in turn to intrigues, bribery and 
other insidious practices. Part of this new trend is 
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the currently famous clich6 'money politics' whereby 
money is used for securing power, favours and even 
position. 39 To add to the complications, there seems 
to be no shortage of ambitious people within the party 
itself. 40 
Out of these clashes for power, there evolved the 
most interesting drama of all thus far within UMNO, 
that is, the rift between Mahathir and his deputy, 
Datuk Musa Hitam and the eventual departure of the 
latter from Mahathir' s cabinet, which in turn helped 
to shed some light on other issues surrounding UMNO 
in the immediate past and the period following it. To 
understand this complex episode in the history of the 
Mahathir-Musa estrangement, one will have to go back 
to the early 80s. Musa, an old ally of Mahathir 
during the days when he opposed the Tunku, became the 
Deputy Prime Minister, the second most powerful man in 
Malaysia, after he had defeated Tengku Razaleigh, a 
Kelantan prince, for the post of the party's deputy 
president in 1981.4 1 Subsequently, he again defeated 
the prince in the same contest in 1984, hence securing 
for himself a very strong position within the party 
and the government. 42 However, local observers knew 
that on both occasions Musa would not have won without 
the backing of Mahathir himself. 4-3 Initially, 
everything seemed to be right for the ' 2MI admin- 
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is--t ration, Very few people were really aware that 
conflicting ideas and life-styles existed between the 
two prominent figures. For instance, as opposed to his 
fun-loving deputy, Mahathir since he came to *power 
appeared to lead a more sober kind of life. 44 In terms 
of Malaysian economic well-being, Mahathir strongly 
propagated the Look East Policy, that i S, having 
close relations with Tapan and South Korea and seeking 
their help in acquiring efficient management and 
better technical know-how, whereas Musa still favoured 
the West. 1- 5 Moreover, while Mahathir emphasized 
Islamisation, Musa seemed more concerned with 
nationaliSM. 46 
Gr adua 11 y, the differences between the two men 
began to appear, although they were constantly shown 
as being friendly in publiC, 47 However, the break came 
out into the open when Musa sent a seven-page letter 
of resignation to the Prime Minister on 26 February, 
1986.48 In the letter which soon became widely- 
circulated in Kuala Lumpur, he Save his reasons for 
resigning from the posts of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Home Affairs Minister and UMNO. Deputy President. Among 
these Musa claimed that he was disappointed with the 
Premier for doubting his loyalty towards him; and that 
he had had enough of 'money politic, -=;, and the abuse of 
power for political interestS. 49 In response to this, 
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during an emergency session, Mahathir produced a 
letter written by Musa in Tuly 1984. SO In this letter, 
Musa as the re-elected deputy president of UMNO warned 
that he would resign in July 1985, if the former 
reappointed the defeated Razaleigh in the cabinet. 51. 
This revelation stunned the members of UMNO Supreme 
Council, causing them to pledge their support to the 
Prime Minister. Nonetheless, all of them agreed that 
Musa, who was then in London, should be urged to 
return and withdraw his resignation. 52 Accordingly, a 
four-member delegation was despatched to London. S3 
At any rate, some political analysts confirmed 
that in 1984 Musa had tried to consolidate his grip on 
the party and the government. For instance, he wanted 
a transfer to the Foreign Ministry and important 
portfolios for some of his CJOS(z aSSOCiateS. 54 However 
the attempt failed. At the same time, Musa was unhappy 
over what was termed Mahathir' s Kitchen Cabinet' 
This included the appointment of Premier's close 
friends or loyalists as Finance Minister and UMNO 
treasurer, party Secretary General and the like. Of 
great importance too was that Musa's camp was 
uncomfortable over the presence of Anwar Ibrahim, the 
main figure behind the Islamisation programme, in UMNO 
and was worried about the resurgence of ISlaM. 56 
Another point of friction between Mahathir and his 
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former deputy was the way in which the latter handled 
the Memali incident, leading to bloodshed and causing 
great embarassment to the government. E; 7 Besides this, 
Musa did not show much enthusiasm for Mahathir' s pet 
projects like the Penang Bridge and the ' Proton Saga' 
national car, which he viewed as "a waste of public 
f unds". 5 13 In this regard, Musa had always advocated 
a us t erit y. To sum up, it was differences in life- 
style, ideals and political ambitions which led to the 
break between the two leaders, thus creating a wave of 
nervousness among the Malaysians. 
In the meantime, the delegation failed to persuade 
Musa to withdraw his resignation, except as UMNO 
deputy president, s9 With the impending elections, a 
truce was for a while restored between the rival camps 
within UMNO. Nonetheless, Musa by his latest move had 
indicated that he was still interested in making a 
comehack and challenging Mahathir at a later date. In 
order to stabilize the situation, Mahathir selected 
n7haffar Baba, a wealthy and respectable veteran 
politician, to be his new deputy, while he himself 
t ook over the Home Ministry. 60 Despite all the 
problems described, and the fear among. UMNO members 
that PAS would capture the northern Ma-lay-dominated 
states, the Barisan managed to win a landslide victory 
in the elections. This was also a great triumph for 
303 
Mahathir, as a reduced majority would mean a forced 
retirement for him as the Prime Minister and party 
President. With a new mandate very much in his favour, 
the Prime Minister was able to continue with his 
Islamisation policy, though austerity was now observed 
as a serious recession was still gripping the country, 
accompanied by a slight modification in the country's 
foreign and trade policies with the West, including 
Britain. 6i On the home front, Mahathir was poised to 
face the UMNO General Assembly meeting for the 
elections of party officials. 
As scheduled, the 38th UMNO General Assembly was 
held on 24th April 1987, thus ending for a spell the 
most bitter infighting that the party had ever known. 
In the heat of the campaigns, especially for the party 
presidency, charges and count er-charges were made by 
the rival CaMpS, 62 Among these were included 
allegations of mismanagement, autocracy and favour- 
itism against the party president. 63 Nonetheless, 
Mahathir managed to retain the presidency after 
beating his main challenger, TenSku Razaleigh by only 
43 votes. 6 '- This slim majority indicated that there 
was widespread dissatisfaction with his leadership, 
besides revealing that the split within UMNO was 
really serious. On the other hand, the Islamists 
within UMNO, including Anwar Ibrahim, who was elected 
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as one of the three vice-president s, got the highest 
number of votes, while Musa lost the deputy presidency 
to his rival Ghaf far Baba. 65 At the same time, seven 
Musa-Razal eigh supporters were elected to the Supreme 
Council. 6 6 In a dramatic move, Razaleigh and a Musa 
supporter Datuk Rais Yatim resigned from Mahathir's 
cabinet, while three other ministers and four deputy 
ministers, who belonged to the Musa-Razaleigh team, 
were dropped from the cabinet by the Prime Minister 
himself. 67 Since then, the secularists within UMNO 
have been held in check. But, the struggle for power 
was far from over, despite the calls for unity within 
the party. 
Contrary to what most observers had expected, the 
next round of bitter struggles even started earlier 
than 1990, the year when new national elections will 
be held. Failing to overthrow Mahathir through the 
ballot boxes, eleven UMNO members, who belonged to 
Razaleigh's team, applied to the Malaysian High Court 
to have the general assembly and party elections 
declared illegal on the grounds that some delegates 
who had participated in the meeting and the elections 
had represented 30 unregistered UMNO branches. 68 In 
this connection, they also wanted an order compelling 
UMNO and its Secret ary-Gene-ral to arrange for fresh 
delegates' elections and a fresh UMNO general assembly 
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and election to be held after that. 69 Consequently, 
much to the dismay of all UMNO members and the Malays 
in general, the High Court judge declared UMNO an 
illegal party as provided for in Section 12 of the 
Societies Act 196E5.70 On this count, UMNO itself was 
trapped by the very Act which it had passed in order 
to eliminate organisations unfavourable to its 
aspirations. This political circus was soon followed 
by a greater farce when the Tunku, on the occasion of 
his 85th birthday celebration, was brought out of his 
retirement with an announcement that he and a group 
of former UMNO members had formed a new party calleý 
UMNO Malaysia. 71 However, before this Tunku-1ed party 
could even get off the ground, its application to be 
registered was dismissed by the Registrar of 
Soc i et i es. 7 Thus, the coujý de theatre executed by 
Mahathir's dissenters had failed miserably. 
Mahathir, on his part, strengthened his own 
position by making a brilliant, if somewhat belated, 
move by registering a new party called UMNO Baru (New 
UMNO. ), which put people who had planned to isolate him 
on the defensive, and which at one fell S WC C) p 
neutralised troublemakers from the old deregistered 
party, 73 As its name suggests, this new party seems to 
be movinS in the new direction that Mahathir has 
charted so far. By emphasizing loyalty to the party 
306 
leadership as a prerequisite for membership of UMNO 
Baru Raza-leigh and his supporters had been kept out 
in the cold. 74 
Meanwhile, as a result of the split among the 
Malay Muslims within and without UMNO, the MCA and the 
DAP, whose raison detre had been to protect Chinese 
interests, and also the MIC, once again began to 
question the mutually accepted National Language 
policy and together with it the nation, =-tl education 
policy as well as the DEB. 75 At this stage, however, 
the Malay Muslim leadership within the Barisan 
administration managed to stifle the unrest, while 
also breaking the opposition posed by both the Malay 
secularists and other dissenting parties. 76 
Simultaneously, the Islamisation programmes st the 
official level and private dal-wah activities have 
continued to flourish throughout the country. 
Not e s. - 
I The legal right of Toseph Pairin Kitingan, the Chief 
Minister and leader of the Christia n-Kadazan dominated 
party, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), to rule over Sabah 
was ch allenged in court by Tun Mustapha. of the Unite-d 
Sabah National Organisation (USNO). At the same time, 
Harris Salleh, whose party BERJAYA was unsea ted by PBS 
in the state election of 1985, was working behind the 
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In discussing Islam in modern Malaysia, we notice 
that there is a pattern of continuity, tension and 
change at work within the nation's history. This 
pattern begins t0 unfold when we take into 
consideration the various developments that have been 
taking place in the country since the beginning of 
direct colonial intervention in the late 19th century. 
As we have observed, Islam in the pre-colonial 
Malay States had never really been a strong force. It 
had a very limited role in the political, social and 
economic spheres. In f act, it had to share its very 
development within Malay society with adat, which at 
times promoted unislamic ideas and practices, 
consisting of legacies from the Hindu-Buddhist and 
local animistic traditions, 
At the same time, there was no central Muslim 
institution in any of the Malay States. Unlike the 
situation in the Muslim heartland of the Middle East, 
there was no clear-cut evidence to show that kathis 
had been employed at the Malay royal courts. Although 
the Sharil-ah had influenced certain aspects of legal 
codes and expressions of Malay adat in some states, 
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it was never really applied in the settlement of 
disputes and was largely ignored in the day to day 
administration. Ironically, British intervention 
brought about many changes in this area in Malay 
St at GýS. For the f irst ti me, Islamic religious 
institutions were set up as part and parcel of the 
administrative changes being made within the acquired 
territories. Simultaneously, the administration and 
practices of Islamic law, especially in the realm of 
personal law, were regulated to fit in with the 
requirements of the time, However, when compared with 
other developments - economic, communication and the 
like - Islam still remained a backwater in the scheme 
of colonial administration. It was neither totally 
ignored nor was it given the stimulus to move farther 
into the realms of politics, economics and so on. In 
this connection, the colonial masters with their own 
alien tradition and background could not alone be held 
responsible for the stagnation of Islam in the 
Malaysian enviroment. Equally responsible in this 
matter were the traditional political (Blites and the 
majority of weak and subservient r-ulamc; V Associated 
with these internal factors Was the fact that 
feudalism, which was rigidly observed within Malay 
society, thereby forcing everyone to submit to the 
whims of the ruling class, had hampered t he 
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development of a more intellectually dynamic and all- 
embracing Islamic order among the Malay Muslims. 
Nevertheless, by the early decades of the 
twentieth century, some Salafi ideas which originated 
in the Middle East had b egun to trickle into the Malay 
States via the Straits Settlements which were ruled 
more directly by the British. Being outside the 
jurisdiction of traditional Malay political and reli- 
gious elit'es, the Tawi Peranakan and some foreign 
Muslims of Arab, Indian and Indonesian descent were 
free to propagate ideas, thus giving rise to 
t, jhat was locally known as the Kaum Muda. With some 
local support, the Kaum Muda managed to promote the 
cause of improving the socio-economic position of the 
Malays and began t. o press for Malayan independence. 
However, because of strong opposition from the 
traditional Malay political 41ite and its allies among 
the secular nationalists, this movement remained 
marginal force within Malay society. Later, with the 
suppression of the reformists by the British autho- 
rities, politics in Malaya were dominated by the 
secular nationalists, who eventually won independence 
for the country. 
Following independence, the Malaysian authorities, 
beginning with the former Federation of Malaya, have 
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been taking the initiative to promote Islam, whi 1e 
simultaneously continuing the past policies of the 
colonial government. As secularism remained very much 
a part of the local scene, the Alliance 
admini st rat ion, and later its successor, the Barisan 
administration, came under heavy attacks from the 
Islamists within PAS. The rivalry between UMNO and its 
opponent PAS became acute from 1959 onwards. The main 
point of friction until the early 80s was that PAS 
wanted the Islamic order to be fully implemented in 
Malaya and later Malaysia, and to defend Malay rights, 
but UMNO advocated a more liberal, capitalistic and 
multi-racial approach to politics and economic 
matters, while selectively promoting Isl3m. as well as 
defending Malay riS. hts. Then, between 1973 until 1977, 
peace was restored between the two antagonists when 
PAS joined the Barisan and had the opportunity to rule 
Malaysia together with the other component parties of 
the BN. 
From the early 70s, the whole of the Muslim world 
had been perceptibly undergoing a great change. This 
was the revival of Islam with its multifarious dimen- 
sions. By the mid-70s, this phenomenon, which started 
off as an effort to reassert Malay identity in the 
multi-racial M31aYsia following the 13th May incident 
of 1969, assumed a more Islamic character. At the same 
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time, it became more widespread, especially among the 
young educated and urban-based Muslims, who in turn 
managed to influence some members of the old 
generation and even establish some kind of rapport 
with certain traditional -r-ulamcV-. 
Accompanying this 
development were of course the changes in ideals and 
aspirations prevalent among these people. For 
instance, in voicing their socio-economic demands theycýý 
often emphasized them in Islamic terms rather than 
Malayism, or Bumiputraism. In due course, they even 
rejected Malay nationalism as a vehicle for Malay 
unity. In addition, they have been more than happy to 
play their role in maintaining Muslim interests 
throug ghout the world. This can be seen clearly, when 
we consider how these fundamentalists have supported 
the Muslim struggle in Patani, the Southern 
Philippines, Afghanistan and so on. Simultaneously, 
they passionately called for the full implementation 
of the Sharfl; ah and laid emphasis on an integrated 
approach to knowledge as well as development. In yet 
another perspective, they not only questioned tra- 
ditional norms and standards, but also condemned 
Western philosophical traditions which have influenced 
some Malaysian civil servants, teachers and poli- 
ticians. Hence, the divergent views that developed 
between the ruling power and' some members of the 
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population could not bring anything else but tension 
within the society. 
In Malaysia, this phenomenon has been linked with 
dal-wah activities of a personal or group nature. In 
dealing with the dal-wah activities, we have focussed 
on three major organisations, that is, AB I M, Darul. 
Arqam and Jama'at Tabligh Although all of them shared 
certain basic characteristics like emphasizing Tawýid 
and the need for the Muslims to return to the Qur' iýin 
and Sunnah for their salvation, they nevertheless 
differed in their approach towards attaining their 
Islamic goals. For example, ABIM has always stressed %.. 0 
da Gwah and tarbiyah, while also concentrating on 
establishing educational and economic instit tutions and 
addressing itself to socio-economic and political is- 
sues at home and abroad. Contrary to the other t wo 
groups, its approach has also been more intellectual 
in that it has carried on dialogues with both Muslims 
and non-Muslims. Meanwhile, Darul Arqam in its recent 
history seemed to be more traditional and syncretist 
in character. While recognizing its contribution to 
the growth of small-trade and agro-based economy among 
the Malays, we cannot ignore the fact that its 
educational system lacks a programme that can lead to 
the development of an Islamically healthy, intellec- 
tual and dynamic society which can effectively with- 
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stand the challenges of modern life. Tabligh, which is 
an offshoot of the Delhi-based movement is more 
inclined towards sufism, with a strong emphasis on 
self-purification and brotherhood and is unconcerned 
with politics. Nonetheless, each of these movements 
has attracted the attention of the Malaysian public. 
But, given its skill in articulating issues and 
handling a wi de range 0f 
certainly generated more fear, 
respect from various quarters. 
Also of great importance 
activities, ABIM has 
apprehension and eve-n 
was that while Islamic 
consciousness was rising in Malaysia, there emerged 
mysteriously within its midst a revival of Islamic 
heterodoxy often in the Suise of turu! 2 or mystical 
movements. The presence of such movements, however, 
created more suspicions and fear among the people, 
thus to a certain degree hampering the development of 
genuine dal; wah activities and giving the authorities k-ý 
the e. -?. -cuse to act against any individual or group 
deemed to be a threat to the status quo. 
Since independence, the UMNO-dominated Malayan 
government and later its successor the Malaysian 
authorities have implemented a number of programmes 
designed to promote Islam. However, certain anomalies 
continued to be visible just as under the colonial 
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administration. For example, Shari 1ýah is still 
confined to the realm of family law,. without any 
jurisdiction over crimes like theft, embezzlement, 
corruption, abuse of power and the like. In addition, 
Sharlcýah courts, a misnomer in themselves, cannot pass 
any sentence, except as provided by Parliament. ' Even 
though some states have recently opted to impose 
caning in cases of drunkenness among Muslims, they 
have stopped short of implementing the full ýadd 
punishment as prescribed by the Sharicah . All these 
cases, to mention only a few, have had their 
precedents in the administ. rative system of the British 
during the colonial era. 
Apart from this, government control of religious 
af f airs, just as during the days of colonial admin- 
istration, extends even to the spheres of education 
and Islamic da(-wah. In all schools and colleges, 
Islam is taught as a compartmentali-sed subject, 
without its philosophy being extended to cover the 
teaching of such subjects as history, economics, 
sciences and so forth. Hence, a secular approach to 
education is still the mainstay of the Malaysian 
educational system, despite the implementation of some 
changes like the introduction of Arabic in some 
residential schools and the teaching of a subject 
called 'Islamic Civilization' in colleges and 
3i9 
universities. Even if at times Islam is explained as 
, it is done with great care by government al-Din 
religious teachers so as not to offend the status 
quo. 2 With regard to Islamic dac-wah, it is controlled 
through the tauliah system. However, the monitoring of 
dal-wah activities at times goes far beyond what the 
British administrators had done. Also as a means to 
control dissent within the country, the Malaysian 
authorities have made use of t he ISA to detain 
opponents without trial, much the same tactic as that 
adopted by the previous colonial government. 
With regard to changes, these have tended to come 
rather slowly in Malaysia. In the 60s and early 70s, 
many of the Islamic programmes implemented by the 
Barisan administration seemed to be more symbolic and 
rhetorical than structural, wi. th the purpose 0f 
appeasing the people and ensuring support for the 
administration. But since the rise of Islamic 
consciousness and the more so with the introduction of 
the Islamisation programme in the early 80s, more 
coverage has been given to Islamic religious matters 
on the government -owned television and radio network, 
Besides this, economic development in Malaysia has 
been interpreted in Islamic terms, although the 
liberal capitalistic approach of the past is still 
maintained in many sectors of the economy. In this 
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context, to ensure greater Muslim involvement in the 
national economy, the government has created such 
institutions as the Bank Islam and the Takaful. At the 
same time, the authorities have taken initiatives to 
streamline the administration and enforcement of the 
collection of zakc; ýt under Islamic Law; while the YPEIM 
has been given the responsibility of increasing saving 
and investment among the Muslims through the Amal 
Tariah (Islamic Social Welfare) Scheme, with the 
cooperation of Tabung Haji and Bank Islam. More or 
less similar initiatives have been adopted in certain 
states. Obviously, these efforts, official or other- 
wise, have dispelled the myth propagated by some g 
scholars that Islam is anti-development. 3 
In terms of education, a great leap has been made 
with the establishment of UIA whose first batch of 
graduates has now begun serving in the administrative, 
economic and educational sectors of the nation. 
Further, to increase the 'ratio of qualified bumiputra 
and to guarant, ee success for the Islamisation. prog- 
ramme, the authorities have concentrated on sending 
more Malays for higher studies, including those who 
are involved in Islamic Studies. All these activities 
among other things have been implemented through the 
efforts of Islamists within and without the admin- 
istration. Simultaneously, the role of PAS has been no 
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less important in bringing about more Islamisation 
within the country. Its constant criticisms of UMNO 
caused the party to be more careful and to steer it 
more towards Islam, so as not to appear less Islamic 
in the eyes of the general Muslim population. 
At any rate-, as more Islamic programmes were 
implemented the government found itself at odds with 
various groups, including some of its own Malay 
supporters. Apparently this, coupled with other 
factors, has caused a split within UMNO as seen i n the 
last party election and eventually led to the court 
c as e and the demise of UMNO itself. Amidst this 
unsettled situation, opposition from the non-Malays 
has reemerged towards the government's more Is lamic 
and pro-Bumiputra policies. However, the Premier with 
the support of the Islamists managed to overcom e all 
these challenges, established a new party, UMNO Baru 
and appears to have remained in control of the 
country. 
Taking all these points into consideration, there 
are a number of possibilities which can come about in 
Malaysia in the near future. It should be noted that 
despite the presence of radicalism among certain PAS 
members and the occurence of such incidents as those 
of Batu Pahat and Kerling, which were in themselves 
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aberrations, there is not likely to be another Iran in 
Malaysia. This is simply because Islam in Malaysia has 
all along been more docile and subservient to the 
establishment. Partly, this is due to the entrenchment 
of feudalism among the Malays. Besides this, among the 
Sunni Muslims, there has never been a parallel 
tradition of strong and independent _4ulamc; 
V_ as in 
Shilite Islam. Moreover, there is no parallel to the 
state of socio-economic and political affairs that 
prevailed in Iran during the time of Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi. For their part, the Malays by nature have 
been more gentle and accomodative in their stand and 
are unlikely to be like their more emotional brothers 
of the Middle East. In such circumstances, radicalism 
will not appeal to them very much. 
This does not mean, however, that the Mal. ---=iys will 
care less or abandon all the achievements that have 
been secured in the name of Islam and for the well- 
being of the Bumiputra. It is already an established 
fact that Islam has reached the centre-stage in 
Malaysia and it is unlikely that it can be pushed back 
into the wings. Hence, Islamisation will go on, but 
its growth may slow down somewhat if infighting among 
the Malays continues unabat ed into the f ut tire. 
Nonetheless, at individual level, religiosity will 
continue to grow among young educated Muslims given 
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the fact that they now have more opportunities to 
learn Arabic, the availability of more religious works 
and the existence of movements to urge them towards 
Islam. Beyond this, with improved communications the 
Muslims of Malaysia have come into closer contact than 
before with their brethren in other pa. rts of the 
world, thus keeping the faith more alive as well as 
enhancing their commitment to it. 
Meanwhile, the call for the establishment of an 
Islamic State will arise from time to time among the 
Islamists outside the admi ni st rat i on. But in all 
probability, Malaysia in the near future will remain a 
secular state with the Malay Muslim-dominated Barisan 
still at the helm of power, as there is as yet no 
other party able to command enough confidence from the 
people. However, what is most important to the Mus- 
lims and Malaysia as a whole is that the Muslims as 
a majority group need really to unite and practise 
Islam as well as to explain their religion to others 
in such a manner as to remove their misgivings. In 
this regard, one of the things to be considered at 
this juncture is the promotion of more integrated, 
non-racial and dynamic approach to Islam via education 
and mass media and the putting of less emphasis on the 
introduction of more draconian rules and regulations. 
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At the same time, the economic atmosphere within 
the country should be improved, this including 
creating more facilities for investment and employment 
for all, while also not forgetting to provide more 
economic outlets based on Islamic principles for the 
Muslims. In this way, no one can justly complain of 
being ill-treated. For the Muslims, more changes can 
be initiated through the exercise of ijtihý3-d and 
i1mal , especially in matters pertaining to mul-c! Rmalah, 
(social transactions), by the C ul amcý! I with the 
cooperation of Muslim intellectuals. 
By any standard, such measures as these are not 
easy to attain. But, with determination, positive 
thinking and sincerity on the part of all the 
responsible Malaysian e"lite goodwill may some day 
triumph in the country. 
Not eý: -;: 
I The Malaysian Parliament has passed an act, that is, 
Muslim Courts (C riminal Jurisdiction) Act 1955, Act of 
Parliament n o. 23 pf 1965, which provides t hat 
Shari4ah courts cannot preside over a criminal case if 
the Judgement e xceeds a prison sente nce of over six 
months or a fine of $M1,000 or both. 
2 There have, however, been cases where the teachers 
themselves have overstepped the limit prescribed. 
3 One of those who -argued that Islam impeded material 
development was Max Weber. See Ma x, Weber, The 
Sociology of Religion (trans. by R. Fischoff), Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964. 
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APPENDIX A: 
OUR NATION, MALAYSIA, being dedicated to achieving a 
greater unity of all her peoples; to maintaining a 
democratic way of life; to creating a just society in 
which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably 
shared; to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and 
diverse cultural traditions, to building a progressive 
society which shall be oriented to modern science and 
technology; 
WE, her people, pledge our united efforts to attain 
those ends guided by these principles: - 
Belief in God 
Loyalty to King and Country 
Upholding the Constitution 
Rule of Law 
Good Behaviour and Morality 
(This translation of the Rukunegara declaration is 
taken from John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A 
St udy of UMNO & PAS, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann 
Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., 1980, p. 219. ). 
NASAB ATAU ASAL-USUL 
SYEIKH SAIYID MUHAMMAD BIN ABDULLAH AS-SUHAIMI 
Saiyidina 
Muhammad 
Rasufullah s. a. w. 
Nabi Muhammad s. a. w. telah bersabda: 5rtinya' 
,, TIsp-tl8P anak bagi seorang bapa 
maks nasabnya adalah kepada jJ, 
bapanyS, kecuall anak-anak Fatimah 
Siffina Saiyidina 
Fatimah 'Ali bin. 
maus sesungguh-nya akulah bapa U 
iýý U 
mereka, " 










Maghf ur Othman, who was born in Java, in his 
preliminary findings concerning Manaqib Syeikh Suhaimi 
among other things stated the following; 
1, Aurad Muhammadiyah in its activities stands on 
its own and is not a part of any other tariqat. 
ID According to the claim of the grandson of the 
tariýjat' s founder (Haji Taha Suhaimi), Syeikh 
Suhaimi received the aurad from the Prophet in the 
Kacbah, whereas in the original man, ý§! ýib, whose 
author was Fadhlullah Suhaimi (the son of Syeikh 
Suhaimi), this story has not been mentioned. 
3. The original maný§! Qib (authored by Fadhlullah 
Suhaimi >contains twenty f ive part s, whi 1et he 
edition produced by Taha Suhaimi has twenty nine 
parts. This means that Taha Suhaimi has added four 
parts, besides making a number of changes. The 
result of this change and addition causes those 
who practiced Aurad Muhammadiyah to deviate from 
the belief of Ahlus, Sunnah and prefer to enjoy all 
sorts of superstitious and amusing stories. 
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4. In the original manc7, iqib, Fadhlullah Suhaimi 
stated that Syeikh Suhaimi died in Klang in the 
year 1925, while in the Malay version [of Taha 
Suhaimil it is stated that he is not dead, but 
merely in temporary occultation and shall return 
as the Mahdf at the appointed hour. 
15. In the original man,; ýqib, [the author] has never 
declared Syeikh Suhaimi to be al- Mahdi. But i n the 
new mancý! Zib, there are additions and changes made 
with the clear intention of instilling Taha 
Suhaimi's own beliefs into the disciples of Aurad 
MuhammadLy ah, that is that the founder of the 
aurad will return as al-Mahdi. 
6. The son of Syeikh Suhaimi states that his fa- 
ther's name is Muhammad Suhaimi b. Abdullah and 
not Muhammad b. Abdullah as-Suhaimi as written in 
the Malay version of the man; ýiqib. 
7. In the original man,; a-qib, the author has only 
written the genealogy of Syeikh Suhaimi up to the 
name of Abu Bakar Asy-Syaibani. In the new 
man3qib, Taha Suhairni has written the , enealogy of g 
his grandfather until Rasulullah via Saidina 
Hussein. According to Taha Suhaimi, he has found 
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the genealogy of Abu Bakar Asy-Syaibani in the 
newspaper ar-Robitah. 
8. In the original man,; ýqib, it is not stated from 
where the Aurad Muhammadiyah has been taken, while 
in the new mancý! Zib, it is stated that Syeikh 
Suhaimi received the aurad directly from the 
Prophet in the Kar-bah. 
In the I new] manifa(aib, it is stated that the 
forest at Alas Kotonggo is really the city of the 
aulial . 
People living around Alas Kotonggo are members of 
a society still strongly influenced by mystical 
teachings plus Hindu-Buddhist beliefs. According 
to the traditional belief of Tavanese society, 
Alas Kotonggo is the place of gods (dewa-dewa)l 
and it is regarded as a sacred place in their 
rel igi on. 
10. In the Mangýjib of Syeikh Muhammad Suhaimi 
there is the prediction of layabaya (Javanese - 
Joyoboyo) that foretold the birth of a Tavanese 
person who shall one day be known as Ratu Adil. 
From this prediction, 7aha Suhaimi claimed that 
Ratu Adil is none other than Syeikh Suhaimi as he 
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is of Javanese-Arab descent. loyoboyo was a 
lavanese king, whose religion was Buddhism. 
11. It should be noted that the original Mangqib 
of Syeikh Suhaimi was written by Hj. Fadhlullah 
Suhaimi in the Javanese language in the year 1931, 
that is, about six years after the death of Syeikh 
Suhaimi. Besides being the son, Fadhlullah Suhaimi 
was also a student who was most intimate with his 
father. In his work, there is nothing which states 
that Syeikh Suhaimi has vanished and will return 
at the end of time as Imam Mahdi. He admitted that 
his father was really dead and buried at Klang, 
Selangor. It was Hj- Taha who made the additions 
and changes in the Malay translated version of the 
work in 1967, that is some 36 years after the 
death of Syeikh Suhaimi. 
Translated and Quoted from Al-Haqir Hamizan Hussin, 
Mengapa Usta-z- Mckhtar Keluar Dari Al-Ar2am, K1131a 
Lumpur: Penerbitan al-Hijrah, 1986. 
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